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THE  ARMY  OF  1918 


BY 

COLONEL  ROBERT  R.  McCORMICK 


NEW  YORK 

HARCOURT,  BRACE  AND  HOWE 

1920 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
Robert  R.  McCormick 


TO  OUR  DEAD 


J.3542S 


FOREWORD 

In  the  early  days  of  my  service,  while  on  duty 
with  the  General  Staff  of  the  A.  E.  F.,  I  expected 
to  publish  my  observations  upon  the  development 
and  conduct  of  that  army ;  but  when  the  war  came 
to  a  sudden  and  unexpected  end,  after  a  campaign 
in  which  I  had  no  part,  I  abandoned  the  idea. 

Now,  however,  more  than  a  year  has  passed 
since  the  armistice.  The  great  army  has  gone 
back  into  civil  life.  The  Regular  Army  is  rap- 
idly returning  to  its  bureaucracy.  Congress  ap- 
pears farther  from  adopting  a  military  policy 
than  at  any  period  in  the  last  decade.  The  Na- 
tional Guard  Association  wants  to  smash  the 
Regular  Army;  and  the  pacifists,  as  though  en- 
couraged by  the  forest  of  white  crosses  they  have 
caused  to  be  planted  in  Europe,  work  for  that  day 
when  they  may  see  even  more  American  dead  than 
there  now  are  in  France,  even  as  the  harvest  ex- 
ceeds the  sowing. 


vi  FOREWORD 

I  have,  therefore,  again  changed  my  mind,  and 
have  recorded  here  my  observations  and  conclu- 
sions as  a  modest  contribution  to  popular  com- 
prehension of  our  effort,  its  difficulties,  its  limi- 
tations and  its  achievements,  so  that  another  gen- 
eration as  untrained,  unorganized  and  unarmed 
as  we  were  may  not  have  to  face  an  enemy  under 
the  fearful  handicaps  we  suffered. 

Robert  R.  McCobmick. 

November  1919. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Foreword v 

CHAPTER 

I    The  Background  of  the  Army      ...  1 

II    The  Inspired  Ambassador 29 

III  Early  Days  op  the  A.  E.  F 39 

IV  The  Great  Division 58 

V    Germany's  Last  Offensive 91 

VI    A  Few  Technical  Points 112 

VII    The  Pursuit  from  the  Marne      .     .     .  145 

VIII    The  American  Offensives 155 

IX    Some  Elements  of  National  Defense    .  195 

X    New  Weapons  and  Their  Use       .     .     .  207 

XI    The  General  Staff 231 

XII    The  Crime  of  Silence 244 

XIII    The  Only  Solution 253 


THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  BACKGEOUND  OF  THE  AEMT 

In  January  of  1917  Germany  decided  to  risk 
war  with  ns  because  she  thought  that  we  were 
more  formidable  to  her  success  as  a  neutral  than 
we  would  be  as  an  enemy. 

As  a  neutral  we  kept  her  from  making  the 
maximum  use  of  her  submarines ;  as  an  enemy  we 
could  only  try  to.  If  her  submarines  were  suc- 
cessful, she  had  nothing  to  fear  from  our  mil- 
itary power;  if  unsuccessful,  as  after  months  of 
effort  on  her  part  and  anxiety  on  ours  they  turned 
out  to  be,  she  still  felt  no  apprehension  of  dan- 
ger from  our  land  forces. 

She  had  watched  the  efforts  made  in  America 
for  a  more  powerful  army;  she  had  seen  Presi- 
dent Wilson  tentatively  adopt  the  idea  and  had 
seen  him  abandon  it ;  she  had  observed  a  secretary 
of  war  (Garrison)  who  was  committed  to  it  jetti- 


^/\;  -    THEjARM^  OF  1918 

soned  and  replaced  by  a  pacifist  (Baker)  who  car- 
ried Ohio  for  Mr.  Wilson's  reelection  in  1916,  on 
the  watchword  **He  kept  us  out  of  war!'' 

She  had  just  witnessed  a  demonstration  of  our 
military  impotence  in  the  mobilization  of  all  our 
armed  forces  on  the  Rio  Grande  to  resist  the  pro- 
jected Mexican  invasion. 

Any  German  who  fought  against  us  in  1918 
and  who  reads  the  German  secret  service  reports 
on  our  1916  farce  must  believe  that  we  had  been 
deliberately  fooling  the  observers. 

Germany  also  knew  that  the  Military  Affairs 
Committee  of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  was 
controlled  by  a  clique  that  would — as  it  did — put 
every  obstacle  in  the  way  of  military  improve- 
ment. She  knew  that  never  in  our  history  had  we 
organized  an  army  fit  to  take  the  field  in  less  than 
two  years.  She  knew,  and  in  this  particular  she 
was  entirely  right,  that  we  did  not  have  and 
could  not  manufacture  arms  for  an  army  of  de- 
cisive size  during  the  months  she  expected  to 
employ  in  winning  the  war  on  land. 

Germany  knew,  likewise,  that  the  only  organ- 
ized forces  in  America,  the  Eegular  Army  and  the 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY         3 

National  Guard,  were  antagonistic.  The  ancient 
quarrel  between  them  and  the  new  elements  of 
friction  which  would  arise  in  the  development  of 
the  new  mobilization  could  be  expected  to  militate 
against  our  efforts  in  the  field. 

Since  this  domestic  military  antagonism  has 
continued  throughout  the  war  and  is  now  one  of 
the  chief  obstacles  to  a  safe  military  policy,  it  is 
desirable  to  outline  its  history,  which  began  long 
before  that  of  the  nation,  in  an  effort  to  find  a 
solution  that  will  bring  harmony  and  efficiency 
into  our  army  councils. 

Antagonism  on  the  part  of  the  people  toward  a 
regular  army  comes  to  us  from  English  history. 
After  Cromwell  overthrew  King  Charles  I.  and 
Parliament,  he  ruled  for  a  quarter  of  a  century, 
a  military  despot  crushing  all  opposition  with  the 
sword.  Upon  the  Restoration,  Parliament  re- 
sisted all  the  efforts  of  Charles  11.  to  establish  a 
new  regular  army ;  this  resistance  was  only  partly 
successful. 

James  II.  increased  the  military  forces  of  his 
brother;  used  them  to  suppress  the  insurrection 
under  Monmouth,  and  followed  the  military  vie- 


4  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

tory  at  Sedgemoor  with  a  bloody  persecution  that 
is  still  remembered  with  horror. 

To  overthrow  James  II.,  William  III.  had  to 
bring  with  him  from  Holland  a  mercenary  force 
of  Dutch  and  Swedes,  whose  unpopularity  is  pre- 
served to  us  by  the  meaning  attached  to  the  word 
** blackguard*' — the  name  (Black  Guard)  of  one 
of  his  household  regiments. 

The  vicissitudes  of  the  mother  country  were  not 
felt  acutely  in  the  colonies,  but  the  refugees  of  all 
parties  that  crossed  to  America  brought  with 
them  their  political  opinions  and  their  grievances, 
and  among  these  we  find  a  fixed  hostility  towards 
*'the  regulars." 

Frontier  life  in  the  new  country  made  it  neces- 
sary for  men  to  acquire  skill  in  arms  and  reintro- 
duced the  condition  of  armed  freeman,  of  which 
increasing  civilization  had  deprived  the  old  coun- 
try. To  defend  themselves  against  the  Indians, 
the  colonials  had  to  organize  military  forces. 

In  the  French  and  Indian  wars,  British  regular 
troops  were  sent  to  America  and  colonial  militia 
were  enrolled  by  the  several  colonies,  particularly 
in  New  England.     The   regulars   and  colonials 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY         8 

were  never  congenial  allies;  ill  feeling  existed 
on  both  sides.  The  resentment  of  the  colo- 
nials was  accentuated  by  a  regulation  which 
made  the  most  junior  oflfioer  of  the  King's  army 
senior  to  every  officer  in  the  colonial  forces.  It* 
was  because  of  this  regulation  that  Colonel 
George  Washington  retired  from  active  military 
duty  until  he  returned  to  fight  against  his  former 
associates. 

One  may  properly  speculate  upon  how  far  this 
regulation  was  responsible  for  the  Revolution. 
Merchants  were  vexed  at  taxation,  lawyers  were 
indignant  at  the  continuous  violation  of  natural 
rights,  legislators  resented  unjustified  and  arro- 
gant interference  with  their  powers.  But  what 
could  all  these  have  done  if  the  colonial  soldiers 
had  not  been  willing  to  fight  their  recent  com- 
rades! 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  shadow  of  this 
regulation,  strangely  incorporated  into  our  serv- 
ice, is  today  one  of  the  causes  of  hostility  be- 
tween officers  of  the  American  regular  army  and 
officers  of  the  other  corps. 

The  American  Revolutionary  war  was  a  conflict 


6  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

between  the  regular  army  of  England  and  the 
colonial  militia  of  the  French  and  Indian  wars, 
although  the  British  were  reinforced  by  German 
mercenaries,  and  the  Americans  by  French  regu- 
lars and  by  German,  Polish  and  French  officers, 
who  entered  the  American  service  as  soldiers  of 
fortune. 

Necessities  of  space  prevent  any  extended  dis- 
cussion of  this  war,  but  two  important  features 
challenge  our  attention :  First,  the  regular  troops 
generally  outfought  the  militia;  and,  second,  the 
militia  generals,  risen  in  a  field  of  free  competi- 
tion, generally  outmaneuvered  the  generals  who 
came  into  authority  by  the  routine  of  the  British 
regular  army. 

Also,  it  is  a  significant  coincidence  of  this  war 
that  the  American  admiral,  the  greatest  naval 
man  America  ever  produced,  came  into  the  navy 
from  the  merchant  service. 

After  the  formation  of  our  nation.  President 
Washington  endeavored  to  formulate  a  national 
military  policy.  He  had  observed  the  breakdown 
of  the  British  regulars  and  he  had  seen  the  fal- 
lacy of  the  untrained  militia. 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY         7 

Recognizing  that  officers  must  be  chosen  for 
ability  and  activity  rather  than  for  length  of 
service,  he  had  mortally  offended  his  old  friend, 
General  Knox,  at  the  time  of  the  expected  war 
with  France,  by  not  appointing  him  one  of  the 
lieutenant  generals  because  of  advanced  age. 
Had  Washington  installed  a  permanent  military 
policy  for  the  United  States  we  should  have 
avoided  many  of  our  subsequent  defeats  and 
heavy  losses  of  life. 

Unfortunately,  after  Washington  the  leader- 
ship of  the  nation  was  taken  by  a  word  man 
(Thomas  Jefferson)  who  never  had  entered  a 
battle  and  never  intended  to,  and  who,  in  playing 
fast  and  loose  with  our  military  system,  exercised 
the  same  freedom  that  characterizes  all  slackers 
and  pacifists.  He  made  of  the  army  a  constab- 
ulary to  garrison  objectionable  army  posts,  and  he 
fastened  upon  it  a  character  which  has  limited  its 
efficiency  to  the  present  day. 

In  1812  there  was  no  regular  force  adequate  to 
conduct  a  war.  There  was  no  such  militia  as  cap- 
tured Louisburg  and  Havana  and  defended 
Bunker  Hill.     As  a  consequence,  Detroit,  Buf- 


8  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

falo  and  Washington  were  captured  and  bnrned, 
wMle  New  Orleans  was  saved  to  the  nation  only- 
through  the  genius  of  Andrew  Jackson. 

The  battle  of  New  Orleans  was  one  of  those 
rare  fights  where  undisciplined  troops  have  van- 
quished regulars.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  they 
were  led  by  a  man  whose  talents  approached 
genius,  while  the  British  regular  troops  were  com- 
manded by  a  man  who,  notwithstanding  twenty 
years'  campaigning  under  England's  greatest 
living  general,  could  not  learn  the  principles  of 
war.  A  wrong  lesson  is  likely  to  be  learned  from 
this  battle — namely,  that  raw  troops  are  equal  to 
veterans.  The  correct  lesson  is  that  a  general 
promoted  according  to  the  routine  of  a  regular 
army  threw  away  the  advantage  he  held  in  com^ 
manding  a  trained  army. 

Thirty-four  years  after  the  battle  of  New  Or- 
leans the  United  States  fought  a  war  with  Mexico 
which  had  a  character  all  its  own  among  American 
wars,  in  that  it  was  a  war  brought  on  by  our  Gov- 
ernment, and  not  a  war  in  which  the  people  as  a 
whole  were  vitally  interested. 

By  order  of  President  James  K.  Polk,  the  regu- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY         9 

lar  army  was  concentrated  on  the  Mexican  fron- 
tier in  January  of  1846.  It  moved  upon  Mexico  in 
September,  forced  Mexico  into  war,  attacked  and 
invariably  defeated  the  Mexican  armies.  It  was 
a  war  of  conquest,  like  the  European  wars  of  the 
previous  century,  and,  like  them,  was  conducted, 
for  the  greater  part,  by  a  professional  army.  As 
a  military  and  political  venture  it  was  completely 
successful. 

But  it  entailed  political  consequences  not  at  all 
to  the  fancy  of  its  creators.  One  of  the  success- 
ful generals,  Zachary  Taylor,  was  elected  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  and  the  other,  Winfield 
Scott,  became  a  constant  candidate,  endeavoring 
to  attract  popular  support  by  a  display  of  mili- 
tary pomp.  Whatever  popularity  might  have  ac- 
crued to  the  regular  army  from  its  successful  con- 
duct of  the  war,  it  was  dissipated  by  the  attempts 
of  its  most  successful  leader  to  capitalize  in  the 
political  arena  its  achievements  on  the  field  of 
battle. 

Largely  in  consequence  of  this  the  army  was 
again  reduced  to  the  status  of  a  constabulary  and 
posted  along  the  Indian  frontier  west  of  Kansas 


10  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

and  in  the  territory  newly  acquired  from  Mexico. 
Its  officers  had  the  benefit  of  an  able  primary  edu- 
cation at  West  Point  academy,  but  after  gradua- 
tion were  left  to  shift  for  themselves  for  any  fur- 
ther learning. 

Many  volumes  of  military  history  have  been 
written  about  our  Civil  war;  but  little  emphasis 
has  been  laid  upon  the  extraordinary  political 
conditions  at  the  time  the  war  began.  Early  his- 
torians assumed  that  their  readers  were  fully  in- 
formed of  these  facts.  Military  critics  have 
merely  ignored  them.  No  military  lessons  can  be 
drawn,  however,  without  recognizing  the  compel- 
ling political  considerations. 

During  the  years  immediately  preceding  seces- 
sion, the  national  government  of  the  United 
States  was  in  the  hands  of  the  future  secession- 
ists. The  leader  of  rebellion  in  1861,  Jefferson 
Davis,  was  in  1857  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the 
United  States.  The  President  of  the  United 
States  in  1861,  Abraham  Lincoln,  belonged  to  a 
party  which  was  in  the  minority  in  1860. 

The  military  revolution  attempted  by  the  South 
in  April,  1861,  was  preceded  by  a  political  revo- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY       11 

lution  in  1860.  War  was  declared,  in  effect,  by 
the  southern  states  by  their  resolutions  of  seces- 
sion before  Lincoln  became  president  and  while 
the  administration  was  unwilling  to  oppose  or  in- 
terfere with  armed  rebellion. 

In  its  inception  the  war  for  the  preservation 
of  the  Union  was,  therefore,  exactly  opposite  in 
character  to  the  war  for  conquest  in  the  southwest 
in  1846. 

In  the  earlier  combat  the  Government  of  the 
nation  used  its  existing  military  force  to  over- 
come a  weak  neighbor.  In  the  present  case,  the 
Government  of  the  nation  had  to  use  such  ele- 
ments of  the  nation  as  would  support  it  to  over- 
come the  rebellious  sections. 

The  new  administration  had  no  knowledge  of 
military  affairs;  it  did  not  know  the  officers  of 
the  army,  and,  in  the  early  days,  when  many  distin- 
guished officers  were  violating  their  oaths  of  loy- 
alty, it  did  not  even  know  which  ones  it  could 
trust. 

Where  the  regular  army  moved  into  Mexico  in 
1846  in  mere  obedience  to  orders,  without  any  con- 
viction of  right  and  with  no  stronger  incentive 


12  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

than  professional  ambition,  the  Union  army  of 
1861  was  composed  entirely  of  men  inspired  by 
the  most  lofty  convictions,  bnt  with  little,  if  any, 
feeling  of  a  legal  obligation  to  fight. 

If  the  army  of  1846  may  be  compared  to  the 
armies  of  Eichelieu  and  Louis  XIV.,  the  army  of 
1861  was  like  the  original  army  of  Cromwell,  and, 
like  the  Cromwellian  army,  its  officers  were  chosen 
for  the  force  of  their  moral  leadership  and  not 
from  any  conception  of  the  military  skill  needed 
to  lead  men  into  battle. 

The  Union  troops  were  raised  by  states,  and 
commissions  up  to  the  rank  of  colonel  were  is- 
sued by  governors.  Generals  at  the  beginning 
were  appointed  largely  upon  the  recommendation 
of  loyal  congressmen. 

Armies  were  thrown  into  action  within  a  few 
weeks  of  the  original  assembly  of  the  men  and, 
naturally,  disasters  resulted. 

The  antagonism  which  had  characterized  the 
cooperation  between  the  British  regulars  and  the 
colonials  reappeared  between  the  American  regu- 
lars and  the  American  volunteers.  There  was  a 
great  deal  of  fault  on  both  sides.    Without  train- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY        IS 

ing  or  experience,  no  civilian,  howsoever  able,  is 
ready  to  perform  the  duties  of  a  high  ranking 
officer.  Inevitably,  therefore,  civilians  appointed 
to  high  rank  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  failed  in 
the  field.  On  the  other  hand,  many  civilians  de- 
veloped into  excellent  generals. 

Mere  training  and  experience,  however,  will 
not  fit  a  dull  man  for  high  command;  and  many 
regular  officers,  who  were  given  their  appoint- 
ments for  no  better  reason  than  that  they  had 
received  preliminary  education  at  West  Point, 
failed  as  dismally  as  the  amateurs. 

If  it  justly  may  be  charged  against  the  volun- 
teers that  they  caused  generals  to  be  made  who 
were  without  the  requisite  training,  it  also  may 
be  charged  against  the  regulars  that  they  caused 
generals  to  be  retained  after  they  had  proven 
their  unfitness. 

The  most  glaring  example  of  this  sort  was  that 
of  General  Sherman,  who  removed  the  brilliant 
and  capable  Logan  and  replaced  him  with  the  de- 
feated and  discredited  Howard.  This  mistake  of 
Sherman  *s  was  fully  recognized  by  Grant,  but 
the  injury  had  been  done. 


14  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Logan,  as  vindictive  as  he  was  brilliant,  for 
years  afterwards  was  the  leader  in  the  Senate  of 
the  *^ volunteer'*  faction  against  the  ** regulars'' 
and  contributed  much  to  perpetuate  the  feud  be- 
tween the  services. 

Stripped  of  hostility  and  prejudice,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  assign  the  regular  army  to  its  proper 
place  in  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  to  point 
out  its  limitations,  and  to  show  where  the  volun- 
teer system  did  help  decisively  in  the  victory. 

The  regular  army  was  the  national  reservoir 
of  military  knowledge.  All  volunteers  had  to  go 
to  it  to  learn  the  elements  of  military  conduct. 
The  regular  army  furnished  an  indispensable 
framework  around  which  the  conquering  armies 
were  built.  It  furnished  most  of  the  successful 
officers  of  high  rank,  and  the  greatest  soldiers 
produced  by  the  war  had,  at  some  period  of  their 
lives,  served  in  it. 

It  did  not,  however,  as  an  organization  per  se, 
produce  the  victorious  commander  nor  his  prin- 
cipal lieutenants. 

It  is  customary  to  look  upon  General  Ulysses 
S.  Grant  as  an  officer  of  the  regular  army.    The 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY        15 

regular  army  claims  him  from  the  volunteers. 
Yet  he  entered  the  war  in  spite  of  the  regular 
army;  and  the  regular  army  today  would  fight 
bitterly  against  permitting  another  officer  to  rise 
to  power  as  he  rose. 

Grant  was  graduated  from  the  West  Point 
Military  Academy  and  served  for  several  years 
before  the  Mexican  campaign  as  an  officer  of  in- 
fantry. In  that  campaign  he  displayed  excep- 
tional brilliancy,  a  brilliancy  which  ought  to  have 
received  instant  recognition  but  did  not.  It  is 
a  congenital  fault  of  our  regular  army  to  fail  to 
recognize  exceptional  conduct.  Shortly  after  the 
Mexican  war  he  resigned  from  the  army.  Rumor 
says  that  intemperance  was  the  cause.  There  is 
no  evidence  to  indicate  that  the  regular  army 
made  any  effort  to  save  for  itself  the  hero  of  San 
Cosme  church  and  the  future  savior  of  the  Union. 

With  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  war  Grant 
sought  employment  from  General  George  B.  Mc- 
Clellan,  commander-in-chief  of  the  Union  forces, 
and  a  regular  army  man.  He  got  no  answers  to 
his  letters,  nor  did  he  obtain  so  much  as  an  inter- 
view. 


16  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

He  went  to  work  in  the  office  of  the  Adjutant 
General  of  the  state  of  Illinois,  and  was  appointed 
colonel  of  an  Illinois  regiment  by  Governor 
Yates  of  Illinois.  He  was  afterwards  ap- 
pointed brigadier  general  by  President  Lincoln 
at  the  unanimous  request  of  the  Illinois  congress- 
men. Thus,  the  volunteer  service  supplied  that 
which  the  regular  service  denied — opportunity  to 
genius. 

Placed  by  accident  in  a  locality  which  did  not 
interest  those  in  authority,  he  marched  from  vic- 
tory to  victory  while  the  regular  army  generals 
were  adding  defeat  to  defeat.  After  each  victory 
his  command  was  taken  away  from  him,  and  he 
was  left  unemployed  until  the  failure  of  his  suc- 
cessor compelled  the  reemployment  of  the  genius. 

Eventually,  he  brought  to  the  Union  arms  the 
most  complete  triumph  in  the  history  of  war ;  and 
today  military  writers  who  rave  over  the 
marches,  even  the  failures,  of  lesser  men  are  busy 
trying  to  explain  away  the  victories  of  a  leader 
whose  rise  was  so  unorthodox. 

If  there  was  a  Grant,  a  Napoleon,  or  a  Marl- 
borough in  the  recent  world  war,  he  was  not 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY       17 

allowed  to  rise.  The  regular  army  system  of  sup- 
pressing brilliant  men  who  might  surpass  all 
their  seniors  was  sufficiently  in  vogue  in  all  the 
belligerent  countries  from  1914  to  1918. 

The  close  of  the  Civil  war  left  us  with  a  splen- 
did organization,  and  with  a  realization  of  the 
necessity  of  allowing  native  ability  free  play,  as 
well  as  of  the  value  of  military  training. 

No  adequate  military  legislation  resulted,  how- 
ever, and  the  regular  army  went  back  to  chasing 
Indians. 

The  nation  in  1865  felt  supremely  strong  in  the 
possession  of  a  million  trained  soldiers,  thousands 
of  trained  officers,  and  generals  of  the  highest 
order.  This  feeling  lasted  long  after  the  soldiers 
had  passed  military  age.  A  few  of  the  volunteer 
regiments  maintained  their  organization,  but  with 
a  character  in  which  the  social  and  political  fea- 
tures gained  ground  at  the  expense  of  the  mili- 
tary. 

After  the  Civil  war  military  drill  was  taught  in 
schools  and  colleges ;  but  this  decreased  every  year 
and  passed  out  of  existence  about  the  time  of  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  with  Spain. 


18  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

The  Spanish  war  again  bears  a  character  en- 
tirely different  from  all  our  other  wars.  It  was 
a  spontaneous  crusade  to  end  Spanish  misrule  in 
Cuba  and  was  brought  about  by  the  insistence  of 
public  opinion. 

Neither  the  administration  of  President  Cleve- 
land, which  left  office  in  the  Spring  of  1897,  nor 
that  of  President  McKinley,  which  succeeded,  de- 
sired or  anticipated  such  a  conflict.  The  regular 
army  was  small,  unorganized,  ill-equipped,  and 
commanded  by  men  whom  advanced  age  had  de- 
prived of  their  once  not  insignificant  military 
powers. 

Enthusiasm  for  the  war  with  Spain  was  intense. 
Volunteers  offered  themselves  much  faster  than 
the  military  authorities  could  prepare  to  accept 
them,  and  a  form  of  organization  was  adopted 
similar  to  that  of  the  Union  army  in  the  Civil  war. 
President  McKinley  took  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunity to  conciliate  the  southern  states  by  ap- 
pointing to  high  command  old  men  who  in  their 
youth  had  been  prominent  in  the  armies  of  the 
Confederacy. 

Events,  however,  took  all  initiative  out  of  the 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY        19 

hands  of  the  Government.  Admiral  Sampson 
blockaded  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Cervera  in  the 
harbor  of  Santiago,  Cuba,  and  demanded  military 
forces  to  drive  it  to  sea.  Hardly  had  the  army, 
comprised  almost  entirely  of  regular  troops,  suc- 
ceeded in  this,  when  yellow  fever  threatened  it 
with  extinction.  From  this  it  was  rescued  by  the 
forcefulness  of  Colonel  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who, 
overcoming  the  inertia  of  regular  channels,  com- 
pelled the  removal  of  the  expedition  to  Long 
Island. 

Meantime,  Admiral  Dewey's  victory  of  May, 
1898,  in  Manila  Bay  had  led  to  complications  both 
with  native  insurrectionary  forces  and  with  Ger- 
many which  made  necessary  the  sending  of  an 
expedition  across  the  Pacific.  This  expedition, 
made  up  nearly  altogether  of  volunteers  from  the 
western  states,  armed  with  old-fashioned  rifles, 
was  successful  in  capturing  the  city  of  Manila 
from  the  Spaniards,  and,  later,  in  defeating  a 
native  army  which  attacked  the  Americans. 

The  vast  majority  of  the  volunteers  in  the  Span- 
ish war  were  never  engaged,  but  were  concen- 
trated in  training  camps  without  adequate  equip- 


20  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

ment  or  organization  where  they  suffered  the 
ravages  of  disease. 

Five  officers  developed  conspicuous  abilities  in 
these  struggles^ — ^Wood,  Eoosevelt,  Bell,  Funston 
and  Pershing — three  of  them  volunteers  and  two 
captains  in  the  regular  army. 

Although  successful  in  every  campaign,  it  was 
recognized  that  the  American  army  was  grossly 
inefficient. 

From  the  close  of  the  Spanish-Philippine  war, 
therefore,  dates  the  improvement  in  our  military 
services  which  contributed  toi  America's  being 
able,  at  the  decisive  moment,  to  put  into  the  field 
enough  battle-worthy  troops  to  turn  the  defeat 
of  the  allies  into  victory;  and  this  in  spite  of  a 
weak  administration  at  Washington.  This  im- 
provement was  the  achievement  of  the  soldiers 
themselves,  the  secretaries  of  war,  and  the  vol- 
unteer spirit  of  our  militia.  No  other  statesmen, 
except  President  Roosevelt,  himself  a  soldier, 
ever  helped. 

In  the  regular  army  the  leadership  was  as- 
sumed by  men  who  had  won  high  rank  in  Cuba 
and  the  Philippines.    They  gathered  about  them, 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY       21 

in  important  staff  positions,  officers  of  demon- 
strated fitness,  although  they  could  not  advance 
them  over  slothful  and  stupid  ones  because  of  the 
seniority  law.  For  the  first  time  in  our  history, 
however,  the  framework  of  a  general  staff  was 
formed.  A  war  college  was  established  in  Wash- 
ington for  the  study  of  military  problems ;  schools 
were  opened  for  instruction  in  the  technical  de- 
tails of  army  duties,  ranging  from  horseshoeing 
and  baking  to  artillery  practice  and  logistics. 
Real  progress  was  made  in  acquiring  technique, 
and  with  it  came  a  corresponding  rise  in  morale. 
These  steps  were  not  taken  without  opposition. 
The  army  figures  largely  in  the  expenditures  of 
government.  The  beneficiaries  were  long  accus- 
tomed to  their  profit.  To  improve  the  old  army 
meant  to  disturb  many  of  these  powerful  and 
greedy  recipients  of  congressional  appropriations. 
Progress  also  disturbed  the  lazy  and  the  incom- 
petent among  the  officers.  These  like  certain  ad- 
mirals of  the  present  day  struck  hands  with  the 
profiteers  and  furnished  ** expert  testimony'* 
against  all  reforms.    Improvement  became  harder 


2S  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

and  harder  and  practically  stopped  after  Roose- 
velt left  the  White  House. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  National  Guard  was  pro- 
ceeding no  less  sincerely  in  its  more  modest 
sphere. 

When  the  regiments  of  volunteers  were  reor- 
ganized after  the  Spanish  war  only  men  of  mili- 
tary bent  remained.  A  strong  desire  for  better- 
ment existed,  but  the  state  governments  furnished 
little  financial  and  no  educational  help.  Troops 
commissioned  by  the  states,  with  commendable 
inconsistency,  appealed  to  the  national  govern- 
ment for  aid.  The  government,  by  acts  of  Con- 
gress, thereupon  began  to  furnish  uniforms,  rifles 
and  instructors,  and,  in  return,  has  kept  a  certain 
check  upon  the  numbers  and  efficiency  of  state 
troops. 

Unfortunately,  the  relations  between  the  Na- 
tional Guard  and  the  Regular  Army  again  as- 
sumed the  character  of  their  ancient  grudge.  The 
soldierly  element  did  not  rise  in  the  National 
Guard  Association.  The  National  Guard  gen- 
erals were,  for  the  most  part,  politicians,  and 
politicians  who  belittled  the  knowledge  and  pur- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY       «» 

poses  of  professional  soldiers  to  conceal  their 
own  ignorance,  an  example  which,  it  is  worth 
noting,  was  followed  in  1918  by  certain  regulars 
who  were  unable  to  grasp  the  modern  tactics  of 
their  French  instructors,  and  who  sought  to  hide 
their  incapacity  with  a  similar  abuse  of  learning. 

The  Regular  Army,  for  its  part,  did  its  work 
grudgingly  because  it  objected  to  the  recognition 
of  any  military  organization  except  its  own.  In 
spite  of  all  obstacles,  many  National  Guard  offi- 
cers and  organizations  absorbed  much  of  the 
knowledge  the  regulars  had  to  teach,  and  with 
this  knowledge  attained  a  degree  of  discipline  and 
organization  hitherto  unknown  in  militia  troops 
in  time  of  peace. 

The  Philippine  insurrection  and  the  Boxer  out- 
break in  China  in  1900  kept  the  army  before  the 
public  eye  for  a  short  while.  Domestic  problems 
became  acute,  and  military  affairs  were  left  to 
army  officers,  national  guardsmen,  and  the  War 
Department,  and  by  all  of  these  they  were  at- 
tended to  with  a  devotion  for  which  the  nation 
may  well  feel  a  deep  and  lasting  gratitude. 

Neither  the  Russo-Japanese  war  in  Manchuria 


34  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

in  1904-5,  nor  the  Italian-Turkish  war  in  1910, 
nor  the  wars  in  the  Balkans  in  1911-13, 
created  much  stir  in  America.  It  was  not  until 
the  great  war  broke  out  in  Europe  in  1914  that  the 
public  agitated  itself  about  military  affairs,  and 
then,  unfortunately,  to  little  purpose.  There  was 
an  element  in  the  nation,  inconsiderable  in  num- 
bers but  strong  in  organization,  in  platform  speak- 
ers, in  writers  and  in  financial  backing  which,  com- 
posed of  men  who  determined  that  under  no  cir- 
cumstances would  they  ever  fight  for  their  coun- 
try, devoted  itself  to  preventing  the  men  that 
would  fight  from  being  given  a  fair  chance  for 
their  lives  and  for  victory.  The  pacifists  were 
against  any  plan  for  national  defense  and,  of 
course,  against  whatever  plan  at  the  moment 
seemed  likely  to  receive  congressional  sanction. 

This  opposition  would  have  been  swept  aside, 
however,  but  that  the  Regular  Army  and  the  Na- 
tional Guard  failed  to  agree  upon  a  method  for 
increasing  the  military  efficiency  of  the  nation. 

In  1911  a  federal  appropriation  had  been  pro- 
vided which  furnished  funds  for  such  units  of  the 
National  Guard  as  measured  up  to  standards  es- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY       25 

tablished  by  the  Regular  Army.  The  measure 
which  carried  this  appropriation  designated  the 
National  Guard  as  the  second  line  of  defense  of 
the  Union,  to  be  mobilized  before  volunteers 
should  be  called  for. 

In  1915  the  Secretary  of  War,  Lindley  M.  Gar- 
rison, introduced  a  bill  creating  an  army  to  be 
known  as  the  ** Continental  Army,'*  to  be  organ- 
ized among  civilians  under  the  direction  of  the 
Regular  Army,  with  junior  officers  from  the  Re- 
serve Corps.  The  new  army  was  to  take  prece- 
dence over  the  National  Guard.  This  measure  was 
vigorously  opposed  by  the  National  Guard  and 
was  never  pushed  to  passage.  Its  only  effect  was 
to  revive  and  increase  the  animosity  between  the 
regular  and  non-regular  services. 

In  1915  Major  General  Leonard  Wood,  then 
commanding  the  eastern  department,  with  head- 
quarters in  New  York,  organized  a  volunteer 
training  camp  at  Plattsburg,  N.  Y.  The  plan  met 
with  instantaneous  and  enthusiastic  success. 
Camps  were  established  in  other  parts  of  the 
country,  and  in  the  following  year  an  appropria- 


26  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

tion  was  obtained  from  Congress  to  defray  the 
expenses  of  the  student-officers. 

Colleges  also  renewed  their  interest  in  military- 
drill,  and,  acting  under  the  National  Guard  act, 
organized  various  units  for  the  training  of  the 
students. 

The  greatest  advance  toward  national  prepar- 
edness, however,  came  about,  not  through  the  ef- 
forts of  any  American,  but  through  the  initiative 
of  President  Carranza  of  Mexico. 

If  Jena  made  the  German  army  great,  and  if 
Sedan  did  the  same  for  the  French,  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  1916  made  the  American  army  of  1918  pos- 
sible. Up  to  June,  1916,  our  administration  had 
refused  to  take  any  military  steps  in  contempla- 
tion of  our  difficult  relations  with  Mexico.  Early 
in  that  month  General  Funston's  secret  service  in- 
tercepted a  Mexican  order  to  raid  the  states  of 
New  Mexico  and  Arizona  and  to  invade  Texas  in 
force,  capture  San  Antonio,  and,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Mexican  population,  reannex  the  south- 
western states  of  our  country  to  Mexico.  Panic 
ensued  in  Washington,  and  the  entire  National 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  ARMY        9.1 

Guard  was  ordered  to  muster  immediately  and 
proceed  to  the  Mexican  border. 

Unless  it  was  in  1898,  never  before  was  dis- 
played such  utter  lack  of  organization  and  mili- 
tary preparedness.  German  and  Mexican  secret 
service  operatives  might  well  have  reported  to 
their  superiors  that  America  was  as  incapable 
of  military  action  as  China. 

The  demonstration  was  not  only  sufficient,  how- 
ever, to  deter  the  Mexicans  from  proceeding  in 
their  plans,  but  it  had  other  far-reaching  effects. 
It  startled  the  people  and  the  administration  into 
a  realization  of  our  actual  weakness.  It  showed 
up  the  manifold  deficiencies  of  our  administration, 
and,  thanks  to  General  Funston  and  the  system  of 
training  he  installed  among  all  the  troops  in  his 
command,  it  formed  the  cadres  which  saved  us 
in  1918;  for  in  the  flotsam  and  jetsam  of  this 
wretched  affair  were  the  formations  which  were 
to  furnish  storm  troops  in  the  hour  of  need. 

It  is  a  strange  fact,  however,  that  when  it  found 
itself  at  war  with  Germany  the  Regular  army  did 
not  want  to  use  the  organized  forces  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  it  had  done  so  much  to  prepare. 


^8  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Eather,  it  would  begin  with  hordes  of  untrained 
men.  It  asserted  with  great  obstinacy  that  the 
only  function  of  National  Guard  troops  was  to 
guard  munition  factories  and  railroad  bridges 
and,  taking  advantage  of  a  panic  over  German 
plots,  got  them  safely  out  of  the  way  and  out  of 
training  and  doing  such  work  as  Clausewitz,  a 
German  general  staff  oflficer  of  a  century  ago,  as- 
signed to  the  Landsturm, 

The  National  Guard,  for  its  part,  organized  in 
different  states  in  units  of  battalions,  regiments 
and  brigades — there  were  even  two  divisions. — 
wanted  to  enter  the  national  service  intact. 

The  mobilization  of  1916  improved  the  feeling 
between  the  two  services,  but  did  not  heal  the 
breach.  Unhappily,  after  two  years  of  bloody 
war,  it  remains  open. 


CHAPTER  n 

THE  INSPIRED  AMBASSADOB 

Fob  some  months  after  the  declaration  of  war 
on  April  6,  1917,  the  German  calculations  ap- 
peared correct.  America  had  entered  the  war 
without  any  idea  of  how  she  was  to  wage  it.  The 
nation  was  not  unanimously  for  the  war.  The  ad- 
ministration let  weeks  pass  without  any  effort  to 
get  ready  for  the  stupendous  consequences  of  the 
course  it  had  adopted. 

Among  those  who  had  been  clamoring  for  war, 
a  great  number  argued  that  its  conduct  would 
merely  require  our  sending  the  fleet  to  tighten 
the  blockade,  putting  an  embargo  on  all  exports 
which  might  reach  Germany  through  neutral 
channels,  and  financing  the  allied  nations  in  arms 
against  her.  Others  demanded  that  a  volunteer 
army  should  be  sent  to  France  and  suggested  as 
its  commander  Colonel  Roosevelt,  the  only  man  in 
sight  who  could  raise  such  a  force.  Recruits  were 
insufficient  to  fill  either  the  Regular  army  or  the 

29 


30  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

National  Guard.  The  enthusiasm  which  brought 
on  and  characterized  the  war  with  Spain  was  lack- 
ing. America  had  considered  victory  for  the 
allies  as  practically  certain  after  the  battle  of 
the  Marne,  and  war  was  declared  in  this  belief. 

Then,  after  onr  declaration  of  war,  Germany 
won  the  great  victory  of  the  Spring  of  1917.  The 
British  and  French  had  hoped  to  win  a  decisive 
battle  by  a  joint  offensive.  Hindenbnrg  maneu- 
vered from  before  the  British  attack,  and  inflicted 
a  frightful  repulse  upon  General  Nivelle,  who  had 
replaced  the  cautious  and  successful  Joffre.  At 
the  same  time  it  began  to  appear  that  the  Eus- 
sian  revolution,  hailed  with  delight,  if  not  actually 
fomented,  by  the  allies,  was  taking  an  unexpected 
turn  and  that  the  Eussian  pressure  in  the  east 
would  be  withdrawn.  From  the  threshold  of  vic- 
tory the  allies  felt  themselves  on  the  brink  of  de- 
feat. France  decided  that  American  assistance 
had  become  imperative  and  sent  Field  Marshal 
Joffre,  victor  of  the  Marne,  to  get  it. 

Of  all  the  strangers  who  ever  came  to  our 
shore  JofPre  exercised  the  greatest  influence 
over  our  people  and  upon  our  destiny.    He  cap- 


THE  INSPIRED  AMBASSADOR  31 

tured  public  opinion  at  once,  and  the  people  im- 
posed his  recommendations  upon  Congress,  Presi- 
dent, and  army  alike.  His  appearance  was  so 
venerable,  his  manner  so  simple,  his  statements  of 
facts  so  devoid  of  artifice  and  revealing  condi- 
tions so  appalling  that  the  nation  was  stirred  to 
its  soul. 

He  told  us  that  France  was  on  the  verge  of  col- 
lapse. A  force  of  troops  must  be  sent  immedi- 
ately to  restore  the  shattered  national  morale. 
After  these  must  follow  an  army  of  gigantic  size. 
He  assured  us  that  our  volunteer  system,  then 
under  consideration,  never  could  provide  the  num- 
ber of  troops  needed  in  this  war;  nor  could  our 
army,  employing  the  tactics  taught  in  our  drill 
regulations,  exist  in  the  face  of  the  war- trained 
German  army,  equipped  with  arms  the  Americans 
had  never  even  seen.  France  would  furnish 
everything  she  had  in  equipment,  in  designs  for 
arms,  and  in  instruction.  He  gave  to  our  ord- 
nance department  the  secret  plans  of  the  famous 
.75  field  piece. 

At  first  the  American  authorities  attempted  to 
impose  a  censorship  upon  his  utterances.     The 


3g  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

text  of  his  first  public  speech  was  edited  by  his 
American  military  aide,  who  eliminated  his  opin- 
ions upon  American  military  organizations. 
Hearers  who  understood  French  supplied  the 
missing  fragments  of  his  speech  to  the  press,  and 
the  field  marshal  constantly  repeated  them  in  his 
private  conversations. 

Suddenly  the  nation  realized  that  it  had  entered 
a  fight  which  threatened  its  very  existence. 

From  that  moment  the  American  people  formed 
a  cohesion  of  purpose  such  as  never  had  existed 
in  our  national  life  and  which  lasted  throughout 
the  war.  The  administration  and  Congress 
marched  with  public  opinion. 

The  pacifists,  the  anti-Americans,  those  who 
had  fought  national  preparedness  in  Congress, 
were  for  the  moment  overwhelmed.  The  Draft  act, 
one  of  the  great  milestones  in  our  national  evolu- 
tion, and  one  that  future  historians  will  class  with 
the  drawing  up  of  the  Constitution  and  the  preser- 
vation of  the  Union,  was  passed.  Every  young 
American  was  made  liable  to  fight  for  his  country, 
and,  therefore,  every  parent  became  interested  in 


THE  INSPIRED  AMBASSADOR  38 

seeing  him  properly  trained,  properly  equipped 
and  properly  led. 

There  remained  to  decide  the  status  of  the  Regu- 
lar army  and  the  National  Guard.  The  former 
wished  to  disband  the  latter.  The  latter  wished 
to  enter  service  under  the  terms  of  legislation 
then  in  force.  A  compromise  was  reached.  The 
National  Guard,  in  its  existing  organization, 
was  mustered  into  the  federal  service,  but  its 
officers  were  reduced  to  the  status  of  reserve  offi- 
cers. This  provision  was  not  acceptable  to  the 
National  Guard,  but  was  strongly  championed  by 
the  Training  Camps  association,  an  organization 
of  men  who  had  been  training  for  reserve  com- 
missions under  the  direction  of  the  Regular  army. 

With  the  splendid  achievements  of  the  national 
guardsmen  ever  fresh  in  mind,  it  is  pleasant  to 
look  back  on  the  unselfish  patriotism  which  im- 
bued them.  They  offered  themselves  for  war; 
they  fought  to  go  to  war;  they  gave  up  long- 
standing privileges  to  go  to  war ;  and  they  allowed 
themselves  to  be  placed  under  the  control  of  the 
Regular  army,  which  they  did  not  believe  would 
give  them  even  fair  treatment.    When  the  War 


34  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Department  later  announced  that  National  Guard 
cavalry  was  not  to  be  sent  to  Europe,  regiments 
of  this  arm  voluntarily  transferred  into  the  artil- 
lery, although  the  artillery  service  at  that  time 
was  believed  to  require  such  technique  that  only 
men  of  long  training  could  officer  it. 

The  National  Guard  had  been  accused  of  too 
much  politics.  Under  pressure  it  showed  its  ca- 
pacity for  perfect  military  sacrifice. 

In  four  weeks  from  the  arrival  of  Marshal 
Jotfre,  Congress  by  legislation  had  provided 
for  the  expansion  of  the  Eegular  army,  for 
the  enrollment  of  the  National  Guard,  and  for  a 
national  army  to  be  composed  entirely  of  drafted 
men.  The  draft  was  also  to  fill  up  vacancies  in  the 
Eegular  army  and  National  Guard  and  furnish 
replacements  for  casualties.  Four  kinds  of  officers 
were  provided:  Officers  of  the  Regular  army, 
officers  of  the  National  Guard,  officers  of  the  Re- 
serve Corps,  and  officers  of  the  National  army. 
This  last  class  might  be  composed  of  civilians  be- 
yond the  age  limitations  for  reserve  officers  or  of 
regular  officers  promoted  for  the  emergency  to 
higher  rank. 


THE  INSPIRED  AMBASSADOR  36 

Much  credit  is  due  to  studious  officers  of  the 
Regular  army  in  drafting  these  bills,  and  also 
severe  blame  for  two  inexcusable  provisions: 
(1)  that  where  two  officers  are  of  the  same  grade, 
if  one  holds  a  lower  commission  in  the  Regular 
army  he  shall  be  deemed  senior,  even  though  his 
commission  in  the  higher  grade  is  the  more  re- 
cent (a  survival  of  the  rule  in  the  French  and 
Indian  wars  which  made  all  officers  of  the  British 
army  superior  to  colonial  officers) ;  (2)  that  offi- 
cers of  the  National  Guard,  Reserve  Corps,  and 
National  Army  could  be  deprived  of  their  com- 
missions for  incompetence,  upon  fhe  recommenda- 
tion of  a  board  of  officers,  while  officers  of  the 
Regular  army  were  exempt  from  this  ruling.  The 
distinction  was  this:  incompetent  officers  of  the 
temporary  services  could  be  discharged,  but  in- 
competent officers  of  the  Regular  army  could  not ! 

The  Draft  act  will  pass  into  history  as  the  out- 
standing legislative  achievement  of  the  war.  Fol- 
lowing a  long  dominance  in  our  national  life  of  a 
faction  of  weak  national  feeling  and  of  centrifugal 
propaganda,  the  Draft  act  asserted  the  supremacy 
of  the  nation  over  all  its  citizens  to  an  extent  that 


36  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

even  our  federalist  and  unionist  ancestors  had  not 
attempted. 

But  if  the  Draft  act  was  the  most  important 
feature  of  the  struggle,  surely  the  officers'  train- 
ing camps  were  the  most  romantic. 

Fifty  thousand  of  the  best  youths  of  the  nation 
assembled  at  the  selected  places  to  undergo  hard 
training,  severe  and  competitive  examination,  and 
then  the  rigors  of  war.  At  this  time  there  was  no 
draft  act  to  evade,  there  were  no  rain-proof  jobs 
on  the  horizon  in  Washington.  The  only  hope  of 
reward  was  a  commission  as  a  junior  line  officer, 
the  most  burdensome,  as  it  is  the  most  perilous, 
position  in  the  army. 

The  men  of  this  first  camp  will  ever  occupy  a 
pedestal  that  no  other  group  of  officers  can  reach. 

Regular  and  National  Guard  officers,  when  they 
entered  military  service,  faced  no  such  certitude 
of  hardship  and  danger. 

In  the  conduct  of  these  schools  the  Regular 
army  rendered  its  greatest  service  in  the  war. 

While  the  shortness  of  the  course  did  not  permit 
much  military  instruction,  nor,  in  fact,  were  our 
Regular  officers  fully  equipped  to  instruct  in  mod- 


THE  INSPIRED  AMBASSADOR  37 

em  war,  they  did  impress  upon  their  pupils 
their  own  unsurpassed  sense  of  duty,  of  self- 
immolation,  of  rendering  and  exacting  obedience. 
They  taught  the  rigors  of  army  life  and  demon- 
strated in  camp  the  heart-breaking  fatigue  which 
it  is  the  lot  of  every  soldier  to  endure. 

The  camps  were  tests  rather  than  courses  of 
instruction.  The  graduates  were  not  trained  offi- 
cers, but  they  were  capable  of  becoming  officers 
of  the  highest  type.  Early  in  the  war  some  of 
them  were  sent  to  the  front  in  regular  divisions 
and  given  responsibilities  that  in  normal  times 
would  not  come  upon  officers  of  ten  years '  experi- 
ence. A  percentage  failed,  and  under  the  iron 
rules  which  preservation  of  an  unbroken  front 
made  indispensable  these  were  relieved.  The 
maj'ority,  however,  served  with  great  honor,  and, 
it  must  be  said,  received  too  little  recognition  in 
comparison  with  their  superior  officers,  whose 
rapid  rise  was  largely  due  to  their  young  sub- 
ordinates. 

Field  Marshal  Jo ff re's  mission  had  borne  fruit. 
America  provided  for  a  great  army.  In  June  it 
dispatched    the    First    Division    with    General 


38  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Pershing  and  his  staff  to  encourage  our  allies 
while  the  gigantic  army  was  being  raised. 

In  July  the  National  Guard  was  called  into  the 
federal  service,  and  in  September  the  draft  went 
into  effect.  All  the  well  considered  calculations 
of  the  Kaiser's  government  had  crashed  to  the 
ground. 


CHAPTER  in 

EAELY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  B.  P. 

I  WAS  mustered  into  the  federal  service  in  May, 
1917,  and  reported  to  General  Pershing  in  Paris 
in  July. 

The  wisdom  of  General  Joffre's  request  for  an 
American  force  to  appear  immediately  in  France 
was  manifest  at  once.  The  morale  of  the  French 
nation  was  at  the  breaking  point.  There  even  was 
a  number  of  people  whose  despondency  was  so 
great  that  they  resented  the  entry  of  America  into 
the  war  because  it  would  delay  peace — a  peace  of 
defeat. 

The  French  censorship,  in  the  interest  of  the 

commanding  general,  of  course,  had  prevented  any 

mention  of  the  French   defeat  of  April.     The 

official  announcement  was,  in  the  words  of  the 

first  Napoleon,  *^as  false  as  an  official  dispatch." 

The  German  communiques  had  been  suppressed 

by  the  allies. 

In  consequence,  France  was  the  prey  of  exag- 

80 


40  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

gerated  rumors.  The  actual  French  losses  in  the 
April  offensive  were  in  the  neighborhood  of 
100,000,  but  rumor  estimated  them  anywhere  from 
double  that  number  to  500,000. 

In  defeat,  the  French  always  suspect  treachery. 
The  existence  of  censorship,  of  course,  accentu- 
ated the  suspicion,  which,  moreover,  was  not  with- 
out foundation.  Treachery  existed  in  high  places, 
and  the  censorship  was  used  to  protect  it. 

We  now  know  how  Bolo  Pasha  was  caught  in 
America,  and,  upon  evidence  produced  from 
America,  was  condemned  and  shot.  We  know  that 
M.  Malvy  was  tried  and  exiled,  and  M.  Caillaux 
was  convicted  of  serious  charges. 

Of  course,  the  American  staff  obtained  this  in- 
formation in  advance  of  the  general  public.  It 
knew  of  the  murder  of  Almarcvda  on  the  day  fol- 
lowing the  crime.  The  story  is  not  generally 
known  and  will  bear  telling  here. 

Almareyda,  an  opium  fiend  and  a  man  of  suspi- 
cious life,  but  at  the  same  time  a  confidant  of  high 
officials  in  the  French  republic,  was  arrested  and 
almost  immediately  afterwards  found  dead  in  his 
cell.    The  prison  doctors  issued  a  certificate  that 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  41 

he  had  died  from  an  overdose  of  morphine,  self- 
administered.  Under  French  law  the  authorities 
retained  jurisdiction  over  the  body  until  it  was 
placed  in  the  grave. 

As  soon  as  this  was  accomplished  the  nearest 
relative,  who  thereupon  obtained  the  right  of  con- 
trol over  the  corpse,  had  it  dug  up  and  demon- 
strated to  witnesses  from  marks  on  the  neck  and 
from  an  examination  of  the  lungs  that  death  haa 
come  from  strangulation. 

A  so-called  investigation  was  held  and  it  was 
declared  that  Almareyda,  in  a  fit  of  despondency, 
had  hanged  himself  with  his  suspenders,  and  that 
the  prison  authorities  had  lied  about  the  manner 
of  his  death  to  save  themselves  from  the  charge 
of  carelessness.  This  story  was  in  itseK  ren- 
dered doubly  ridiculous  by  the  fact  that  the  sus- 
penders could  hardly  have  supported  the  weight 
of  the  man  and  by  the  second  fact  that  the  highest 
support  to  which  this  peculiar  hangman's  noose 
could  be  attached  was  the  head  of  the  prison  bed, 
some  two  and  a  half  feet  above  the  floor.  The 
public  was  asked  to  believe  that  Almareyda  hung 
himself  lying  down! 


42  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Publication  of  the  crime,  of  course,  was  per- 
mitted only  in  versions  sanctioned  by  the  authori- 
ties. The  story,  as  told  here,  is  the  one  which 
came  into  the  Intelligence  Department  of  our  Gen- 
eral Staff.  It  was  generally  believed  that  Alma- 
reyda  had  been  murdered  to  prevent  his  betray- 
ing important  accomplices.  The  names  of  those 
prominent  officials  were  mentioned,  but  I  do  not 
recollect  whether  their  names  were  placed  in  the 
records  of  our  General  Staff. 

About  the  same  time  Mati  Hara,  a  woman  of 
the  half -world,  was  executed ;  and  it  was  believed 
that  she  was  induced  not  to  betray  her  accom- 
plices by  promises  that  her  life  would  be  spared 
at  the  last  moment,  and  that  the  death  volley  was 
fired  before  she  understood  the  deception  prac- 
ticed upon  her. 

A  movement  was  seriously  projected  to  call  a 
joint  meeting  of  the  Senate  and  Chamber  of 
Deputies  at  Versailles.  (When  the  Senate  and 
Chamber  meet  in  joint  session  at  Versailles  they 
automatically  become  a  joint  constitutional  con- 
vention and  parliament  with  unlimited  powers.) 
The  overthrow  of  the  government  and  the  re- 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  48 

moval  of  President  Poincare  were  contemplated. 

The  object  of  the  proposed  convention  was  en- 
tirely patriotic;  but  it  was  gradually  abandoned 
as  the  Eussian  revolution  developed  into  a  reign 
of  terror  and  a  surrender  to  Germany.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  French  government,  however,  gradu- 
ally became  impossible  and  it  was  finally  over- 
thrown by  the  terrific  attacks  of  Georges  Clemen- 
ceau.  Publication  of  these  attacks  was  absolutely 
forbidden  by  the  censorship.  French  officials 
never  mentioned  them;  yet  they  were  known  in 
Paris  among  American  newspaper  men,  who 
brought  the  news  to  our  General  Staff. 

The  staff,  of  course,  came  into  possession  of  a 
large  part  of  the  secret  history  of  the  war.  It 
learned  the  nature  of  the  dual  alliance  between 
France  and  Russia;  the  terms  of  the  military 
compact  between  France  and  England,  under 
which  England  guaranteed  an  army  to  fight  on 
the  continent  against  Germany,  France,  in  return, 
opening  up  to  England  the  broad  studies  of  her 
war  college,  studies  which  went  far  beyond  any- 
thing dreamed  of  outside  of  the  continent  of  Eu- 
rope, and  even  more  profound  than  those  of  the 


U  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

German  general  staff.  The  staff  learned  how,  for 
some  years  before  the  war,  Belgium  had  been 
irresolute,  unable  to  make  up  her  mind  whether 
to  join  the  alliance  against  Germany  or  to  stand 
neutral.  This  vacillation,  preventing  the  forma- 
tion of  a  plan  to  use  French  and  British  troops 
for  the  defense  of  the  Belgian  frontier,  is  respon- 
sible for  Germany's  easy  conquest  of  the  little 
country  and  the  successful  turning  of  the  French 
left  flank  at  Charleroi. 

We  learned  that  before  the  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities Germany  had  asked  Italy  merely  to  mobil- 
ize troops  on  the  French  border  and,  in  payment 
for  such  slight  service,  offered  territory  both  on 
the  French  mainland  and  in  Morocco.  Italy  re- 
fused to  comply,  saying  that  action  on  her  part 
was  not  required  under  the  terms  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  On  the  other  hand,  she  notified  France 
of  her  intention  to  remain  neutral,  thus  permit- 
ting France  to  concentrate  against  Germany  the 
troops  which,  in  the  scheme  for  a  general  Euro- 
pean war,  had  been  assigned  to  the  Italian  fron- 
tier. 

The  general  staff  obtained  the  details  of  the 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  R  45 

various  secret  treaties  between  the  allies,  publica- 
tion of  which  during  the  peace  conference  caused 
such  public  commotion.  The  first  treaty  between 
England,  France  and  Russia  for  the  partition  of 
Turkey  gave  Persia,  Palestine  and  Alexandretta 
to  England,  Syria  to  France,  and  Armenia  and 
Constantinople  to  Russia.  It  is  likely  that  Bul- 
garia, learning  of  the  disposition  of  Constanti- 
nople, which  she  coveted,  was  influenced  thereby 
to  join  the  Central  powers. 

In  order  to  draw  Italy  into  the  Entente,  this 
treaty  had  to  be  modified ;  and  it  had  to  be  altered 
again  to  secure  the  support  of  Greece.  All  this 
information  was  forwarded  by  our  general  staff  to 
Washington  in  the  summer  of  1917,  and  was  avail- 
able to  our  State  Department  throughout  our  par- 
ticipation in  the  war. 

All  the  allied  governments  had  military  mis- 
sions in  Russia,  exerting  various  kinds  of  in- 
fluence upon  that  government.  From  them  we 
learned  of  the  fast  waning  morale  of  the  Russian 
troops ;  how  the  demagogue  Kerensky  was  letting 
the  nation  rapidly  drift  into  anarchy,  and  how  the 
soldier  Korniloff  was  striving  desperately  to  pre- 


46  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

serve  discipline  which  would  enable  the  army  to 
stand  before  the  Germans  and  prevent  them  from 
massing  against  the  western  front  before  the 
American  army  could  be  prepared. 

The  reports  of  all  the  allied  missions  came  into 
our  hands.  It  is  gratifying  to  note  that  those  of 
the  American  attache  were  the  clearest  and  the 
most  prophetic. 

Each  of  the  allied  missions  urged  its  govern- 
ment to  exert  every  pressure  for  the  support  of 
Korniloff,  our  only  hope  in  the  military  situation. 

Unfortunately,  the  allied  governments  were 
controlled  by  word  men.  They  supported  their 
fellow  word  man,  Kerensky,  and  the  Russian  front 
collapsed. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  United  States  upon 
entering  the  war  was  to  place  embargoes  on  ex- 
ports to  countries  trading  with  Germany.  The 
British  blockade  had  not  been  entirely  effective  in 
keeping  American  materials  of  various  kinds  from 
reaching  Germany,  and  had  been  practically  pow- 
erless in  preventing  Germany's  neighbors  from 
trading  with  her.  The  Scandinavian  countries 
were  absolutely  dependent  upon  imports  from  the 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  47 

United  States.  They  were  now  compelled  to  stop 
shipments  of  home  products  to  Germany  under 
penalty  of  an  embargo  on  the  necessities  of  life. 

The  same  methods  of  coercion  were  directed 
against  Switzerland,  but  with  most  unexpected 
and,  as  we  look  back  upon  the  occasion,  ludicrous 
results.  Switzerland  replied  that  unless  the  allies 
furnished  her  with  necessary  foodstuffs  she  would 
open  her  frontier  to  the  German  army.  At  that 
time  the  allies  were  on  the  defensive,  waiting  for 
the  American  army,  and  the  lengthening  of  the 
battle  line  was  to  be  avoided  at  all  costs.  Our 
diplomats  were  compelled,  therefore,  to  climb 
down  as  gracefully  as  they  could,  and  food  was 
brought  across  the  submarine  zone  in  bottoms 
sorely  needed  to  carry  troops  and  military  sup- 
plies, and,  as  the  Swiss  would  not  even  send  their 
own  railroad  engines  and  cars  to  transport  it  from 
the  ports  to  their  frontier,  the  overworked  French 
railroad  equipment  was  taxed  for  this  purpose. 

The  French  General  Staff  showed  great  loyalty 
to  ours  in  furnishing  us  with  copies  of  deciphered 
messages  from  the  German  wireless  station  in 
Spain  informing  the  submarine  commanders  of 


48  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

tie  location  and  course  of  our  convoys.  This  was 
a  real  act  of  friendship,  as  the  French  staff  was 
so  anxious  to  keep  secret  the  fact  that  it  could 
decode  the  German  dispatches  that  it  had  never 
given  any  decoded  information  to  its  other  allies 
olr  even  to  its  own  navy. 

The  one  piece  of  information  our  allies  did  not 
offer  us  was  the  number  of  allied  divisions  that 
were  engaged  or  in  reserve  on  all  fronts.  We  ob- 
tained this  information,  but  I  consider  the  method 
by  which  it  was  done  a  military  secret. 

At  this  time  the  Catholic  party  in  Germany 
made  secret  proposals  of  peace,  and  shortly  after- 
ward a  public  effort  toward  that  end  emanated 
from  the  Vatican.  The  German  proposal  was  con- 
veyed by  Herr  Erzberger  to  Switzerland,  and  by 
him  to  French  secret  agents.  The  French  Gen- 
eral Staff  passed  the  word  on  to  us.  I  do  not 
know  whether  its  terms  were  made  public  in 
America.    They  were  as  follows: 

Belgium  was  to  be  evacuated  and  compensated 
for  damages.  Invaded  France  was  to  be  evacu- 
ated, but  not  compensated  for  damages.  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  (German  since  1870)  were  to  be  re- 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  49 

turned  to  France,  and  Germany  recompensed  by 
territory  (not  specified)  in  some  other  part  of  the 
world.  German  colonies  were  to  be  restored.  The 
Austrian-Italian  boundary  and  the  eastern  boun- 
daries were  to  be  determined  at  a  peace  confer- 
ence. 

The  officers  assembled  at  General  Pershing's 
headquarters  were  men  who  had  distinguished 
themselves  by  long,  continuous  and  arduous  stud- 
ies at  the  schools  which  the  army  had  formed. 
They  had  bought  the  military  books  of  the  re- 
nowned German  military  authorities,  most  of 
which  had  been  translated  into  English  by  British 
officers.  Officers  conversant  with  the  German  lan- 
guage studied  the  originals,  and  other  books  which 
had  not  yet  been  translated.  Thus  they  acquired 
a  knowledge  that  had  not  been  known  to  previous 
generations  of  American  officers ;  for  if  Napoleon 
exhausted  the  principles  of  strategy  and  tac- 
tics. Von  Moltke  and  his  school  standardized  ad- 
ministrative machinery  and  the  staff  system  neces- 
sary to  the  conduct  of  large  armies. 

My  feeling  on  first  meeting  the  staff  was  one  of 
national  pride ;  but  later,  when  I  learned  how  these 


60  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

men  had  equipped  themselves  for  the  task,  I  real- 
ized that  while  the  nation  should  rejoice  at  having 
such  men  ready  in  her  hour  of  need,  she  had  no 
right  to  congratulate  herself  upon  their  achieve- 
ments. 

In  European  countries  a  great  part  of  the  ef- 
forts of  government  has  been  devoted  to  the 
efficiency  of  the  army.  In  America  the  substan- 
tial efforts  toward  military  efficiency  originated 
within  tFe  army  and  were  carried  on  by  the  offi- 
cers without  aid  or  encouragement  from  the 
nation. 

There  was  something  professorial  about  these 
staff  officers  with  General  Pershing.  Their  lives 
had  been  devoted  to  study  and  they  had  had  little 
opportunity  to  practice  their  theories.  Accus- 
tomed to  command  small  units,  they  were  inex- 
perienced in  the  dispatch  of  business,  because  the 
army  frowns  severely  on  minor  mistakes  of  ad- 
ministration and  offers  little  reward  for  positive 
accomplishment.  This  explains  the  friction  that 
arose  everywhere  between  army  officers  and  busi- 
ness men  drafted  into  the  army.  The  soldiers 
failed  to  keep  pace  with  the  rapidity  of  adminis- 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  61 

tration  to  which  the  business  men  had  been  edu- 
cated in  the  school  of  commercial  competition. 

The  work  to  which  this  General  Staff  addressed 
itself  was  the  greatest  that  ever  confronted  any 
similar  body  of  men.  It  had  to  equip  the  army 
with  weapons  and  ammunition,  and,  as  the  event 
turned  out,  it  had  to  produce  more  than  half  of 
all  the  other  supplies.  It  had  to  study  not  only 
the  developments  which  had  come  in  this  war  but 
also  the  phenomena  of  European  warfare,  which 
are  very  different  from  those  with  which  Ameri- 
can soldiers  had  become  familiar. 

All  our  wars  had  been  fought  in  sparsely  in- 
habited territories,  with  little  artificial  shelter 
against  the  weather,  and  with  few  and  bad  roads. 
The  billeting  of  large  numbers  of  troops  in  the 
Civil  war  would  have  been  impossible  for  lack  of 
houses;  and  the  principle  of  billeting  had  never 
been  accepted  in  America.  In  France,  the  mul- 
titude of  villages  furnished  cover  for  all  soldiers 
not  on  the  firing  line;  the  dividing  of  organiza- 
tions into  proper  numbers  for  shelter  in  the  vari- 
ous towns  and  their  reassembly  for  the  march  had 
to  be  learned  by  the  Americans. 


52  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Ever  since  the  time  of  the  Eomans,  roads  in 
France  have  been  built  with  an  eye  to  military  use. 
The  capacity  of  these  roads  to  carry  troops  and 
their  supplies  had  been  studied  for  centuries.  Bat- 
tlefields have  been  fought  over  time  and  again, 
and  have  furnished  encyclopedias  of  military  in- 
formation for  European  soldiers;  and  most  of 
this  was  unknown  to  us. 

The  difference  in  the  weather,  the  absence  of 
severe  cold,  the  presence  everywhere  of  water, 
the  defensible  character  of  the  masonry  build- 
ings, even  the  shape  of  the  ground,  the  color  of 
the  landscape  and  the  refractions  of  light — 
these  were  alien  to  our  experience.  All  this  had 
to  be  learned  while  ports  of  debarkation,  supply 
depots  and  railroads  were  built.  Finally,  the 
personal  relationship  between  our  forces  and 
those  of  our  allies  had  to  be  built  up,  and  misun- 
derstandings and  European  jealousies  overcome. 

The  French  and  British  governments  were  in- 
tensely jealous  of  each  other.  A  veritable  contest 
arose  between  them  for  the  control  of  their  new, 
great  and  unmeasured  ally.  In  the  early  years  of 
the  war  American  ambassadors  had  been  clay  in 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  63 

the  hands  of  European  diplomats.  They  expected 
American  generals  to  be  the  same.  They  did  not 
doubt  that  the  American  command  would  be  con- 
trolled— the  question  which  agitated  their  minds 
was,  by  whom  would  it  be  controlled?  The  Eng- 
lish held  the  great  advantage  of  a  common  lan- 
guage and  their  instinctive  ability  in  the  selection 
of  men  for  international  conferences.  They  also 
held  control  of  the  sea,  and  owned  the  shipping 
upon  which  the  American  army  must  cross. 

Against  this,  in  the  first  instance,  the  French 
could  only  oppose  the  fact  that  the  war  was  in 
France  and  that  all  transportation  had  to  be  on 
French  roads  and  railroads. 

With  some  abruptness  the  French  high  com- 
mand placed  the  American  sector  as  far  as  pos- 
sible from  the  seacoast,  and  separated  the  Amer- 
icans by  hundreds  of  miles  of  French  troops  from 
the  English. 

Early  in  the  war,  the  Americans  would  have 
preferred  to  train  with  the  English  and  to  go  into 
line  with  and  beside  the  English.  \This,  however, 
the  French  obstinately  forbade.  They  were  un- 
willing to  contemplate  the  two  English  speaking 


64  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

nations  so  closely  allied.  They  were,  perhaps,  also 
unwilling  to  give  the  American  army  a  too  easy 
line  of  retreat  to  the  seacoast  in  the  event  of  a 
lost  battle.  That  their  last  decision  was  well 
taken  will  never  be  questioned  by  any  American 
soldier  who  was  in  the  active  army  after  March 
21st,  1918,  when  it  looked  as  if  a  German  success 
would  pen  the  American  troops  against  the  Alps 
and  when  the  British  army,  falling  back  on  the 
sea,  left  in  the  allied  line  an  almost  fatal  gap. 

The  first  premise  was  probably  a  false  one. 
The  American  army  was  incapable  of  any  side 
agreements  among  allies.  I  cannot  but  remember, 
though,  that  in  the  early  days  of  our  sojourn  in 
France  the  British  army  exercised  an  influence 
upon  our  own  quite  incommensurate  with  its  mili- 
tary skill.  Later,  however,  our  ablest  officers  per- 
ceived that  the  French  General  Staff  possessed 
vast  stores  of  military  lore  unknown  to  the  other 
allies,  and,  lacking  which,  war  against  Germany 
must  have  spelled  catastrophe. 

Our  General  Staff  was  earnest,  capable  and  suc- 
cessful. It  would  have  benefited  from  an  earnest 
perusal  of  ^'Pinafore,''  but  probably  to  no  greater 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  65 

extent  than  any  other  body  of  men  possessed  of 
almost  unlimited  authority.  It  soon  impressed 
upon  the  allies  the  fact  that  our  army  was  cast  in 
a  mold  entirely  different  from  that  of  our  dip- 
lomats or  our  idle  rich.  Said  an  English  colonel 
to  me :  * ^I  did  not  know  that  there  were  such  men 
in  America.  My  conception  of  Americans  has 
been  of  men  trying  to  make  enough  money  for 
their  wives  to  spend  and  of  women  trying  to  spend 
all  the  money  their  husbands  could  make.  There 
are  no  such  people  in  Europe  as  you  are  bringing 
over.  By  mere  force  of  character  you  must  dom- 
inate the  world.'* 

Of  course,  this  Englishman  had  seen  the  ex- 
tremes of  our  nation.  The  nation  is  much  sounder 
than  its  specimens  abroad  generally  appear  to 
Europeans — and  the  best  elements  of  our  nation 
were  found  in  our  army.  The  staff,  however, 
furnished  amusement  for  the  allies  in  one  purely 
American  way. 

The  General  Staff,  among  other  things,  is  the 
legislature  of  the  organization  which"  it  controls. 
Our  G.H.Q.  (General  Headquarters)  was  a  regu- 
lar American  legislature,  and  produced,  in  spite 


56  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

of  its  many  and  complicated  duties,  an  amazing 
mass  of  regulations  governing  the  individual,  just 
like  legislatures  at  home.  Later,  when  the  army 
went  overseas,  we  had  a  number  of  staff  legisla- 
tures legislating  their  heads  off. 

The  American  uniform  was  designed  by  the 
worst  tailor  in  the  world  in  conjunction  with  the 
worst  soldier;  so  our  dress  regulations  became 
subject  to  many  changes.  Tastes  varied  among 
the  army  corps,  divisions  and  brigades;  and  so 
did  the  anatomy  of  the  commanding  officers.  From 
these  diverse  viewpoints  came  codes  of  laws  as 
diverse  as  the  statutes  of  our  several  states. 
It  is  a  military  principle  that  a  lower  authority 
cannot  repeal  the  restriction  imposed  by  any 
higher  authority ;  but  he  may  add  to  it  or  legislate 
upon  subjects  not  covered  by  the  higher  conunand. 
Hence,  an  officer  dressed  in  the  height  of  fashion 
in  one  sector  might  find  himself  under  arrest  in 
another  for  wearing  or  failing  to  wear  a  pair  of 
spurs,  for  the  length  of  his  overcoat,  or  for  carry- 
ing a  cane. 

To  the  French,  who  do  not  interfere  with  man- 
kind's idiosyncrasies,  who  devote  their  energy  to 


EARLY  DAYS  OF  THE  A.  E.  F.  67 

achieving  a  higher  degree  of  professional  skill 
than  any  other  army  has  attained,  this  Yankee 
legalism  was  a  source  of  much  amusement.  Many 
officers  preserve  to  this  day  the  celebrated  order 
that  ''American  soldiers  are  not  to  be  seen  with 
notoriously  immoral  women,'*  issued  because  mili- 
tary police  from  rural  districts,  unacquainted  with 
Parisian  fashions  and  metropolitan  cosmetics,  re- 
vealed an  embarrassing  lack  of  discrimination  in 
enforcing  a  rule  that  ''soldiers  should  not  associ- 
ate with  immoral  women.'' 

The  French  also  were  more  amused  than  com- 
plimented when  the  American  troops  in  Paris 
were  given  as  a  distinctive  badge  a  white  fleur-de- 
lys  on  the  left  shoulder  I 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  GREAT  DIVISION" 

Upon  the  arrival  of  the  1st  artillery  brigade 
in  France  I  was  transferred  to  this  organization 
at  my  request,  my  own  regiment  having  been 
made  into  artillery. 

My  previous  military  service  had  been  in  the 
National  Guard  cavalry.  I  was,  therefore,  a 
stranger  both  to  the  men  and  the  work  of  the 
regular  field  artillery.  The  first  impression  these 
made  upon  me  has  not  faded,  but  has  grown  stead- 
ily both  from  intimate  acquaintance  with  them  and 
from  the  reflections  following  the  close  of  the  war. 

The  United  States  field  artillery  is  the  most 
admirable  organization  with  which  I  have  ever 
come  in  contact.  During  the  years  immediately 
preceding  our  entry  into  the  war  it  prepared  itself 
to  play  a  threefold  role:  It  had  to  keep  in  con- 
stant readiness  to  engage  the  numerically  su- 
perior artillery  of  Mexico;  it  endeavored  to  con- 
stitute itself  a  sample  of  the  field  artillery  we 

58 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  59 

should  require  in  a  great  war ;  and  it  had  to  pre- 
pare for  the  stupendous  expansion  which  a  great 
war  would  demand. 

That  it  would  have  performed  the  first  of  these 
duties  successfully,  if  called  upon,  none  will  ever 
question.  To  chronicle  its  success  in  the  others 
always  will  be  the  pleasant  duty  of  every  Ameri- 
can military  historian. 

Although  too  small  in  its  totality  to  execute  an 
artillery  maneuver,  and  never  allowed  to  concen- 
trate for  practice  purposes,  it  had  worked  out  the 
role  of  artillery  in  modern  war  as  fully  as  foreign 
artilleries  had  done  before  1914  with  every  facility 
at  their  disposal. 

I  believe  its  use  of  field  guns  before  the  war  was 
second  only  to  the  French.  Also,  it  fully  foresaw 
the  value  of  curved  fire,  which  the  Germans  ex- 
celled in  and  which  the  French  had  neglected, 
and  it  had  asked  to  be  supplied  with  powerful 
howitzers.  It  followed  the  European  war  more 
closely  than  did  the  other  arms  of  our  service  and 
endeavored  to  keep  its  equipment  abreast  of  war 
developments.  Its  form  of  organization  was  en- 
tirely adequate,  and,  once  free  from  the  incubus 


60  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

of  the  ordnance  department,  it  provided  itself 
from  foreign  arsenals  witli  the  most  effective 
weapons. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  record  here  how  the  course 
of  the  war  surprised  the  officers  of  all  armies. 
The  early  plans  of  operations  of  all  general  staffs 
failed  because  their  conceptions  of  the  roles  of 
artillery  and  infantry  proved  to  be  erroneous. 

Each  of  the  three  years  following  1914  brought 
innovations  in  war  materiel,  technique  and  tac- 
tics. Our  allies  loyally  offered  to  instruct  our 
inexperienced  army  in  all  the  lessons  they  had 
learned  at  heavy  cost.  In  the  United  States  ar- 
tillery, or,  to  bring  this  statement  within  the  prov- 
ince of  my  own  knowledge,  in  the  1st  brigade  of 
the  United  States  field  artillery,  which  was  the 
model  and  the  training  school  for  all  later  forma- 
tions, this  instruction  was  accepted  with  the  open- 
mindedness  that  characterizes  the  well-trained 
and  self-reliant  professional. 

The  French  instructors  were  selected  from 
among  their  best  technicians,  assisted  by  a  naval 
officer    who    had    introduced    methods    adapted 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  61 

from  ocean  navigation  into  the  domain  of  field 
artillery. 

The  American  ofiScers  were,  or  course,  thor- 
oughly up  to  date  in  all  matters  relating  to 
draught  and  mobility  and  the  care  of  horses.  They 
also  were  so  familiar  with  their  own  guns  that 
learning  the  materiel  of  the  French  pieces  was  not 
more  difficult  than  for  a  thoroughly  skilled  auto- 
mobile mechanic  to  familiarize  himself  with  the 
characteristics  of  a  new  car,  although  among  the 
higher  ranking  officers  exceptions  to  this  must  be 
made.  They  rapidly  mastered  a  number  of  im- 
proved methods  of  directing  fire,  as  developed 
by  the  exigencies  and  the  opportunities  of  war, 
these  only  involving  improvements  on  thoroughly 
understood  mathematical  principles. 

Even  before  our  training  period  was  half 
elapsed,  the  need  of  an  expanding  army  began  to 
draw  heavily  on  the  existing  organizations;  but 
so  efficient  were  these  that,  although  the  practice 
cont  tmed  throughout  the  war,  the  1st  artillery 
brigade  was  able  to  meet  the  demands  upon  it  for 
officers  to  instruct  or  command  new  units,  and,  at 


6g  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

the  same  time,  to  comply  with  every  request  for 
military  service  in  the  field. 

In  October  the  1st  division  was  ordered  to  the 
front.  The  reason  given  was,  to  furnish  fur- 
ther instruction ;  but  the  real  reason,  it  is  believed, 
was  to  inform  the  allied  world  that  American 
troops  were  in  action.  The  division  did  not  enter 
the  line  as  a  unit,  but  each  infantry  battalion  was 
attached  to  and  put  under  the  command  of  a 
French  regiment,  each  battalion  of  artillery  being 
made  a  part  of  a  French  groupment.  Junior 
French  officers  directed  each  of  the  companies,  or 
batteries,  and  non-commissioned  instructors 
abounded.  Much  useful  knowledge  was  acquired 
in  this  way,  but  the  most  important  and  costly 
lesson — not  to  betray  their  presence  to  the  enemy 
— ^was  one  which  our  troops  never  thoroughly 
learned. 

German  observers  saw  strange  auto  trucks  on 
the  roads.  They  saw  khaki-clad  men  around  the 
artillery  observation  posts  and  in  the  trenches. 
To  ascertain  the  significance  of  this  novelty,  they 
made  a  small  trench  raid  on  November  3rd,  and 
killed  and  captured  a  handful  of  our  infantry. 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  63 

On  our  return  to  the  rear  we  learned  of  the 
great  Italian  disaster  of  October  24th  at  Capo- 
retto.  I  felt  keenly  at  that  time  that  this  was  a 
disgrace  to  America.  We  had  been  in  the  war  six 
months,  with  ample  warning  beforehand,  and  yet 
we  were  not  able  to  put  into  the  field  at  the  vital 
spot  the  insignificant  number  of  troops  that  would 
have  saved  the  day. 

The  Italians  had  shown  their  ability  to  fight  on 
even  terms  with  the  Austrians.  It  was  eight  small 
German  divisions,  acting  like  the  edge  of  a  knife, 
that  cut  the  hole  through  the  Italian  line.  If  we 
could  have  been  able  to  put  100,000  American 
troops  at  that  point  the  disaster  would  have  been 
averted. 

Even  after  the  debacle  America  was  powerless 
to  help.  English  and  French  troops,  worn  with  the 
hard  fighting  of  the  summer,  were  rushed  to  stop 
the  rout;  but  American  troops  were  unavailable. 
Our  system  of  training  was  not  at  fault;  we  had 
to  raise  a  great  army  for  1918,  and  to  do  this  we 
had  to  break  up  our  entire  regular  army  and  even 
distribute   the    officers   of   our   National   Guard 


64  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

among  the  raw  troops.  Our  shameful  unprepar- 
edness  was  responsible. 

The  division  then  returned  to  the  rest  area 
to  await  its  equipment  and  to  resume  its  train- 
ing. All  Kegular  officers  were  promoted  one 
grade;  some  were  sent  back  to  America;  still 
others  became  instructors  in  France ;  a  few  went 
on  staff  duty.  The  lower  grades  were  filled  with 
reserve  officers,  graduates  of  the  artillery  schools 
in  France.  There  was  a  shake-up  in  the  higher 
command,  the  division  commander  and  one  bri- 
gade commander  being  relieved.  Supplies  were 
short;  clothing  could  not  be  kept  up;  the  meat 
ration  had  to  be  obtained  from  the  Canadians; 
pay  day  was  irregular;  the  mails  were  dilatory; 
forage  was  lacking,  and  the  horses  suffered.  Ar- 
tillery drivers  bought  oats  out  of  their  own  scant 
funds  to  feed  the  government  horses  that  the  gov- 
ernment did  not  provide  for. 

At  this  time  the  General  Staff  College  was  or- 
ganized at  Langres  with  French  and  English  in- 
structors. Eeserve  and  National  Guard  officers 
were  assigned  there,  as  well  as  Regulars;  but 
the  regulations  provided  that  the  desirable  ap- 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  65 

pointments  from  the  school,  the  chiefs  of  staff  and 
operations  officers,  could  only  be  given  to  Kegn- 
lar  officers ;  and  the  years  of  service  required  for 
the  different  appointments  limited  the  field  of 
competition  for  the  most  important  posts. 

On  January  6th,  1918,  the  division  was  sur- 
prised at  receiving  orders  to  proceed  to  the  front. 
It  was  still  short  of  much  essential  equip- 
ment, and  the  artillery  had  never  been  supplied 
with  the  telephone  equipment  needed  to  train  its 
telephone  details.  The  new  battery  commanders 
were  away  at  school,  leaving  these  important  com- 
mands to  officers  who  had  been  commissioned  only 
a  few  months  previously. 

The  reason  for  ordering  the  1st  division  to  the 
front  at  this  time  has  never  been  given.  I  do 
not  believe  that  it  was  planned  by  General  Per- 
shing. At  least,  I  know  his  plan  a  few  weeks 
before  had  been  not  to  put  the  division  into  line 
before  spring. 

It  may  be  that  considerations  of  French  morale 
prompted  it,  or  it  is  possible  that  the  beginning 
of  the  Senate  investigation  into  the  conduct  of  the 


ee  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

war  bronglit  irresistible  pressure  from  Wash- 
ington. 

After  a  reconnaissance,  insufficient  because  of 
lack  of  automobiles  and  time,  the  division  marched 
from  the  Gondrecourt  area  to  the  St.  Mihiel  front. 

Here,  for  the  first  time,  we  held  a  continued 
sector — the  American  sector.  We  went  in,  first, 
as  battalions  under  French  colonels,  then  as  regi- 
ments under  French  brigadiers ;  and,  finally,  as  a 
division  under  our  own  officers.  To  each  Ameri- 
oan  unit  was  attached  an  experienced  French  of- 
ficer, very  much  as  Eegular  officers  were  formerly 
attached  to  the  militia  as  inspector-instructors. 
Experienced  non-commissioned  officers  were  pres- 
ent to  help  the  men.  Staff  officers  and  technical 
experts  were  provided.  In  short,  everything  was 
done  that  could  be  done  to  obtain  assistance  and 
instruction  from  the  experienced  troops  who  had 
fought  for  four  years. 

Strangely  enough,  all  the  American  officers  did 
not  take  kindly  to  this  wonderful  agnd  necessary 
assistance.  Some  announced  that  their  education 
was  complete;  others  that  the  French  methods 
were  bad.     A  few  complained  of  the  individual 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  67 

officers  attached  to  them.  On  the  other  hand, 
most  of  the  officers  accepted  the  instruction  with 
enthusiasm,  or,  at  least,  in  good  grace.  They 
were  eager  to  add  whatever  they  could  to  their 
store  of  military  information.  They  were  keen 
to  learn  the  French  methods,  even  if  they  were 
not  at  first  convinced  of  their  excellence. 

As  I  look  back  on  the  early  days  of  our  partic- 
ipation in  the  war  and  consider  my  friends  who 
failed  or  who  succeeded,  I  cannot  recall  one  ex- 
ception to  this  statement:  That  all  the  failures, 
who  were  sent  to  the  rear  or  to  America  bitter, 
disappointed  men,  belonged  to  the  class  which  dis- 
dained the  military  advice  of  the  French,  while  all 
the  successful  officers,  ranging  from  those  who  ad- 
vanced only  a  grade  or  two  in  promotion,  or  may- 
be received  only  a  simple  decoration,  up  to  those 
who  rose  to  the  command  of  corps  and  of  armies, 
belonged  to  the  class  which  eagerly  absorbed  the 
grim  lessons  of  war  as  learned  by  the  French. 

This  was  inevitable.  No  man*s  education  ever 
is  completed.  No  man  has  fully  mastered  any 
profession.  The  men  who  turned  from  French  in- 
struction, from  the  experience  gained  in  four  years 


68  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

of  war,  were  men  whose  intellects  were  numbed 
by  complacent  egotism;  or  who  were  too  lazy  to 
exert  themselves  in  further  study;  or  were  men 
who,  like  Napoleon  III.  and  his  marshals,  either 
thought  that  the  mere  possession  of  military  rank 
in  itself  constituted  military  education  or  were 
afraid  to  enter  into  military  discussions  through 
fear  of  betraying  an  ignorance  of  which  they  were 
fully  aware  or  at  least  suspected. 

There  had  been  too  much  talk  of  **  American 
methods.  * '  Any  methods  we  had  were  the  result 
of  experience  in  the  Civil  war,  the  Spanish  war 
and  the  Philippine  war,  none  of  which  formed  any 
accurate  criterion  of  what  the  great  European 
war  was  like.  None  of  the  armies,  not  even  the 
German,  which  had  made  the  most  dispassionate 
study  of  the  lessons  of  Manchuria  and  the  Bal- 
kans, had  anticipated  what  the  tactics  of  this  war 
would  be.  The  views  entertained  by  our  army 
were  exceedingly  good  when  compared  with  those 
of  the  other  armies  in  the  days  when  all  were 
equally  inexperienced.  They  were  crass  and  inef- 
fective when  compared  to  the  tactics  developed  in 
four  years   of  actual  fighting.     Unfortunately, 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  69 

high  ranking  officers  were  not  easily  removed,  and 
too  often  they  had  to  prove  Iheir  incompetency 
by  costly  and  unsuccessful  battle  before  they  were 
removed. 

To  s.  new  division  sector  warfare  is  exceedingly 
trying,  and  to  a  division  which,  like  ours,  only 
recdived  an  important  part  of  its  necessary  equip- 
ment after  arriving  at  the  front,  and  was  not 
practiced  in  the  use  of  it,  the  trial  was  particu- 
larly hard.  Until  a  soldier  becomes  familiar  with 
the  sounds  of  war  every  little  burst  of  artillery 
fire,  every  flurry  of  machine  guns,  suggests  an 
attack.  Any  indication,  or  no  indication  at  all,  is 
sufficient  to  cause  the  sounding  of  a  gas  alarm. 
Officers  of  all  ranks  are  uncertain  of  themselves 
and  of  their  subordinates.  This  is  a  trying  phase 
that  every  division  must  go  through,  and  it  is  the 
more  disagreeable  and  serious,  if  the  division 
entering  the  line  has  not  been  given  adequate 
training. 

Looking  across  the  perspective  of  more  than  two 
years,  I  realize  what  a  wonderful  school  for  the 
division  the  Toul  sector  was.  Under  our  able 
French    instructors    we    began    with    the    sim- 


'TO  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

plest  operations  of  the  separate  arms,  and 
worked  progressively  forward  to  trench  raids  of 
considerable  magnitude,  raids  which  were,  in 
effect,  small  attacks. 

The  Germans  did  all  they  could  to  assist  our 
training.  Their  efforts  were  never  beyond  our 
powers  not  only  to  resist  but  to  understand.  If 
we  destroyed  a  German  battery,  they  destroyed 
an  American  battery.  If  our  patrols  captured  a 
German  listening  post,  the  Germans  retaliated. 
They  kept  even  step  with  our  growing  experience, 
and  firmly  established  our  morale  by  an  unsuc- 
cessful trench  raid  of  large  size  on  March  1st,  a 
good  six  weeks  after  our  entry  into  line. 

The  position  which  the  division  occupied  was 
ideal  for  a  school,  provided  the  enemy  wished 
to  treat  it  as  such.  Our  line  lay  in  a  low,  slightly 
rolling  country,  dominated  by  Mont  Sec,  a  steep, 
high  mountain  held  by  the  enemy.  To  keep  out 
of  sight  of  his  watchful  observers,  troops  had  to 
lie  close  in  their  trenches,  dugouts  or  camou- 
flaged battery  positions.  Troops  in  the  woods, 
which  abounded,  were  allowed  freer  action ;  but  the 
mountain  looked  down  on  the  tops  of  the  forest. 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  71 

and  the  German  observers  could  recognize  cut- 
tings for  batteries  when  indiscreetly  made;  and 
they  easily  located  habitations  and  kitchens  if 
smoke  was  allowed  to  rise  during  the  day.  The 
enemy  also  had  complete  control  of  the  air,  and 
he  flew  at  will  over  our  lines  for  observation,  pho- 
tographic purposes  and  offensive  sorties.  This 
control  of  the  air  also  allowed  him  to  maintain  his 
balloons  close  to  the  front  lines  and  at  a  maximum 
height. 

Thus,  American  indiscretions  invariably  were 
punished.  Trenches,  reserve  positions  and  bat- 
teries which  were  revealed  by  the  least  care- 
lessness received  chastisement.  Sometimes  this 
came  in  the  form  of  harassing  fire,  or  fire  for 
destruction,  or,  in  the  event  of  a  trench  raid  by 
either  side,  the  enemy  artillery  would  fire  upon 
every  American  position  known  to  it.  Thick 
heads  and  dull,  which  had  failed  to  learn  the  teach- 
ing at  school,  had  the  lessons  of  war  pounded  into 
them  by  the  German  schoolmasters,  whose  motto 
was:  **He  who  will  not  heed  must  feel.''  Su- 
perior officers  were  enabled  to  judge  of  the  intel- 
ligence and  force  of  their  subordinates  by  measure 


'72  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

of  the  losses  they  sustained.  Performing  exactly 
similar  work  and  facing  identical  problems,  some 
units  were  almost  wiped  out;  others  suffered  the 
minimum  of  loss. 

The  Germans  also  taught  artillery  tactics  to 
our  higher  command. 

It  may  be  said  here  that  while  the  French  in 
1918  excelled  in  the  technique  of  artillery,  in  the 
location  of  the  enemy,  and  in  the  accuracy  of  fire, 
the  Germans  retained  a  superiority  of  tactical 
skill.  In  the  placing  and  moving  of  guns  they 
maintained  this  superiority  over  the  allies  to  the 
(end. 

The  artillery  brigade  entered  the  Toul  sector 
well  instructed  by  the  French,  but  also  retaining 
a  great  many  of  its  preconceived  ideas.  Conse- 
quently, it  was  roughly  handled  in  the  early  days ; 
but  with  characteristic  American  celerity  it 
discarded  its  notions  and  adopted  the  methods  of 
the  enemy  where  and  when  they  had  proved  su- 
perior. 

During  all  this  time  there  was  a  constant  flow 
of  junior  officers  through  the  organizations. 
Those  who  had  received  training  at  the  front  were 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  78 

ordered  to  other  organizations,  their  places  being 
taken  by  new  arrivals  from  America  and  from  the 
artillery  schools.  This  system  increased  the  diffi- 
culty of  conducting  the  division,  but  it  was  neces- 
sary in  the  greater  interest  of  preparing  the  army 
for  its  future  role. 

Service  at  the  front  also  was  a  great  test  of 
personal  fitness.  Steps  to  dispose  of  incompetent 
officers  holding  permanent  commissions  in  the 
regular  army  differed  from  the  system  employed 
in  getting  rid  of  inefficient  reserve  or  national 
guard  officers.  Officers  of  the  regular  army  could 
be  relieved  by  their  superiors,  deprived  of  their 
temporary  rank,  and  returned  to  the  United 
States  with  their  permanent  rank  by  order  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  They  could  not  be  dis-. 
missed.  All  other  officers  could  be  ordered  by 
their  regimental  commanders  before  a  board  of 
inquiry  and,  upon  an  adverse  finding  approved  by 
higher  authority,  deprived  of  their  commissions. 

It  was  my  unpleasant  duty  to  sit  on  one  of  these 
boards  during  my  entire  service  at  the  front.  This 
board  adopted  two  standards,  a  higher  standard 
of  efficiency  being  required  for  provisional  officers 


74  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

in  the  regular  service,  whose  commissions  would 
become  permanent  with  the  lapse  of  time,  than  for 
the  temporary  officers.  For  the  latter  a  degree  of 
competence  to  perform  the  duties  of  their  rank 
in  warfare  was  selected  in  the  beginning;  but, 
later,  when  it  was  seen  that  the  number  of  avail- 
able officers  was  less  than  the  requirements  of  the 
army,  the  judgment  of  the  board  was  tempered  by 
the  possibility  of  finding  better  material  to  re- 
place the  man  under  a  charge  of  incompetence. 

It  was  a  singularly  oppressive  duty  to  bring  a 
recommendation  for  dismissal,  so  disastrous  to  the 
feelings  of  young  men  who  had  offered  their  lives 
to  their  country;  but,  in  the  face  of  a  thoroughly 
trained  and  experienced  enemy,  the  retention  of 
other  than  efficient  officers  would  have  been  a  be- 
trayal of  our  private  soldiers  and  of  our  cause. 
The  criticism  has  been  made  that  the  testimony  of 
officers  superior  to  members  of  the  boards  was 
admitted,  and  that  this  testimony  exercised  undue 
influence  on  such  boards.  In  my  experience,  such 
charges  are  nnsustained.  I  remember  that  the 
testimony  of  our  forceful  brigade  commander  was, 
upon  occasion,  held  insufficient,  and  that  by  a 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  76 

board  on  which  his  adjutant  sat  as  a  member ;  on 
another  occasion,  a  defendant  arrested  by  order 
of  the  commander-in-chief,  through  whose  initia- 
tive the  proceedings  were  brought,  was  found  com- 
petent to  hold  his  commission. 

In  the  earlier  sittings  of  these  boards  the  only 
recommendation  the  boards  were  allowed  to  make 
was  whether  or  not  the  commission  of  the  officer 
in  question  should  be  vacated.  Later  this  rule 
was  modified,  and  the  boards  could  recommend 
the  transfer  of  an  officer  to  some  other  duty. 

In  the  rush  of  the  training  camps  it  was  not 
only  natural  that  commissions  should  be  issued  to 
men  incapable  of  holding  them  but  that  they 
should  be  issued  in  a  branch  of  the  service  for 
which  the  officers  were  not  qualified.  In  the  artil- 
lery, for  instance,  a  certain  proficiency  in  mathe- 
matics is  indispensable ;  and  no  degree  of  leader- 
ship will  enable  a  man  to  figure  his  firing  data,  or 
to  regulate  the  firing  of  a  battery  from  a  flank.  On 
the  other  hand,  an  artillery  officer  does  not  need 
the  same  excellent  degree  of  physique  required  of 
an  infantryman.  A  man  can  be  a  very  useful  junior 
officer  on  the  staff  without  possessing  in  any  de- 


76  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

gree  the  qualities  of  leadership.  Indeed,  within 
the  same  arm  of  the  service  different  qualities 
could  be  recognized.  I  recall  one  man  who  failed 
as  a  telephone  officer  but  who  became  the  chief  of 
operations  of  a  brigade  and  actually  improved 
upon  the  firing  methods  of  the  French  artillery. 
Another  artillery  officer,  who  had  failed  to  shine 
elsewhere,  acquired  distinction  while  operating  in 
liaison  with  the  infantry;  and  he  was  not  one  of 
those  who  forgot  his  mission  to  lead  an  infantry 
platoon  in  assault. 

It  certainly  was  not  true  in  the  division  that 
permanent  officers  in  the  Eegular  army  were 
held  to  a  lower  standard  than  those  of  the  re- 
serve. From  one  regiment,  two  colonels,  a  lieu- 
tenant-colonel and  a  major  were  ordered  to  the 
rear.  It  is  a  fact,  however,  that  gross  incompe- 
tence received  no  severer  treatment  than  depriva- 
tion of  temporary  rank.  The  Regular  army  still 
contains  officers  whose  utter  incapacity  was  dem- 
onstrated on  the  battlefield,  and  the  dangerous 
rule  of  seniority  is  raising  them  to  positions  where 
they  can  do  more  damage  in  our  next  war. 

The   Regular   officers   were   scrupulous    about 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  77 

maintaining  for  their  subordinates  from  the  Re- 
serve corps  all  honors  rightfully  earned.  I  re- 
member an  instance  where  a  first  lieutenant  of 
the  Reserve  corps  had  come  into  command  of  a 
battery  and  exercised  great  ability.  The  corps 
staff,  perceiving  that  there  was  a  captaincy  vacant 
in  the  regiment,  assigned  to  it  a  regular  captain, 
an  artilleryman  by  profession  and  a  graduate  of 
West  Point.  The  colonel  of  the  regiment,  himself 
a  professional  artilleryman  and  an  academy  grad- 
uate, refused  to  supersede  the  reserve  lieutenant 
and  assigned  the  new  captain  as  second  in  com- 
mand of  another  battery. 

It  seemed  to  me  then,  and  it  seems  to  me  now, 
that  the  Germans  should  have  adopted  a  policy 
of  smashing  each  American  division  as  it  ap- 
peared in  line.  This  would  not  have  been  diffi- 
cult. It  is  simple  to  destroy  one  division  by  mass- 
ing against  it  sufficient  materiel  and  men.  When 
the  unit  is  raw,  the  operation  becomes  elementary. 
If  the  Germans,  therefore,  had  smashed  the  Ist 
division,  and  then  the  2nd  and  26th  and  42nd,  the 
original  American  divisions  that  went  to  France, 
it  not  only  would  have  kept  these  future  assault 


78  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

divisions  from  ever  maturing  but  it  would  have 
broken  up  the  entire  scheme  of  instruction  which 
made  our  participation  so  decisive  in  the  summer 
of  1918. 

"We  should  have  had  to  delay  putting  our 
divisions  into  line  until  we  had  a  sufficient  number 
to  prevent  concentration  against  any  one  of  them. 
This  would  have  meant  delay,  and  delay  is  one 
of  the  great  dangers  of  war.  I  never  have  learned 
what  reason,  if  any,  guided  the  German  high  com- 
mand. Perhaps  it  was  devoted  to  the  principle 
of  major  maneuvers  and  was  against  all  other 
considerations.  Perhaps  it  feared  to  stir  up  the 
American  people  as  early  in  the  war  the  English 
people  had  been  stirred.  At  all  events  the  Ger- 
mans did  not  interfere  with  our  raw  divisions,  and 
this  enabled  them  to  perform  a  threefold  mission 
which  led  to  the  German  undoing  before  the  fol- 
lowing winter. 

This  triple  achievement  was :  The  green  Amer- 
ican divisions  in  line  relieved  the  worn  and  thor- 
oughly experienced  French  divisions  and  allowed 
them  to  rest;  they  gained  the  experience  of  war- 
fare, which  can  come  only  from  actual  fighting, 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  79 

without  heavy  losses,  and  they  constantly  wore 
down  the  trained  and  tired  troops  opposed  to 
them. 

One  general  tribute  may  be  paid  to  our  senior 
officers.    They  were  full  of  fight. 

Said  one  commander:  **I  don't  want  to  hear 
any  talk  of  German  atrocities.  These  complaints 
have  made  the  Germans  think  the  allies  are  afraid 
of  them.  When  we  hear  the  Germans  complain  of 
us  I  will  feel  that  their  morale  is  breaking.'' 

It  had  been  the  custom  for  both  sides,  the  Ger- 
mans and  the  allies,  to  take  as  much  rest  as  pos- 
sible in  what  were  known  as  quiet  sectors.  The 
Americans  made  these  quiet  sectors  active.  Un- 
prepared to  enter  any  large  maneuvers,  the  Amer- 
ican infantry,  nevertheless,  constantly  harassed 
its  opponents  by  patrols,  trench  raids  and  con- 
tinuous sniping,  and  the  artillery  fired  day  and 
night  on  every  possible  target.  Undoubtedly,  the 
American  troops  lost  more  heavily  than  their  op- 
ponents, but  they  had  a  large  reservoir  of  rein- 
forcements to  draw  upon,  and  their  enemy  had 
not.  Our  individual  energy  and  nervous  force 
was  unweakened ;  that  of  the  enemy  was  far  spent 


80  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

from  four  years  of  war.  Finally,  we  had  every- 
thing to  learn  from  these  operations,  while  we 
could  teach  our  opponents  nothing. 

A  great  principle  of  warfare,  announced  by 
Napoleon  and  taught  by  Marshal  Foch,  is  the 
wearing  down  of  the  opponent  while  holding  out 
a  reserve  for  the  final  blow.  The  green  American 
divisions  did  the  wearing  down;  they  released 
trained  reserves  for  the  final  blow,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  transformed  themselves  into  assault 
troops  of  a  high  order. 

On  the  day  the  division  repulsed  the  German 
raid  on  Eemieres  Wood,  in  the  Toul  sector,  it 
received  orders  foretelling  the  expected  German 
offensive. 

During  the  winter  the  Soviet  government 
of  Russia  made  peace  with  Germany,  and  Rou- 
mania  was  compelled  to  follow  suit.  The  Ger- 
mans, therefore,  were  able  to  reinforce  their 
western  armies,  retaining  at  the  rear  a  number 
of  troops  for  rehearsing  the  forthcoming  battle. 
The  German  plan  of  operations  was  known.  It 
was  to  follow  the  method  employed  in  their  recent 
success  at  Riga  against  the  Russians,  and  was  a 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  81 

further  development  of  the  offensive  used  by 
Brusiloff  against  the  Austrians  in  1916;  and,  be- 
fore that,  by  the  Germans  and  Austrians  on  May 
1st,  1915,  at  the  Dunajec.  The  plan  of  attack  con- 
templated a  secret  assembling  of  artillery  and 
infantry,  a  short  and  brutal  artillery  preparation, 
in  which  the  use  of  yperite  gas  formed  an  impor- 
tant function,  and  then  an  attack,  not  in  lines,  as 
had  been  used  before,  but  by  detached  groups 
which  were  to  infiltrate  (slip  between)  the  de- 
fensive units  and  fire  upon  them  from  the  flanks, 
while  further  groups  of  Germans  rushed  them 
from  the  front. 

The  method  of  defense  adopted  by  the  allies 
was  the  occupation  of  a  series  of  defensive  lines 
by  the  front  line  divisions.  Each  unit  of  infan- 
try and  artillery  was  to  defend  its  position  to  the 
last  man,  without  hope  of  reinforcement,  in  the 
expectation  that  twenty-four  hours  would  elapse 
before  the  German  attack  could  overwhelm  the 
last  line  of  defense  of  the  sector  troops,  which 
would  allow  sufficient  time  for  reserves  held  at 
strategic  points  along  the  line  to  form  behind  the 
breach. 


82  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Autliorities  better  informed  tlian  I  will  have 
to  tell  the  world  what  was  the  matter  with  the 
allied  command  in  the  Spring  of  1918.  Possibly 
there  was  dissension  among  the  allied  command- 
ers-in-chief; otherwise,  how  explain  the  supine 
sitting  on  the  defensive  and  waiting  for  the  blow 
to  fall,  tactics  which  every  work  on  war  has  de- 
nounced as  foredoomed  to  disaster?  The  excuse 
cannot  be  offered  that  the  allies  were  waiting  for 
the  arrival  of  the  American  army.  A  large  army 
was  in  the  making  in  America,  and  the  greater 
part  of  it  had  been  ready  for  transportation  to 
Europe  for  several  months;  but  the  transporta- 
tion, while  available,  had  not  been  forthcoming, 
as  events  subsequently  disclosed  clearly  proved 
and  explained. 

The  Germans  attacked  the  5th  British  army  on 
March  21st,  and  quickly  broke  through  on  an 
extended  front.  The  disaster  galvanized  the  allies 
into  life.  The  gap  was  closed  as  brilliantly  and 
as  skillfully  as  it  had  been  opened. 

The  French  1st  army  was  moved  from  Alsace 
to  Picardy,  and  the  1st  division,  known  in  the 
army  as  the  American  division,  was  taken  along. 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  83 

An  immediate  counter-attack  was  projected,  and 
while  stopping  for  a  few  days  behind  the  new 
front  the  division  received  instruction  and  prac- 
tice in  the  assault.  For  reasons  unknown  to  me 
the  plan  for  the  attack  was  given  up.  Probably 
the  troops  necessary  to  this  operation  were  more 
urgently  needed  as  reinforcements  in  Flanders 
or  in  front  of  Amiens. 

The  1st  division  entered  the  line  in  Picardy 
while  the  German  forward  pressure  was  still  in 
force.  It  entered  a  battlefield  fairly  covered  with 
artillery  on  both  sides,  artillery  which  continued 
a  duel  for  more  than  a  month  before  the  American 
and  French  artillery  obtained  the  mastery.  All 
kinds  of  guns,  from  trench  mortars  with  a  range 
of  a  few  hundred  yards  to  long  naval  guns  firing 
twenty  kilometers  into  the  enemy's  back  areas, 
were  constantly  in  action.  All  day  the  opposing 
artilleries  fired  to  destroy  each  other,  or  upon 
targets  which  revealed  themselves  to  the  battery 
observers  or  to  the  balloons.  All  night  they  fired 
on  roads,  paths  and  stream  crossings,  to  impede 
the  advance  of  supplies,  ammunition  and  rein- 
forcements;   day   and   night   they  poured   their 


84?  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

shells  upon  trenches,  villages  and  woods,  to  rob 
the  enemy  of  sleep,  shatter  his  nerves,  and  kill 
him.  The  country  behind  the  lines  was  made  more 
deadly  from  artillery  j&re  than  the  front  lines, 
which  were  spared  to  avoid  the  accidents  of  short 
firing  into  their  own  infantry.  The  infantry,  how- 
ever, indulged  in  continuous  fighting  with  ma- 
chine gun,  rifle  and  grenade.  All  night  long  was 
conducted  a  partisan  warfare. 

**No  Man's  Land  must  be  American,''  was  the 
order  of  the  commanding  general,  and  our  infan- 
try made  it  so.  Enemy  patrols  were  attacked 
wherever  found,  irrespective  of  numbers  in  either 
party.  If  the  enemy  remained  in  his  trenches, 
he  was  sought  out  there.  During  the  early  days 
of  the  battle  the  Germans  on  our  left  unleashed 
an  attack  which  made  considerable  progress  for 
a  while,  and  eventually  some  of  our  long-range 
guns  were  brought  into  action;  but  so  concen- 
trated were  we  on  our  own  problem  that  hardly 
a  man  today  remembers  the  episode. 

We  had  learned  much  in  the  Toul  sector,  but 
were  still  lacking  in  that  knowledge  which  saves 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  85 

life.    We  lost  three  men  to  one  lost  by  the  French 
divisions  on  either  side  of  us. 

A  splendid  aviation  squadron  to  assist  our 
heavy  artillery  in  counter-battery  was  furnished 
by  the  French,  and  little  by  little  our  artillery  su- 
periority grew  and  the  German  batteries  were 
destroyed  or  withdrawn.  One  battalion  of  Ameri- 
can 155s  was  credited  with  the  destruction  of  ten 
German  batteries.  It  lost  no  guns  from  enemy 
hits,  but  two  were  blown  up  and  several  were 
worn  out  from  continuous  firing.  The  American 
batteries  were  heavily  manned.  It  was  possible 
to  have  two  shifts  of  gunners,  working  twelve 
hours  each,  and  still  replace  exhausted  men  with 
fresh  groups  from  the  horse  lines.  For  the  offi- 
cers, however,  there  was  no  rest,  and  the  excessive 
fatigue  revealed  the  greater  combatant  value  of 
young  men.  Officers  around  forty  years  of  age — 
and  there  were  a  number  of  gallant  spirits  of  that 
age  who  had  sought  commissions  as  junior  lieu- 
tenants— ^wore  down  under  the  strain,  while  boys 
in  their  early  twenties,  whose  military  value  had 
appeared  much  less  in  the  training  period,  on  the 
march,  and  in  the  early  days  of  action,  became 


86  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

red-eyed  and  pale,  it  is  true,  but  evinced  no  dim- 
inution of  vitality. 

Early  in  May,  German  resistance  was  so  far 
weakened  that  the  French  undertook  the  offen- 
sive. 

The  German  line  had  stopped  and  was  holding 
a  series  of  naturally  strong  points.  The  policy 
of  the  allied  high  command  was  to  take  all  of 
these  points  so  as  to  leave  the  enemy  no  points 
of  departure  for  new  attacks,  and,  likewise,  no 
bases  of  defense  for  our  future  offensive. 

Grivesnes  was  stormed  by  the  French,  our 
artillery  participating.  Soon  afterwards  it  was. 
confided  to  the  senior  officers  that  a  great  allied 
offensive  was  to  start  at  the  end  of  May  to  drive 
the  Germans  from  their  positions  so  dangerously 
near  to  Paris  and  too  close  to  Amiens.  The  gen- 
eral plan  was  for  three  divisions  to  attack  along 
the  line  we  held  and  advance  eastwardly;  and 
three  days  later  twenty  divisions  were  to  move 
north  from  the  front  at  Lassigny.  Later,  the  plan 
was  changed  to  an  attack  by  three  divisions  only ; 
but  when  the  assault  was  finally  made  the  1st 
division  infantry  made  it  alone. 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  87 

The  attack  was  of  the  kind,  carefully  prepared 
and  suddenly  executed,  which  had  been  introduced 
by  the  French  at  Verdun  in  the  previous  summer. 
Great  quantities  of  artillery  were  brought  up  to 
reinforce  that  of  our  division.  Batteries  of  trench 
mortars  were  installed  to  destroy  all  life  above 
ground  in  the  village  of  Cantigny ;  guns  of  220  mm. 
caliber  were  to  demolish  all  the  cellars;  two  bat- 
teries of  380  mm.  guns  (approximately  eleven 
inches  diameter)  were  to  break  into  a  tunnel 
known  to  exist  in  the  old  chateau,  and  a  hundred 
75s  were  to  put  the  rolling  barrage  before  our 
infantry.  French  tanks  were  to  lead  in  the  as- 
sault and  French  flame  throwers  were  to  destroy 
any  defenders  who  insisted  on  fighting  to  the  last 
from  underground  shelters. 

The  plan  of  battle  was  approved  by  the  French 
army  corps  under  which  we  served,  and  the  artil- 
lery plan  was  formulated  by  officers  specially  de- 
tailed for  this  purpose.  The  scheme  was  an  edu- 
cation in  itself,  and  the  method  of  putting  it  into 
execution  was  a  novelty  to  the  American  officers. 
We  had  been  brought  up  under  the  system  where- 
by orders  were  issued  by  a  superior  authority  and 


88  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

were  carried  out  by  subordinates,  without  ques- 
tion or  comment.  Eather  than  speak  back  to  a 
superior  officer,  our  batteries  bad  more  than 
once  fired  at  targets  designated  by  the  higher  com- 
mand, but  which  were  known  to  the  battery  and 
battalion  commanders  to  be  behind  their  range. 

For  the  assault  on  Cantigny  the  artillery  field 
officers  were  assembled  and  written  instructions 
were  issued  to  each.  The  plan  was  explained  and 
a  general  discussion  invited. 

The  American  officers  sat  silent  while  certain 
French  commanders  made  such  comments  as  ap- 
peared to  them  reasonable.  Comments  and  criti- 
cisms alike  were  received  amiably.  Some  criti- 
cisms were  waved  aside ;  but  others,  which  showed 
that  the  staff  had  been  mistaken  in  its  plan, 
brought  amendments,  thus  encouraging  some  of 
the  American  officers  to  make  observations  upon 
matters  particularly  within  their  own  knowledge. 
These  were  taken  under  consideration.  Where 
batteries  were  given  missions  upon  targets  for 
which  they  had  no  observation,  telephonic  com- 
munication with  observation  posts  overlooking 
these  targets  was  provided.    The  meeting  broke 


THE  GREAT  DIVISION  89 

up  with  every  officer  thoroughly  understanding 
the  work  before  him  and  sharing  the  general  con- 
fidence in  the  plans,  so  fully  explained  and  bound 
to  succeed. 

The  assault  took  place  exactly  as  scheduled. 
Every  objective  was  taken.  Every  counter-attack 
was  beaten  off.  The  smallness  of  the  losses  proved 
at  once  the  skill  of  the  planners  of  the  battle  and 
the  state  of  efficiency  at  which  the  1st  division 
had  now  arrived. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  Cantigny  battle  was  in- 
finitely greater  than  its  tactical  importance.  Since 
early  spring  the  Germans  had  been  winning  all 
along  the  line.  Now,  on  the  morrow  of  another 
great  German  victory,  when  the  only  hope  of  the 
allies  lay  in  American  reinforcements,  American 
troops  proved  that  they  could  throw  back  the 
enemy  in  formal  battle. 

The  success  of  the  1st  division  on  May  28th  was 
repeated  by  the  2nd  division  on  June  6th  at 
Chateau  Thierry.  The  American  quality  was 
proved;  only  numbers  were  necessary  to  assure 
the  victory. 

From  Cantigny  the  1st  division  was  to  go  to 


90  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

greater  victories  at  Soissons  and  at  St.  Mihiel, 
and  to  carry  the  greater  part  of  the  burden  of  the 
second  phase  of  the  Argonne.  It  was  to  furnish 
one  army  commander,  two  corps  commanders, 
seven  division  commanders,  a  commander  of  army 
corps  artillery,  and  too  many  brigadiers,  regi- 
mental commanders  and  important  staff  officers 
to  catalogue.  Thirty-two  thousand  of  its  officers 
and  men  were  killed  and  wounded.  Of  those  un- 
touched by  enemy  shot,  so  many  were  promoted  to 
command  in  other  organizations  as  to  leave  but 
a  leaven  to  inspire  the  replacements  of  officers  and 
men. 

So  great  a  thing  is  an  American  division  when 
thoroughly  trained  and  disciplined. 


CHAPTER  V 
gekmany's  last  offensive 

Before  taking  up  the  larger  operations  of 
American  troops,  which  were  now  arriving  in 
France  in  great  numbers,  it  is  necessary  to  review 
the  course  of  the  war  throughout  that  year. 

The  year  1917  closed  with  Germany  once  more 
successful  on  all  fronts.  In  the  east  Russia 
had  gone  bolshevik  and  made  peace,  a  peace  which 
Roumania  was  compelled  to  follow.  Italy,  badly 
routed,  had  reestablished  her  lines  only  with  the 
help  of  two  hundred  thousand  French  and  English 
troops.  On  the  western  front  the  Germans  had 
repulsed  both  the  French  and  English  offensives. 
The  French  attack  was  stopped,  with  heavy  losses 
to  Nivelle,  within  forty-eight  hours.  The  British 
offensive  proceeded  through  the  month  of  August, 
but  gradually  lost  its  momentum,  and  it  wore 
down  the  British  army,  not  yet  sufficiently  devel- 
oped to  conduct  a  major  operation.     Captured 

German  documents  attested  to  the  bravery  of 

91 


92  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Haig's'  troops,  dwelt  upon  the  inaccuracy  of  Ms 
artillery,  and  exposed  the  unskillfulness  of  the 
British  commanders. 

At  the  end  of  the  year  several  small  actions 
conveyed  important  military  lessons  to  those  who 
might  be  conversant  with  the  facts.  At  Verdun 
and  at  Malmaison  the  French,  striking  for  limited 
objectives,  made  attacks  whose  brilliancy  demon- 
strated that  at  last  France  had  competent  com- 
manders, who  had  discovered  how  to  co-ordinate 
the  operations  of  troops  of  the  different  arms 
equipped  with  modem  weapons.  They  formulated 
the  principle  that  *Hhe  artillery  conquers  the 
ground,  the  infantry  occupies  it."  The  German 
defenders,  both  infantry  and  artillery,  were  anni- 
hilated by  overwhelming  attacks  of  French  artil- 
lery, secretly  concentrated.  The  French  infantry 
mopped  up  what  was  left,  organized  the  occupied 
ground,  and  held  it  against  counter-attacks. 

The  British  assault  on  Cambrai  in  November 
was  an  experiment  with  a  new  weapon,  and  it 
succeeded  beyond  all  expectations.  A  large  num- 
ber of  tanks  and  a  supporting  force  of  infantry, 
which   events    proved   to    be    inadequate,    were 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE  93 

launched  in  an  early  morning  surprise  attack  with 
little  artillery  preparation.  They  easily  broke  the 
German  line  and  penetrated  a  number  of  kilo- 
meters, but  the  troops  were  insuflScient  to  exploit 
this  startling  success.  When  stopped,  they  occu- 
pied a  new  line  in  the  form  of  a  small  salient. 
The  German  general.  Von  der  Marwitz,  imme- 
diately concentrated  his  reserves  and  counter-at- 
tacked. Without  tanks  and  massed  artillery,  his 
success,  nevertheless,  was  complete.  The  English 
were  driven  back  in  confusion,  and  the  line  was 
only  restored  by  the  arrival  of  hastily  summoned 
French  troops,  who  made  one  of  those  long 
marches  that  no  other  allied  troops,  because  of 
incomplete  training  and  their  inexperienced  staffs, 
have  been  able  to  perform. 

A  valuable  lesson  should  have  been  drawn  from 
this  battle  by  any  soldiers  informed  of  its  details. 
Unfortunately,  the  military  censorship  had  thor- 
oughly absorbed  the  conviction  that  it  must  pub- 
licly announce  all  actions  as  victories.  This  time 
it  also  misinformed  its  allies.  American  head- 
quarters cabled  Washington  that  Cambrai  was  a 
moral  and  material  victory.    I  happened  to  be  at 


94  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

British  headquarters  the  day  of  the  German  suc- 
cess at  Cambrai,  and  I  told  our  staff  what 
actually  happened.  The  official  British  account, 
however,  was  accepted. 

If  Cambrai  had  been  recognized  for  what  it  was 
— a  British  defeat,  and  nearly  a  British  disaster — 
enough  pressure  might  have  been  brought  to  bear 
to  obtain  the  shipping  necessary  to  transport  our 
army  to  the  western  front  before  the  disaster  of 
March,  1918. 

Only  in  the  southeast  did  the  year  1917  end 
more  favorably  to  the  allied  cause.  More  success- 
ful in  diplomacy  than  in  battle,  the  entente  brought 
Greece,  whose  government  was  pro-German,  into 
the  war  on  its  side.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  after  Germany  had  defeated  and  was  over- 
running Serbia,  the  allies  invaded  northern 
Greece  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  making  a 
connection  with  that  country  and  using  Greek 
ports  as  submarine  bases.  Under  the  protection 
of  the  invading  armies  a  revolution  was  staged  by 
that  wiliest  of  statesmen,  Venizelos.  King  Con- 
stantine,  brother-in-law  of  the  German  Kaiser, 
was  compelled  to  abdicate,  and  his  son,  Prince 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE  95 

Alexander,  was  placed  on  the  throne.  A  republic 
probably  would  have  been  established  but  for  the 
opposition  of  English  royalists,  who  were  not 
anxious  to  see  a  monarchy  destroyed  to  make 
^oom  for  a  republic. 

In  December,  1917,  the  British  defeated  the 
Turkish  army  in  Palestine. 

The  incoming  year,  therefore,  saw  the  French 
and  English  standing  opposite  the  Germans,  and 
subsidiary  armies  facing  each  other  in  Italy  and 
Greece.  Everybody  knew  that  the  Spring  and 
Summer  would  witness  a  tremendous,  if  not  a  de- 
cisive, campaign  on  the  western  front.  Germany 
had  available  the  army  which  defeated  Kussia  and 
was  preparing  to  bring  it  across  Europe  by  rail. 
The  allies  had  the  American  army,  its  prelimi- 
nary organization  and  training  in  America  ac- 
complished, to  bring  across  the  Atlantic,  to  equip 
it  with  modern  weapons,  and  give  it  final  instruc- 
tion at  the  rear  and  in  the  trenches.  Here  was  re- 
produced on  a  grand  scale  the  oft  repeated  situa- 
tion of  two  hostile  armies  in  contact  and  awaiting 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  which  would  decide 
the  fate  of  the  battle. 


96  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

German  troops  now  marched  to  the  guns  while 
American  troops  were  left  fuming  in  America. 

The  1st  American  division  was  moved  to  France 
between  June  and  September,  1917,  and  was  fol- 
lowed, in  order,  by  the  26th  and  42nd.  The  2nd 
division  assembled  in  France  during  the  winter, 
and  the  41st  crossed  the  ocean  early  in  January. 
This  rate  of  progress  was  more  in  keeping  with 
America's  pre-war  unpreparedness  than  with  the 
glorious  rising  of  the  nation  which  followed  Field 
Marshal  Jeffreys  embassy. 

The  fault  was  not  principally  American.  True, 
our  newly  constituted  shipping  board  did  not 
function  well.  Resisting  the  demands  of  the  mili- 
tary authorities,  it  devoted  a  large  percentage  of 
its  shipping  to  commerce.  This  conduct  was  more 
reprehensible  than  injurious,  however,  because  the 
tonnage  at  its  disposal  was  smaU.  Troops  could 
not  be  moved  in  quantity  except  in  British  bot- 
toms, which,  from  the  beginning  of  our  overseas 
movements,  our  general  staff  in  Europe  had  been 
negotiating  unsuccessfully  to  obtain.  The  British 
held  back. 

M.  Painleve,  the  former  French  War  Minister, 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE  97 

tells  us  that  high  oflficers  of  the  British  army 
thought  they  could  win  the  war  before  American 
troops  arrived,  and  with  characteristic  sporting 
instinct  wished  to  carry  off  the  victory  without 
assistance.  The  war,  however,  had  made  over- 
whelming demands  on  British  shipping.  Merchant 
ships  had  been  used  as  breakwaters;  great  num- 
bers had  been  sunk  by  submarines;  many  had 
been  commandeered  to  carry  munitions,  war  sup- 
plies and  troops  to  England,  to  her  allied  coun- 
tries and  to  her  columns  of  conquest  in  Asia  and 
Africa.  Only  a  small  percentage  of  her  total  was 
left  to  maintain  her  foreign  trade  and  capture 
that  of  Germany. 

It  is  the  traditional  policy  of  England,  while 
engaged  in  European  wars,  to  lend  only  such  help 
on  the  continent  as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  the 
victory,  and  to  bend  the  rest  of  her  efforts  to  ex- 
tending the  British  empire  throughout  the  world. 

With  the  British  army  in  France  so  confident 
of  success,  it  was  unreasonable  to  expect  England 
to  deprive  herself  of  shipping  to  bring  into  France 
an  army  which  would  detract  from  British  im- 
portance at  the  peace  table. 


98  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Thus  January  and  February  and  the  first  three 
weeks  of  March  went  by  with  only  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  American  combatant  troops  in 
France,  and  no  movement  on  foot  to  accelerate 
their  transportation.  Less  excusable  was  the 
situation  on  the  actual  battlef  ront. 

Every  general  officer  in  each  allied  army  was 
sufficiently  read  in  the  history  of  warfare  to 
comprehend  the  disadvantage  under  which  two 
or  more  armies  under  separate  commanders 
labor  when  they  face  enemy  forces  operating 
under  a  single  commander.  Even  officers  who 
had  not  studied  military  history  hardly  could 
have  failed  to  see  how  the  united  German  com- 
mand for  four  years  had  resisted  and  defeated 
greatly  superior  numbers  of  allies,  divided  as  they 
were  into  separate  armies  under  generals  inde- 
pendent of  each  other.  Yet  so  shortsighted  in  real 
patriotism,  which  ought  to  look  only  for  the  ulti- 
mate success  of  their  country,  and  so  absorbed  in 
personal  glorification,  were  the  men  responsible 
for  the  military  control  of  the  war  that,  rather 
than  become  subordinate  one  to  another,  they  in- 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE  99 

sisted  upon  maintaining  a  military  relation 
doomed  to  defeat. 

Looking  back  on  the  days  of  March,  1918,  it  is 
strange  to  recall  how  confident  we  were  of  throw- 
ing back  the  inevitable  German  attack.  We  knew 
that  the  Germans  were  training  armies  back  of 
their  lines  for  the  decisive  assault;  we  knew  in 
general  the  tactics  they  proposed  to  employ.  We 
knew  that  the  Germans  had  successfully  broken 
the  Eussian,  Serbian  and  Italian  fronts,  and  we 
had  learned  of  their  new  mustard  gas  through 
bitter  experience.  Yet,  each  army  on  the  west- 
em  front  felt  that  the  Germans  could  not  break 
through  it! 

What  happened  on  March  21st  is  known.  In 
spite  of  air  patrols,  of  trench  raids,  and  of 
allied  spies,  the  Germans  succeeded  in  marching 
a  great  army  through  a  territory  inhabited  by  a 
French  population  hostile  and  eager  to  furnish  in- 
formation to  their  countrymen,  and  completely 
surprised  the  British  5th  army. 

They  were  well  informed  of  the  location  of  the 
British  organized  defenses  and  batteries.  Before 
the  assault  these  were  overwhelmed  by  yperite 


100  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

gas,  the  effects  of  which  continued  long  after  the 
bombardment  had  ceased,  allowing  the  German 
artillery  to  turn  its  full  force  to  the  protection  of 
the  attacking  troops. 

The  British  defeat  was  complete.  The  way  was 
open  to  Amiens.  The  Germans  did  what  the  allies 
had  failed  to  do  under  more  favorable  circum- 
^stances — they  completely  broke  the  trench  system 
and  annihilated  the  defending  army.  One  British 
general,  believing  all  was  lost,  maneuvered  his 
troops  as  though  to  protect  the  broken  right  flank 
of  the  British  army,  apparently  forgetting  there 
was  a  gap  in  the  common  front  that  must  be  closed 
to  avert  an  allied  disaster.  In  momentary  panic, 
he  acted  as  if  his  only  thought  was  to  enable  the 
British  army  to  get  back  safely  to  the  seacoast. 

Then,  with  victory  in  Germany's  hands,  the 
French  army  performed  a  maneuver  as  extraordi- 
nary in  its  way  as  the  German  attack,  gfnd  closed 
around  the  hole  in  the  line.  Nearby  troops 
marched  to  the  battlefield  with  unprecedented 
speed,  more  remote  troops  moved  in  camions,  and 
an   entire   army  crossed  France   by  rail  from 


GERMANY'S  LAST  05;FPNSXYP,        IQX 

Lorraine.  Of  this  army  the  Americaii  Ist  division 
formed  a  part. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  result  of  the  battle  of 
March  21st  was  the  inevitable  consequence  of  a 
situation  which  allowed  an  army,  organized  and 
trained  through  the  years,  to  devote  its  entire  at- 
tention to  an  army  built  up  during  the  war.  I 
have  no  doubt  the  same  thing  would  have  hap- 
pened to  the  American  army,  in  the  same  position. 
Only  the  French  could  meet  the  Germans  on  even 
terms,  and  this  because  they  had  organized  for 
war  as  long  and  as  carefully  as  their  traditional 
foe. 

The  desperate  situation  galvanized  the  torpid 
allied  governments  into  action.  An  allied  com- 
mander-in-chief was  named.  After  March  21st 
there  could  be  no  doubt  in  what  army  the  supreme 
command  should  lie.  It  was  given  to  General 
Foch  and  his  French  staff. 

Foch  received  the  appointment  because  of  the 
high  opinion  Clemenceau  entertained  for  him.  In 
many  circles  Joffre  would  have  been  the  most 
welcome  leader.  Joffre,  however,  had  a  certain 
military  opposition  and  he  was  much  feared  by 


.10^        .  ,  ,,_THE;  ARMY  OF  1918 

ttV  French  pbliticiaiis  because  of  his  popularity. 

I  do  not  feel  that  the  personality  of  Foch  made 
much  difference.  What  was  needed  was  any  one 
of  a  half  dozen  French  generals  educated  in  the 
French  schools  of  high  command,  who  had  prac- 
ticed during  the  years  of  peace  the  maneuvering 
of  large  bodies  of  men  by  rail  and  by  road,  and 
who  had  risen  in  the  French  army  with  a  freedom 
of  promotion  for  merit  which  did  not  exist  in  the 
English  armies.  If  France  did  not  produce  any 
great  general  in  this  war,  she  did  furnish  a  num- 
ber of  masters  of  technique  and  she  certainly 
promoted  officers  who  demonstrated  unusual 
ability. 

With  the  German  drive  stopped  by  the  French 
just  short  of  Amiens,  and  again  in  April  at  Kem- 
mel  Hill,  the  allied  position  was  almost  hopeless. 
A  few  more  concentrations,  a  few  more  drives, 
and  Germany  must  be  victorious.  The  only  hope 
of  salvation  was  to  get  American  help  before  Ger- 
many could  strike  again. 

Commercial  considerations  being  forgotten, 
shipping  was  produced  as  if  by  magic.  A  new 
and   serious  question,   however,   had  presented 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE         103 

itself.  Should  the  half-trained  and  imperfectly 
armed  American  troops  be  transported  across  the 
ocean  in  the  face  of  a  not  improbable  German  vic- 
tory, of  which  they  could  only  be  the  spoils?  If 
Germany  should  win  before  Summer,  the  Ameri- 
can troops  would  not  be  in  condition  to  assist  in 
the  allied  defense;  they  would  fall  into  the  Ger- 
man hands  as  hostages,  and  they  would  not  be 
available  to  defend  the  American  seacoast  from 
the  attack  of  the  victor. 

I  have  an  idea  that  many  readers  will  scorn  a 
suggestion  implying  so  despicable  a  motive.  Let 
them  study  the  conduct  of  the  allies  during  the 
war;  the  ratio  between  English  troops  in  France 
and  in  England  and  the  failure  to  support  Eussia 
in  1915. 

America  sent  her  troops.  She  did  much  more. 
She  sent  them  as  the  allies  needed  them,  and  not 
as  the  ambitions  of  their  generals  dictated  or  as 
their  own  welfare  required.  Divisions  were 
broken  up  and  the  infantry  sent  without  its  ar- 
tillery. They  were  sent,  not  to  enter  quiet  sectors 
for  instruction  in  modem  warfare,  but  to  reinforce 
tired,  hard-pressed  troops  on  an  active  front.    A 


104  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

large  part  of  them  were  put  under  generals  and 
colonels  of  an  army  which  had  just  been  com- 
pletely defeated. 

The  troops  which  went  into  action  with  the 
British  were  not  raw  troops.  They  were,  for  the 
most  part,  national  guardsmen,  many  of  whose 
officers  had  given  their  leisure  time  to  military 
study.  They  had  received  preliminary  training 
in  the  Mexican  mobilization  and  had  now  been 
drilling  for  nearly  a  year.  They  had  been  prac- 
ticed in  marching  formations,  had  received  small 
arms  and  bayonet  training,  and  had  been  taught 
infantry  tactics  so  far  as  these  had  developed  up 
to  the  Summer  of  1917.  They  had  not  studied  the 
use  of  the  modem  infantry  weapons  of  assault, 
the  trench  mortars  or  infantry  cannon.  They  had 
not  learned  the  use  of  cover,  which  only  comes 
from  service  at  the  front,  and  which  can  be  taught 
with  smaller  losses  in  sector  warfare.  They  were 
totally  uninformed  as  to  the  methods  of  attack 
developed  and  perfected  by  the  French  at  the  end 
of  1917  and  they  were  not  accompanied  by  their 
own  artillery,  which  should  have  been  trained 
with  them  until  they  had  reached  the  perfect  un- 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE         105 

derstanding  essential  to  the  support  of  infantry 
if  it  is  to  be  saved  heavy  losses  in  assault. 

So  much  higher,  therefore,  is  their  glory,  that 
without  flinching  they  faced  the  strain  of  battle 
which  the  French  higher  command  only  required 
of  the  1st  division  after  three  months  of  sector 
training,  of  the  2nd  after  five  months,  and  of  the 
26th  and  42nd  after  six. 

After  March  21st  American  divisions  debarked 
in  France  in  the  following  sequence :  32nd,  3rd,  5th 
complete,  and  the  28th,  77th,  4th,  27th,  30th,  35th 
and  33d  without  artillery. 

On  May  27th  the  Germans  broke  the  Franco- 
British  Chemin  des  Dames  line  and  marched  into 
the  Chateau  Thierry  salient,  to  be  stopped  on  June 
4th  by  another  army,  hastily  collected  by  General 
Foch,  of  which  the  American  2nd  division  occupied 
the  key  position  on  the  direct  road  to  Paris,  while 
the  machine  gun  battalion  of  the  3rd  division  went 
into  action  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Mame. 

American  troops  were  now  called  upon  in  num- 
bers. The  3rd,  4th  and  28th  divisions  were  moved 
from  British  fronts  to  the  Chateau-Thierry 
salient.    The  26th  was  brought  from  Toul  and  put 


106  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

into  the  front  line,  and  the  42nd  was  taken  from 
reserve  at  Baccarat  and  put  into  line  near  Reims. 
The  77th,  82nd,  35th  and  32nd  divisions  were 
training,  relieving  divisions  already  trained,  and 
wearing  down  the  Germans  in  the  quiet  sectors. 

The  German  advances  had  stopped,  forming  a 
series  of  salients  projecting  into  our  lines. 

From  the  days  of  short  fronts  and  short  range 
weapons,  salients  have  been  well  recognized  weak 
points  for  the  reason  that  the  adversary  could 
concentrate  a  heavy  fire  upon  them  from  several 
directions  and  confuse  the  defenders  by  simul- 
taneous attacks  on  the  different  fronts.  In  the 
early  part  of  this  war,  although  ranges  had  in- 
creased enormously,  the  lengths  of  fronts  had  in- 
creased in  even  greater  proportion,  and  many 
salients  were  created  and  held  with  impunity  be- 
cause they  were  so  much  greater  in  extent  than 
the  range  of  the  artillery  used  in  the  early  period 
of  the  war  that  it  was  impossible  to  concentrate 
fire  upon  them.  It  seemed  as  though  the  old  prin- 
ciple of  tactics  no  longer  held. 

However,  by  the  Spring  of  1918  the  French  had 
armed  themselves  with  a  great  number  of  mobile 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE  107 

guns  ranging  nearly  20,000  meters.  With  these 
they  surrounded  the  Cantigny  and  Chateau- 
Thierry  salients.  The  divisional  artillery  fired  to 
its  extreme  range.  From  there  on  the  155  longs 
took  up  the  mission.  A  small  semicircle  which  the 
longs  could  not  reach  was  attacked  with  special 
cannon  of  still  greater  range  and  with  aerial  bom- 
bardments. Nowhere  in  the  salients  was  there 
safety  or  rest  for  the  Germans.  Advancing  to  the 
front  line  or  returning  to  rest,  they  were  compelled 
to  pass  mile  after  mile  over  roads  subject  to  artil- 
lery fire. 

The  effect  of  this  artillery  fire  must  not  be  for- 
gotten in  casting  up  the  reasons  for  the  German 
collapse. 

On  June  7th  the  Germans  attempted  another 
grand  attack  on  the  line  Montdidier-Noyon, 
and  here  they  met  their  first  complete  check.  The 
French  had  notice  of  the  plan  and  adopted  a  spe- 
cial form  of  tactics  to  defeat  it.  Strong  points 
were  skillfully  concealed  and  held  in  force.  Ger- 
man troops  passing  between  them,  according  to 
their  new  tactics  of  infiltration,  were  caught  under 
the   concentrated  artillery  fire   of  the   defense. 


108  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Wlien  the  weight  of  the  German  attack  forced 
back  the  garrisons  at  the  strong  points,  these  re- 
tired in  good  order  upon  a  line  of  supporting 
troops,  drawn  up  beyond  the  range  of  the  German 
barrage,  and  fully  prepared  for  battle.  The  at- 
tack was  stopped,  and  the  10th  army,  under  Gen- 
eral Mangin,  advancing  from  billets  in  the  region 
of  Beauvais,  counter-attacked  on  the  German 
right  flank  and  drove  it  back  in  disorder. 

This  was  the  first  big  allied  success  and  it  was 
made  possible  by  the  valor  of  the  French  troops, 
the  tactical  skill  of  their  leaders,  and  the  presence 
of  five  hundred  thousand  American  troops,  which 
released  an  equal  number  of  French  veterans 
from  the  quiet  sectors  to  thicken  their  defensive 
organization. 

With  the  entrance  into  line  of  the  American 
army  in  force  the  hour  for  German  victory  had 
passed. 

Disturl)ed  by  rumors  from  the  Fatherland,  and 
hurried  by  the  rapid  development  of  the  Ameri- 
cans, the  German  staff  began  to  falter.  The 
preparations  for  the  attack  around  Eeims  were 
not  well  concealed.     Field  Marshal  Foch  was 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE         109 

fully  informed  of  them  and  massed  his  defensive 
troops.  Not  only  Americans,  but  English  and 
even  Italians,  were  brought  to  the  battlefield. 
Even  the  exact  hour  of  the  assault  was  learned, 
and  the  French  defensive  bombardment  was 
started  one  hour  before  the  German  fire.  Sur- 
prised with  munitions  for  the  artillery  prepara- 
tion piled  beside  the  guns,  with  columns  of  troops 
advancing  into  position  along  heavily  shelled 
roads,  it  was  too  late  to  stop  the  attack. 

General  Gouraud  withdrew  his  troops  from  the 
front  into  three  defensive  lines.  He  ordered  that 
the  first  line,  when  hard  pressed,  should  fall  back 
on  the  second,  and  the  third  line  troops  should 
act  for  counter-attack,  or  for  defense  of  the  last 
position,  as  developments  of  the  battle  might 
dictate. 

In  the  first  line  only  groups  of  machine  gunners 
and  signalers  were  left.  They  were  to  notify  the 
command  of  the  start  of  the  German  assault  and 
keep  the  defensive  artillery  informed  of  its  prog- 
ress, so  that  the  heavy  barrage  could  be  kept  con- 
stantly on  the  advancing  Germans. 

From  Chateau-Thierry  to  Verdun  this  attack 


110  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

stopped  either  at  the  advance  or  at  the  inter- 
mediate line,  excepting  just  west  of  Eeims,  where 
the  German  column  thrust  back  its  opposition  and 
continued  to  progress  towards  Epernay.  Nowhere 
did  Americans  give  way.  The  42nd  and  3rd  di- 
visions particularly  distinguished  themselves. 

Not  many  troops  on  either  side  were  available 
for  maneuver,  but  on  the  allied  side  there  re- 
mained at  the  disposition  of  Marshal  Foch  the 
best  troops  in  the  war,  the  1st  and  2nd  American 
divisions  and  the  French  Moroccans.  These  three 
divisions  were  formed  into  a  special  corps  under 
General  Berdoulat,  and,  assisted  by  a  mass  of 
little,  fast  French  tanks,  debouched  from  the  for- 
est of  Villers-Cotterets  at  daylight  on  July  18th. 
By  nightfall  they  had  driven  seven  kilometers  into 
the  enemy's  line.  Without  reinforcement  or  re-" 
lief,  they  attacked  again  the  next  day,  and  on  the 
20th  captured  Berzy-le-Sec,  cutting  the  road  from 
Soissons  to  Chateau-Thierry. 

The  German  advance  on  Epernay,  made  in  the 
hope  of  capturing  Reims  and  flattening  out  the 
salient,  had  to  be  abandoned,  and  their  resources 
devoted   to    stopping   the    great    counter-attack 


GERMANY'S  LAST  OFFENSIVE         111 

which  threatened  to  capture  their  whole  army. 
Scotch  and  French  troops  relieved  the  Americans 
and  the  Moroccans,  but  German  reinforcements 
in  equal  numbers  had  been  rushed  to  the  scene 
and  the  allied  advance  was  stopped. 


CHAPTEE     VI 

A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS 

Shobtly  after  the  battle  of  Cantigny  I  was  pro- 
moted to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel  in  my 
old  regiment,  now  the  122nd  field  artillery,  and 
upon  its  arrival  in  France  was  assigned  to  it  at 
the  request  of  the  regimental  commander.  Nei- 
ther in  the  regular  army  nor  in  any  foreign  serv- 
ice have  I  seen  a  body  of  men  reach  a  greater 
state  of  efficiency  before  they  had  undergone  the 
experience  of  battle.  The  regiment  was  in  a  splen- 
did state  of  administration,  of  discipline  and  of 
morale.  The  officers,  who  had  come  from  the  cav- 
alry more  than  a  year  before,  had  studied  their 
new  technique  to  good  effect. 

Upon  the  order  of  the  commanding  officer  I 
prepared  a  course  of  instruction,  drawn  from 
eight  months'  experience  at  the  front,  which  was 
to  supplement  the  instruction  in  fire  adjustment 
given  by  the  school. 

I  insert  these  instructions,  written  in  the  midst 

112 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  113 

of  war,  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  illustration. 
In  later  chapters  I  will  refer  to  untrained  divisions 
and  green  divisions.  Our  inexperienced  troops 
were  ignorant  of  many  military  accomplishments 
not  touched  upon  in  this  simple  course.  The  points 
I  sought  to  cover  were  essentials  in  which  most 
of  the  officers  who  had  come  to  the  1st  division 
from  America  and  from  training  schools  in  France 
had  either  not  been  taught  or  had  totally  failed  to 
comprehend. 

The  immense  blockades  on  the  roads  during  the 
Argonne  fighting  were  primarily  due  to  ignorance 
of  road  discipline.  The  hunger  of  which  so  many 
complained  was  due  to  their  ignorance  of  the  con- 
servation and  use  of  food. 

INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  TROOPS  ABOUT  TO  ENTER 
THE  LINE 

Upon  leaving  the  training  camp  and  entering  upon 
active  duty,  it  is  necessary  for  junior  officers  to  appre- 
ciate the  immensely  greater  responsibilities  which  they 
incur.  In  a  regimental  camp,  the  commanding  officer 
or,  in  all  events,  the  field  officers  between  them,  can 
personally  supervise  everything  and  can  personally 
direct  and  correct  whenever  necessary.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  deployed  in  action,  when  spread  out  on  the 


114  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

marcli  and  even  when  billeted  in  towns,  this  immediate 
supervision  becomes  impossible.  Enforcement  of  orders 
and  discipline  devolves  upon  the  junior  officers  v/mdded. 

The  senior  officers  can  only  issue  orders  and  inspect 
to  see  if  they  are  properly  carried  out  and  if  not,  to 
proceed  against  the  officer  who  has  fadled  ta  ca^y  them 
out. 

CHAPTER  I.  The  Maxch.— The  rules  for  con- 
ducting a  march  are  the  following: 

(1)  All  vehicles  must  be  securely  and  neatly  packed. 

(2)  When  moving,  all  vehicles  must  be  kept  at  all 
times  at  the  extreme  right  of  the  paved  road,  in 
order  to  allow  traffic  freely  to  pass  the  column. 
When  halted,  the  vehicles  will  be  pulled  clear  off 
the  road,  whenever  possible. 

(3)  They  must  be  formed  in  groups.  Generally,  ten 
vehicles  form  a  group  and  the  distance  between 
groups  is  fifty  meters,  to  form  a  pocket  in  which 
faster  vehicles  may  enter  when  meeting  traffic, 
or  while  passing  the  train.  A  red  disc  is  placed 
on  the  rear  end  of  the  rear  wagon  of  each  group. 

(4)  Trains  will  never,  under  any  circumstances,  be 
stopped  in  towns. 

The  foregoing  rules  are  elementary,  but  because  of 
their  simplicity  are  frequently  neglected.  Their  ob- 
servance is  absolutely  obligatory  and  must  be  enforced, 
if  necessary,  by  severe  disciplinary  measures  against 
negligent  officers.  The  next  two  rule?  are  not  easily  ob- 
served.   They  are: 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  116 

(5)  Never  allow  the  road  to  become  blocked. 

(6)  Never  lose  the  way. 

Most  frequent  causes  for  blocking  of  traffic  are  becom- 
ing mired  and  driving  off  the  paved  road.  These  faults 
can  be  minimized  with  well  trained  drivers,  but  there  is, 
on  narrow  or  bad  roads,  a  constant  opportunity  for  the 
initiative  of  the  commanding  officer.  For  instance, 
when  coming  to  a  steep  hill,  or  to  a  soft  length  of  road 
that  threatens  to  stjdl  the  train,  attach  additional  horses 
to  each  vehicle  before  it  enters  the  bad  spot.  It  is 
easier  to  pull  a  moving  vehicle  through  a  muddy  hole  or 
up  a  steep  slope  than  to  start  one  once  stalled.  In  the 
case  of  a  sharp  turn  in  a  narrow  road,  it  is  desirable  to 
unhitch  the  lead  horses ;  sometimes  all  except  the  wheel- 
ers may  be  removed.  Time  taken  in  these  little  opera- 
tions is  inconsequential  compared  with  the  long  delays 
due  to  stalling  of  a  gun  or  park  wagon. 

On  the  march  to  Cantigny  two  wagons  getting  off  a 
bad  piece  of  road  delayed  a  regiment  of  artillery  eight 
hours. 

Whenever  a  train  becomes  blocked  for  any  reason,  it  is 
the  duty  of  a  superior  commander  to  investigate  the  con- 
duct of  the  officer  immediately  in  charge,  to  ascertain 
not  only  whether  he  was  guilty  of  negligence  but  whether 
he  exercised  all  the  initiative  and  energy  which  might 
be  expected  and  required  of  him. 

The  final  injunction  (6)  is  the  most  important,  the 
most  frequently  violated,  and  the  one  whose  violation 
is  the  most  fatal  in  its  consequences. 


116  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

The  rule  is  absolute. 

An  officer  travelling  must  never  lose  his  way. 

An  officer  who  violates  this  injunction  must  be  con- 
sidered prima  fcbcie  guilty  of  a  very  serious  offense,  re- 
quiring the  strongest  kind  of  evidence  to  overcome  his 
presumption  of  guilt. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  be  lost.  Sometimes  a  road  is 
easy  to  follow  and,  therefore,  invites  carelessness.  Other 
times  a  way  may  appear  so  difficult  as  to  invite  dis- 
couragement. The  consequences  of  a  mistake  may  be 
so  serious,  in  a  military  way,  that  mistakes  must  be 
made  serious  for  the  offender.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  many  battles  have  been  lost  because  an  organization, 
or  even  a  messenger,  violated  this  simple  rule. 

Precautions  to  be  taken  include  a  careful  study  of 
the  map,  a  careful  reading  of  all  signboards  along  the 
road,  and,  when  doubt  exists,  an  interrogation  of  inhabi- 
tants and  scouting  along  different  forks  of  a  doubtful 
crossroad. 

A  train  once  committed  to  a  wrong  road  may  be  com- 
pelled to  a  long  detour;  may  run  to  a  blind  end;  may 
have  to  be  left  out  of  an  operation  entirely.  It  is,  there- 
fore, indispensable  that  a  train  shall  have  competent 
scouts  pushed  sufficiently  far  in  advance  to  establish 
the  correct  direction  before  the  column  reaches  the 
crossroad. 

Each  battery  will  have  a  machine  gun  mounted  on  a 
wagon  for  use  against  airplane  attack.  The  machine 
gun  detail  will  be  charged  with  keeping  a  sharp  look- 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  117 

out  for  hostile  airplanes.  Whenever  a  hostile  airplane 
is  reported  within  the  vicinity  of  the  column,  the  column 
will  be  withdrawn  under  trees,  if  possible,  otherwise 
halted  on  the  road  until  the  airplane  has  passed.  All 
mounted  men  will  dismount  when  at  a  halt.  On  the 
march,  drivers  will  be  required  to  walk  about  half 
the  time. 

Officers  should  be  taught  to  locate  the  North  Star 
by  the  Big  and  Little  Dippers  and  by  Cassiopeia.  They 
should  accustom  themselves  to  follow  the  course  of 
the  sun  by  day  and  of  the  stars  at  night.  They  should 
also  memorize  the  general  course  of  the  rivers  of  the 
neighborhood.  Watches,  compasses,  and  maps  are  es- 
sential to  scientific  warfare,  but  one  should  be  prepared 
to  get  along  without  them  if  necessary. 

CHAPTER  11.  Occupying  Positions. — Occupying 
battery  positions  divides  under  four  heads.  The  first 
is  in  the  case  of  the  relief  of  a  sector.  In  this  case 
a  battery  generally  takes  up  the  position  of  the  battery 
it  relieves.  Ample  time  is  furnished  for  reconnaissance 
of  roads.  The  relief  is  made  at  night  in  order  to  avoid 
observation  by  the  enemy,  and  if  traffic  on  the  road 
permits  it  is  desirable  to  separate  the  guns  by  an  in- 
terval of  five  minutes'  march  to  allow  each  gun  to  un- 
limber  and  the  horses  to  move  away  before  the  next  gun 
arrives  in  position.  This  plan  will  minimize  confusion 
in  case  fire  comes  on  the  battery  during  the  relief,  or 
in  case  of  fire  along  the  road  of  approach.  It  is  the 
duty  of  the  outgoing  battery  to  turn  over  to  the  iacom- 


118  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

ing  battery  all  information,  of  whatever  nature,  per- 
taining to  its  battery  position.  An  officer  of  the  out- 
going battery  remains  with  the  incoming  battery  for  a 
day  or  two;  the  incoming  battery  commander  should 
avail  himself  to  the  fullest  extent  of  the  information 
of  the  outgoing  officer.  Pride  or  a  false  fear  of  appear- 
ing ignorant  cannot  be  tolerated. 

The  second  case  of  occupying  a  battery  position  is  as 
a  reinforcing  battery.  In  this  instance,  a  number  of  the 
available  battery  positions  will  have  been  noted  by  the 
staff,  and  there  will  be  offered  to  each  groupment,  or 
group,  either  a  certain  number  of  alternative  battery 
positions  from  which  to  select,  or  the  locations  for  bat- 
teries will  be  indicated  by  coordinates.  Sometimes  no 
opportunity  for  reconnaissance  can  be  given  the  battery 
officers.  Hence,  absolute  familiarity  with  the  map  is 
essential. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  with  the  immense  quan- 
tity of  artillery  used  in  this  war,  individual  batteries 
must  be  located  according  to  a  general  plan,  the  needs 
of  the  individual  battery  giving  way  to  the  greater 
needs  of  the  whole.  At  the  same  time,  group  and  bat- 
tery officers  have  much  better  opportunity  for  deter- 
mining the  very  best  location  for  a  battery  within  a 
limited  area  and  much  greater  interest  in  so  doing  than 
has  the  staff.  Therefore,  when  a  battery  commander 
finds  a  position  which  he  thinks  will  allow  him  to  per- 
form all  his  missions,  will  not  interfere  with  any  other 
battery,  and  will  afford  him  greater  protection  than  the 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  119 

one  allotted  him,  he  should  report  this  fact  to  his  imme- 
diate superior.  Every  battery  and  group  commander 
studies  the  ground  in  his  area  with  great  care  so  as  to 
endeavor  to  get  absolutely  the  best  location  and  ar- 
rangement of  his  guns.  The  Plan  Director  is  a  map 
of  extraordinary  exactness,  but  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  contours  are  separated  by  five  meters  and  cannot 
portray  the  small  accidents  of  the  ground  which  fur- 
nish the  best  defilade  both  from  view  and  from  fire. 

The  third  case  is  that  of  an  advance.  The  conditions 
are  much  the  same  as  in  reinforcing;  the  batteries  are 
moved  according  to  a  plan  of  operations.  The  difference 
is  that  the  accidents  of  battle  may  disarrange  the  plan 
and  call  upon  the  immediate  commander  to  display 
initiative  and  originality. 

The  fourth  case  is  of  batteries  going  to  fill  a  gap  in 
the  line,  as  at  Montdidier  and  Chateau-Thierry.  This 
condition  more  nearly  approximates  the  methods  set 
down  in  our  drill  regulations  than  any  of  the  others. 
It  may  be  pointed  out  that  in  this  situation  the  enemy's 
infantry  has  preceded  his  artillery  and  that,  as  less 
counter-battery  is  to  be  feared,  less  attention  need  be 
paid  to  defilade  and  more  to  the  selection  of  positions 
which  facilitate  the  quick  opening  of  fire. 

CHAPTER  in.  Emplacements.— -Work  on  battery 
emplacements  should  be  begun,  when  possible,  be- 
fore the  arrival  of  the  battery,  and  to  this  end  the  bat- 
tery and  group  commanders  should  endeavor  to  send 
forward  working  parties  to  get  some  sort  of  protection 


120  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

before  the  battery  arrives.  Work  on  the  emplacement 
must  continue  as  long  as  the  battery  occupies  the  posi- 
tion. Men  should  be  encouraged  to  take  pride  in  their 
skill  in  constructing  battery  positions  and  not  to  feel 
disappointed  when  their  well-built  position  must  be 
evacuated. 

It  is  a  simple  matter  to  make  a  protection  against 
shrapnel  and  shell  fragments,  even  of  large  caliber 
shells.  When  a  gun  crew  is  so  protected  that  it  cannot 
be  put  out  of  action  except  by  a  direct  hit  by  shell, 
there  is  little  chance  of  it  failing  to  perform  its  duty 
in  battle,  even  if  under  fire.  With  time,  tunnels  to 
shelter  gun  crews  can  be  driven  to  a  sufficient  depth  to 
render  them  proof  against  counter-battery  fire. 

The  method  and  order  of  construction  of  battery  posi- 
tions are  laid  down  in  general  orders.  It  is  well  to  call 
the  attention  of  battery  commanders  to  the  fact  that  the 
battery  commander  ^s  command  posts  should  be  at  least 
100  meters  to  one  flank  of  the  guns. 

CHAPTER  IV.  Defilade.— This  is  the  most  dif- 
ficult part  of  the  artillery  and,  next  to  correct  shooting, 
the  most  important.  It  includes  the  selection  of  a  posi- 
tion, the  artificial  improvement  of  this  position,  and 
the  abstention  from  doing  things  which  will  reveal  the 
position  to  an  enemy  on  the  ground  or  in  the  air. 

An  ideal  position  for  75s  would  be  along  a  road  of 
irregular  tracing  not  carried  on  the  map;  in  some 
broken  ground  in  which  the  wheels,  trail  and  gun  crew 
can  be  located  in  a  depression  where  the  natural  sur- 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  121 

f axje  of  the  ground  reaches  up  to  the  muzzle  and  forward 
rises  a  mask  which  does  not  interfere  with  the  minimum 
range  required  for  the  tactical  use  of  the  guns ;  for  the 
howitzers  a  position  along  a  similar  road  but  behind  a 
hill,  the  higher  the  better,  with  a  slope  of  30  degrees, 
or  behind  a  steep  bank,  or  in  a  cut  or  ravine. 

The  75s,  because  of  their  small  size  and  flash,  can  be 
very  effectively  concealed  among  bushes,  hedges  or 
orchards.  The  howitzers  are  not  as  easily  concealed,  and 
because  of  their  high  angle  of  fire  may  be  placed  in 
woods  or  behind  hills  where  the  field  pieces  could  not 
operate.  In  any  battery  area  a  number  of  sites  will 
be  found,  each  possessing  various  advantages  and 
disadvantages.  It  is  a  part  of  the  function  of  an 
artilleryman  to  balance  the  advantages  and  select  the 
most  suitable. 

Battery  officers  should  take  every  opportunity  to 
study  the  conformation  of  ground  and  to  pick  out  likely 
battery  positions.  It  is  only  by  perfect  familiarity  with 
ground  conformation  that  officers  in  battle  can  rapidly 
select  the  best  available  position.  They  should  beware 
of  small  woods  carried  on  the  plan  director.  If  their 
presence  in  such  a  wood  becomes  known,  their  cover 
becomes  a  target,  a  point  which  can  be  used  by  the 
enemy  to  measure  ranges  and  deflections  and  an  object 
of  good  visibility  for  airplane  observation. 

The  battery  position  selected,  the  problem  of  artificial 
concealment  [camouflage]  presents  itself.  This  is  the 
subject  of  vital  importance.     One  of  the  greatest  mis- 


12S  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

takes  an  artillery  officer  unfamiliar  with  the  subject  can 
make  is  to  minimize  it  through  egotism.  A  study  of 
enemy  counter-battery  fire  upon  any  groupment  will 
reveal  the  fact  that  one  or  two  batteries  receive  most 
of  the  punishment.  This  is  due  to  bad  camouflage  and 
bad  defilade  discipline  in  the  batteries  concerned. 

Any  battery  commander  can  learn  the  principles  of 
camouflage,  and  by  availing  himself  of  talent  in  his 
organization  can  obtain  a  great  degree  of  invisibility. 
The  principle  of  camouflage  is  to  have  the  ground  upon 
which  the  battery  rests  reveal  to  aerial  observation  or 
photography  little  or  no  change. 

First,  the  four  pieces  should  not  be  placed  at  regular 
intervals  or  in  line;  second,  no  shadows  should  be 
thrown;  camouflage  nets  should  be  sloped  so  that  early 
morning  sun  and  the  late  evening  sun  will  not  cast 
shadows.  Existing  shadows  should  not  be  suppressed; 
for  instance,  if  a  battery  is  located  in  a  quarry  the 
camouflage  should  not  cover  the  side  of  the  quarry.  Re- 
flection of  light  is  to  be  avoided ;  camouflage  should  not 
be  stretched  tight  and  flat.  Black  holes  should  not  ap- 
pear, for  which  reason  curtains  must  extend  over  em- 
brasures and  back  of  the  emplacements  and  over  ammuni- 
tion shelters.  It  is  found  desirable  to  have  the  bottom 
of  the  camouflage  net  about  two  feet  from  the  ground. 
Where  foliage  must  be  cut  to  permit  the  firing  of  bat- 
teries, this  must  be  done  with  careful  study ;  the  cutting 
must  be  (1)  reduced  to  the  absolute  minimum;  (2)  not 
nearer  to  the  ground  than  the  requirements  of  minimum 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  123 

range  demand,  and  (3)  not  regular  in  shape.  Batteries 
in  woods  and  hedges  will  be  greatly  helped  in  their  con- 
cealment by  use  of  freshly  cut  branches  set  on  end, 
either  in  the  ground  or  in  wire  netting  above  the  pieces. 

The  camouflage  erected,  the  battery  commander  can- 
not dismiss  the  subject.  Camouflage  has  the  habit  of 
falling  into  disarray,  like  the  clothing  of  a  schoolboy, 
and  in  order  to  look  natural  needs  to  be  readjusted  to 
meet  the  different  conditions  of  light,  like  the  com- 
plexion of  a  mature  beauty.  If  one  of  the  officers  shows 
an  aptitude  for  the  subject,  he  may  be  designated,  in 
addition  to  his  other  duties,  as  camouflage  officer ;  other- 
wise this  duty  must  be  confided  to  a  suitable  non- 
commissioned officer.  The  camouflage  officer,  or  non- 
commissioned officer,  must  be  constantly  wandering 
around  the  position  looking  for  faults  and  for  oppor- 
tunities of  improving  the  camouflage.  No  greater 
evidence  of  military  proficiency  can  be  given  by  a 
battery  officer  than  by  keeping  his  battery  in  condition 
of  good  defiiade. 

The  battery  commander  must  determine  the  avenues 
of  circulation.  If  the  battery  is  on  a  road,  the  kitchen 
must  be  put  down  the  road  in  one  direction  and  the 
latrine  in  the  other  direction.  Under  no  circumstances 
must  men  leave  the  road  except  to  perform  duty.  If 
one  or  more  paths  are  absolutely  unavoidable,  they 
should  be  wound  irregularly  around  trees  and  bushes 
or  along  the  border  separating  two  different  crops  in  a 
field.    Cutting  of  comers  must  be  forbidden  under  severe 


IM  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

penalty.  It  is  desirable  to  fence  tlie  permitted  paths 
with  barbed  wire,  and,  until  this  is  done,  to  station  path 
sentries  with  orders  and  to  compel  every  one,  even  senior 
officers,  to  obey  them. 

The  necessity  of  keeping  out  of  sight  must  be  thor- 
oughly explained  to  the  men,  and  discipline  must  be 
used  whenever  necessary  to  enforce  this  rule.  Men  in 
the  open  must  take  cover  immediately  upon  a  hostile 
airplane  being  reported.  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
it  is  much  easier  to  keep  men  out  of  the  open  than  to 
get  them  in  from  the  open  in  time  to  prevent  their 
being  seen.  "While  batteries  are  generally  defiladed  from 
enemy  view,  lengths  of  roads  leading  to  them  are  always 
in  enemy  view.  Circulation  along  these  roads  may  re- 
veal to  the  experienced  enemy  the  locations  of  batteries 
themselves  invisible.  The  battalion  commander,  there- 
fore, must  control  such  circulation. 

Smoke  is  a  frequent  means  of  betraying  locations. 
In  clear,  windless  weather,  smoke  columns  can  be  inter- 
sected from  enemy  0.  P  's.  and  their  location  determined 
to  a  yard.  An  example  of  the  penalty  of  poor  smoke 
discipline  was  that  of  a  battery  kitchen  in  a  large  forest 
of  tall  trees  which  received  a  volley  of  forty  shells  per- 
fectly aimed. 

Even  the  best  defiladed  battery  will  be  located  by 
intersection  of  its  flashes  or  by  sound  ranging,  if  it  fires 
alone.  A  sufficient  volume  of  fire  will  confuse  both  the 
flash  spotting  and  sound  ranging  sections  of  the  enemy. 
Thus,  in  general  action,  batteries  are  not  apt  to  reveal 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  126 

their  presence,  and  the  chances  of  being  located  by  flash 
spotting  and  sound  ranging  may  be  minimized  in  regis- 
tration by  having  several  different  batteries  fire  at  the 
game,  or  approximately  the  same,  moment;  during  fire 
lor  destruction,  by  having  several  destructions  carried 
on  at  the  same  time.  In  registration,  this  is  best  accom- 
panied by  cooperation  between  battalion  commanders; 
and  in  fires  for  destruction,  must  be  regulated  by  the 
chief  of  the  divisional  artillery. 

The  enemy  may  be  further  confused  by  the  use  of 
roving  guns.  Individual  guns,  platoons  or  even  batteries, 
in  the  case  of  the  light  artillery,  are  taken  out  of  their 
regular  position,  moved  under  the  cover  of  darkness  and 
fired  for  a  day,  or  a  part  of  a  day,  from  a  temporary 
position,  moving  out  again  that  night. 

As  a  protection  against  enemy  fire  for  destruction, 
the  practice  of  separating  the  platoons  by  a  hundred 
yards  or  more  is  coming  more  and  more  into  use.  In 
batteries  of  155s,  the  separation  of  a  battery  into  two 
platoons  for  firing  is  done  more  than  half  the  time 
when  standing  on  the  defensive.  Intervals  between  guns 
are  also  greatly  increased,  sometimes  to  as  much  as 
100  meters. 

The  movement  toward  the  dispersion  even  of  the 
component  units  of  batteries  has  been  accentuated  by 
the  use  of  yperite  (mustard  gas).  While  the  gas  mask 
and  oiled  clothing  give  temporary  protection  against 
this  gas,  it  is  impossible  for  men  to  remain  on  the  ground 
upon  which  any  considerable  number  of  yperite  shells 


126  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

have  fallen.  The  dividing  of  batteries  renders  the  dis- 
abling of  an  entire  battery  less  probable,  or,  in  any 
event,  demands  a  double  expenditure  of  enemy  shells. 

The  battery  command  post  also  should  be  located  far 
enough  from  the  battery  to  be  out  of  the  yperite  fumes. 
Alternate  battery  positions  must  be  located  and  oriented, 
to  which  the  pieces  must  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the 
gas  bombardment  upon  the  position  has  ended.  The 
pieces  must  be  thoroughly  disinfected,  the  clothing  of 
men  exposed  to  the  yperite  fumes  changed,  the  men 
bathed  in  soap  and  water,  and  the  clothing  hung  to  let 
the  yperite  evaporate  into  a  location  where  the  fumes 
can  do  no  damage. 

Finally,  in  order  to  confuse  the  enemy,  Quaker  bat- 
teries will  be  made.  These  should  not  be  too  visible  or 
they  will  not  fool  the  enemy.  If  false  flashes  are  ob- 
tainable from  the  storage  park,  they  can  be  fired  from 
these  dummy  positions.  If  they  are  not  available,  the 
unused  packages  of  powder  from  the  155s  can  be  fired 
by  means  of  Bickford  fuses. 

CHAPTER  V.  Artillery  Observation.— Upon  com- 
ing into  position,  observation  should  be  organized  in 
the  first  instance  by  battalion.  The  batteries  of  75s 
find  observation  posts  where  they  can  observe  their  bar- 
rage. The  battalion  observation  post  is  located  where 
it  can  get  the  best  view  of  the  battalion  sector.  The 
battery  observation  posts  will  report  directly  to  the 
batteries  observation  of  fire  and  barrage.  All  other 
information  is  reported  to  battalion  headquarters.    Ob- 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  127 

servation  posts  of  the  155s,  not  being  concerned  with 
the  barrage,  seek  longer  views.  They  will  become 
valuable  to  regulate  barrage  if  the  enemy  crosses  our 
first  line,  and  should  be  used  to  study  the  ground  where 
such  barrage  would  be  put  down.  Their  occupants 
should  be  ready  to  control  the  fire  of  the  75s  on  such 
barrage,  if  called  upon  to  do  so. 

Where  an  0.  P.  has  a  special  mission,  as  in  the  case 
of  a  battery  observation  post  of  75s,  one  man  will  watch 
this  field,  while  another  performs  general  observation. 

The  number  of  the  personnel  occupying  observation 
posts  will  vary  according  to  the  cover  obtainable.  It  is 
desirable  to  have  it  not  less  than  three  nor  more  than 
six.  Where  an  0.  P.  is  in  a  position  exposed  to  enemy 
view,  details  are  changed  every  night  and  remain  in 
the  observation  post  for  24  hours. 

Strict  discipline  must  be  used,  if  necessary,  to  prevent 
men  from  disclosing  their  persons  or  in  any  way  be- 
traying the  0.  P.  to  the  enemy.  A  disclosure  not  only 
endangers  the  personnel  but  may  lead  to  the  destruction 
of  the  0.  P.  at  the  moment  observation  is  most  needed. 

It  is  highly  desirable  to  have  the  observation  posts 
interconnected  by  telephone,  as  will  be  pointed  out 
in  the  chapter  on  Telephone.  In  the  absence  of  such 
line,  the  battalion  observation  posts  can  readily  com- 
municate with  each  other  through  the  battalion  switch- 
board and  the  lines  connecting  battalion  command  posts. 

Upon  occupying  an  observation  post,  the  officer  in 
charge  will  immediately  select  an  object  in  enemy  ter- 


128  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

ritory  about  the  middle  of  his  field  of  vision,  and  which 
is  accurately  represented  upon  the  map.  This  will  be 
the  zero  line  of  his  observatory.  The  instruments  will 
be  oriented  with  the  zero  of  the  lower  limb  laid  on  this 
point.  The  lower  limb  will  be  securely  clamped.  Ob- 
servations from  the  observatory  will  thereafter  be  read 
on  the  mill  scale:  so  many  mills  right  or  left  (of  Mont 
See  steeple  or  Cantigny  graveyard).  It  will  be  the 
duty  of  the  personnel  in  charge  of  the  observatory  to  see 
that  the  lower  limb  of  the  instrument  is  never  moved, 
and  to  caution  senior  officers,  who  alone  have  the  right 
to  enter  observation  posts,  as  a  further  protection  against 
a  loss  of  the  zero  line.  Stakes  will  be  driven  along  this 
line  which  can  be  seen  in  thick  weather  and  identified 
at  night  by  means  of  luminous  watch  faces.  If  the  ob- 
servatory is  occupied  in  thick  weather,  observation 
must  be  made  according  to  the  points  of  the  compass 
until  the  weather  clears. 

As  rapidly  as  possible  the  officer  of  the  observation 
post  will  prepare  a  panoramic  sketch  and  a  visibility 
map  of  the  field  of  view  from  his  observatory.  Each 
O.  P.  will  be  given  the  coordinates  of  the  other  0.  P's. 
in  the  battalion.  Each  observer  will  visit  all  the  0.  P  's. 
as  opportunity  offers,  and  will  communicate  directly 
with  them  when  he  sees  something  of  interest  which  he 
thinks  may  be  invisible  from  their  observatories. 

All  matters  of  sufficient  interest  are  to  be  reported 
immediately  to  battalion  command  posts,  from  which 
they  will  be  relayed  to  the  higher  commands. 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  129 

A  diary  will  be  kept  in  each  0.  P.,  divided  into  24 
parts,  corresponding  to  the  hours  of  the  day,  and  all 
events  of  whatever  kind  not  worthy  of  immediate  re- 
port will  be  written  down  in  this  diary.  This  will 
include  the  fall  of  enemy  shells  and  an  impression  as 
to  their  origin.  If  enemy  shells  pass  directly  over  the 
observation  post,  this  should  be  reported  by  telephone. 
The  point  of  fall  then  being  determined,  a  line  is  estab- 
lished within  which  the  enemy  battery  lies.  All 
occurrences  deemed  of  interest  to  the  battery  will  be 
reported  immediately.  Among  these  will  be  firing  of 
any  kind,  with  the  observer's  best  impression  as  to  the 
direction  from  which  it  comes;  all  activity,  flashes,  all 
smoke,  all  unusual  noises  within  the  enemy  lines,  any 
suspicious  movements  within  our  own  lines,  and  partic- 
ularly any  signals  from  our  infantry. 

These  will  all  be  reported  by  reference  to  the  zero 
line  and  to  objects  on  the  ground. 

In  case  of  enemy  attack,  the  observers  will  report  its 
progress  and  call  for  fire  on  vulnerable  targets.  If  the 
attack  advances  far  enough,  the  observers  will  have  an 
opportunity  for  individual  distinction.  A  few  deter- 
mined men  in  a  concealed  dugout  may  delay  many  times 
their  number  for  an  appreciable  time. 

Observers  of  different  batteries,  battalions  and  regi- 
ments will  at  need  register  the  fire  of  any  battery  in 
the  brigade.  Where  none  of  the  observation  posts  is 
suitable  to  fire  on  any  particular  objective,  use  of  the 
ground  telegraphic  sets  of  the  infantry  may  be  made. 


130  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

The  observer,  accompanied  by  the  operator,  finds  a 
location  where  he  can  view  the  objective.  If  the  dis- 
tance permits,  the  messages  are  sent  direct  to  the 
antennas  of  its  battalion;  if  not,  they  are  sent  to  the 
infantry  command  post,  which  relays  them  by  telephone. 

As  rapidly  as  possible  the  regimental  observation 
officer  coordinates  the  observation  posts  of  the  regiment, 
and  the  brigade  observation  officer  coordinates  all  those 
within  the  brigade.  Upon  occasion,  0.  P's.  of  different 
battalions,  or  even  of  different  regiments,  may  be  con- 
nected to  regimental  and  brigade  centrals,  though  this 
practice  must  be  limited  owing  to  the  amount  of  traffic 
over  brigade  and  regimental  lines. 

Because  no  two  divisional  sectors  are  alike,  it  is  im- 
possible to  fix  hard  and  fast  rules  for  the  conduct  of 
observation.  The  efficiency  of  the  observation  system 
will  depend  on  the  skill  and  energy  of  the  officers  con- 
cerned. 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  while  all  the^observation 
posts  of  the  brigade  are  to  be  considered  one  system,  the 
initiative  of  battalion  commanders  and  observation  of- 
ficers must  not  be  dulled. 

The  brigade  has  the  use  not  only  of  the  divisional 
artillery  observation  posts  but  is  in  communication  with 
the  infantry  observation  officer  and  corps  observation 
officers.  Frequently  an  uncertain  report  as  to  the  loca- 
tion of  an  enemy  position,  or  activity  in  the  enemy  line, 
from  one  observation  system  can  be  corroborated  from 
one  of  the  other  sources. 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  131 

Regimental  and  brigade  headquarters  will  install  addi- 
tional observation  stations,  or  move  existing  stations 
of  battalions  and  even  of  batteries,  when  this  will  re- 
sult in  reducing  the  extent  of  the  invisible  areas. 

CHAPTER  VI.  Artillery  Telephones.— The  scheme 
of  artillery  telephone  consists  of  branching  lines 
from  brigade  to  regiments,  regiments  to  battalions, 
battalions  to  batteries,  and  batteries  to  battery  observa- 
tion posts.  Regimental  headquarters  are  connected 
together,  as  are  adjoining  battalions  and  battery  com- 
mand posts;  in  addition,  the  units  of  75s  are  connected 
with  corresponding  units  of  infantry. 

With  every  telephone  operator  there  will  always  be 
an  orderly  to  be  sent  for  any  person  desired  on  the 
telephone ;  in  time  of  unusual  activity,  there  will  be  two 
orderlies. 

Telephone  liaison  will  always  be  reinforced  by  visual 
signalling  and  by  mounted  or  foot  messengers.  It  is 
essential  that  all  men  of  the  liaison  detail  shall  be 
familiar  with  all  roads  and  paths  between  battery  posi- 
tions and  battalion,  battalion  and  regiment,  and  regi- 
ment and  brigade. 

The  many  diversions  of  attention,  the  many  calls  for 
men,  the  constant  assignment  of  men  to  different  duties, 
creates  an  erosion  which  wears  away  these  organizations 
established  at  the  beginning  of  a  campaign.  It  is  the 
constant,  and  perhaps  the  most  important,  duty  of  a 
battalion  commander  to  see  that  these  are  continually 
renewed   and   that   the   organization    will   never   find 


13^  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

itself  surprised  by  the  cutting  of  the  telephone  liaison. 

Operation  of  telephones  at  the  front  requires  a  degree 
of  rapidity,  skill  and  accuracy  far  in  excess  of  that  re- 
quired commercially.  A  few  seconds  lost  by  a  delay, 
or  a  mistake,  may  cost  many  lives. 

When  two  or  more  calls  come  at  the  same  time,  the 
first  preference  should  be  given  to  an  observation  post, 
second  preference  to  the  line  of  the  senior  command, 
third  preference  to  a  junior  command,  and  fourth  to 
a  collateral  line.  This  may  be  varied,  according  to  the 
intelligence  of  the  operator,  when  especially  important 
news  is  expected  from  some  source.  All  telephones  will 
be  tested  every  half  hour  in  each  direction.  Operators 
will  never  call  an  officer  to  the  telephone  to  speak  to 
an  officer  of  inferior  rank.  Officers  below  the  rank  of 
battery  commander  or  adjutant  will  not  ask  an  oper- 
ator to  get  a  party  on  the  line,  but  will  be  given  con- 
nection with  the  switchboard  and  personally  ask  for 
the  desired  party. 

Lines  are  used  only  for  official  communication.  Ter- 
rible things  have  happened  because  a  telephone  wire  was 
being  used  for  sociable  conversation.  The  locations  of 
friendly  positions  are  never  mentioned  over  the  tele- 
phone, nor  is  any  other  information  that  might  be  use- 
ful to  the  enemy. 

As  the  relative  location  of  observation  posts,  battery 
and  command  posts  vary  indefinitely,  so  an  indefinite 
number  of  opportunities  exists  to  increase  the  telephonic 
liaison  beyond  that  contemplated  by  the  regulations. 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  138 

For  instance,  two  observation  posts  or  batteries  of  sepa- 
rate units  may  be  located  so  close  together  that  a  short 
length  of  wire  may  connect  them.  A  battery  of  one 
battalion  may  find  itself  so  close  to  the  command  post 
of  another  that  an  intercommunication  wire  can  be 
made  at  a  minimum  of  labor  and  material. 

All  officers  interested  in  observation  should  seek 
opportunities  to  increase  the  amount  of  telephone 
liaison  without  an  undue  expenditure  of  wire.  In  this 
fashion,  telephone  liaison  offers  an  opportunity  for  ini- 
tiative similar  to  that  of  selection  and  camouflage  of 
battery  positions. 

CHAPTER  Vn.  Maps  and  Records  in  Command 
Post. — Each  command  post  will  keep  the  following 
records  pertaining  to  its  sector : 

Maps  showing  the  location  of  the  command  posts, 
battery  positions,  observation  posts,  telephonic  and 
visual  liaison;  these  last  two,  approximately  exact. 
Threads  are  pinned  to  the  map  at  the  locations  of 
the  0.  P*s.  Mill  scales  are  made  with  a  zero  cor- 
responding to  the  zero  at  the  0.  P.  Thus  reports 
from  the  0.  P.  are  rapidly  located  on  the  map. 
Where  any  two  0.  P's.  report  the  same  subject,  it 
can  be  located  by  intersections,  visibility  maps  of 
the  observation  posts,  fields  of  fire  and  dead  spaces 
of  the  batteries. 

A  graphic  representation  of  the  normal  and  even- 
tual missions  of  the  batteries,  such  as  barrages, 
counter-preparations,  interdiction  fires,  counter-bat- 


134.  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

tery,  and  also  the  normal  and  the  eventual  zones. 

This  information  will  also  be  kept  in  the  form  of 
written  orders.  When  any  orders,  in  any  form,  have 
been  superseded  by  others,  the  old  orders  will  be  de- 
stroyed to  prevent  possible  confusion. 

A  list  of  ammunition,  rations,  horses,  wagons,  harness, 
etc.,  will  also  be  kept  at  command  posts. 

CHAPTER  VIII.  Combat.— Offensive  combat  being 
at  the  will  of  the  higher  command,  is  precised  in  orders. 
Attacks,  general  or  limited,  are  accompanied  by  a  plan 
of  artillery  made  in  the  army,  corps,  or  division  head- 
quarters. The  duty  of  the  subordinate  commanders  is 
to  give  full  effect  to  the  plan  of  the  higher  command. 
Firing  data  are  prepared  in  the  batteries  and  checked 
in  the  battalions.  Regimental  and  battalion  commanders 
assure  themselves  that  all  orders  have  been  read  and 
comprehended  by  those  intrusted  with  carrying  them 
out.  They  assure  themselves  of  the  efficiency  of  their 
communications,  and  they  follow  the  plan  of  action  step 
by  step,  superintending  its  execution  by  their  subor- 
dinates. 

The  daily  activity  of  the  artillery  is  determined  in 
the  division  and  corps,  and  is  laid  out  in  orders  issued 
every  evening  for  the  following  24  hours.  These  orders 
specify : 

1.  Destructions. 

2.  Interdictions  and  harassing  fire. 

3.  Concentrations. 

The  higher  command  determuies  the  objectives  to  be 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  135 

fired  upon  and  divides  them  among  the  regiments  in 
whose  sector  they  lie.  The  regiments  divide  their  tar- 
gets between  their  battalions;  the  battalions  between 
the  batteries.  The  actual  conduct  of  fire  reposes  in  the 
battery  commander.  The  major's  supervision  is  merely 
to  assure  himself  of  the  captain's  competency.  In  case 
of  incompetency,  the  remedy  is  a  removal  of  the  battery 
commander,  not  taking  over  the  battery  commander's 
duties  by  the  major. 

Defensive  Combat.  Fire  called  forth  by  activity  of 
the  enemy  is  defensive  in  cause,  although  it  may  lead 
to  fire  offensive  in  effect.    The  defensive  fires  are: 

(1)  Counter-Battery. — An  enemy  battery  firing  upon 
our  troops  is,  in  turn,  fired  upon  by  our  artillery.  This 
fire,  as  a  rule,  is  ordered  by  the  brigade  commander 
or  commander  of  the  heavy  artillery ;  but  in  the  case  of 
enemy's  batteries  whose  location  is  known,  and  which  it 
is  desired  to  silence  as  often  as  they  come  into  action  and 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  authority  to  open  fire  may  be 
given  to  the  battalion  or  even  the  battery  commander 
upon  receipt  of  information  that  this  battery  is  firing. 

(2)  Reprisal  Fire. — When  friendly  troops  are  being 
fired  upon  by  enemy  batteries  which  for  any  reason 
cannot  be  counter-batteried,  our  artillery  fires  upon 
corresponding  enemy  troops.  This  fire  is  ordered  by 
the  commander  of  the  divisional  artillery,  generally  at 
the  request  of  the  organization  under  fire.  Reprisal  fire 
may  also  accompany  counter-battery  fire. 

(3)  Offensive  Counter-Preparation. — This  is  a  plan 


136  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

of  fire  upon  enemy  organizations,  trenches,  command 
posts,  batteries  and  assembly  points.  Its  object  is  to 
break  up  enemy  organizations  before  they  can  launch 
the  assault.  It  is  generally  called  by  order  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  divisional  artillery,  upon  information  of 
the  assembling  of  hostile  troops,  heavy  enemy  bombard- 
ments, or  other  reasons  leading  him  to  believe  an  enemy 
attack  is  imminent.  However,  any  commanding  officer, 
upon  receiving  what  appears  to  him  sufficient  evidence 
of  a  planned  enemy  attack,  must  not  hesitate  to  put  his 
artillery  into  action  in  his  normal  enemy  counter-attack 
zone,  or  even,  if  he  deems  it  justifiable,  into  one  of  his 
eventual  zones.  He  will,  of  course,  immediately  pass 
the  information  on  to  his  commanding  officer. 

(4)  Barrage. — Artillery  barrage  is  principally  the 
work  of  75s  and  the  principal  duty  of  the  75s.  The  line 
of  barrage  is  laid  down  by  the  chief  of  the  divisional 
artillery,  who  may  also  call  upon  a  part  or  all  of  the 
155s  to  participate.  Barrage  is  delivered  at  the  request 
of  the  infantry,  either  by  telephone  or  signal ;  upon  the 
request  of  the  artillery  liaison  officer;  or  upon  a  call 
from  an  airplane,  balloon  or  observation  post;  or  when 
enemy  bombardment  or  rifle  fire  leads  any  artillery 
commander  to  believe  that  barrage  of  his  organization 
is  called  for. 

In  order  to  deliver  defensive  fire  without  unnecessary 
delay,  trail  circulars  wiU  be  marked  at  the  points  at 
which  the  trail  shall  rest  for  each  normal  and  special 
barrage   and   counter-preparation.      The   weather   cor- 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  137 

rections  for  each  principal  target  will  be  kept  up  to 
the  moment.  The  firing  data  for  the  different  barrages 
and  counter-preparations  will  be  prepared  separately 
for  each  gun  and  will  be  given  to  the  chiefs  of  section. 
The  executive's  command  for  this  fire  are  the  name 
and  number  frequently  repeated,  as  **  Special  barrage 
No.  2'*  or  ** Counter-Preparation  No.  1."  Each  section 
lays  its  piece  and  begins  firing  immediately. 

When  a  secondary  barrage  has  been  planned,  the  line 
of  which  runs  across  our  territory  and  which  is  to  be 
used  only  in  the  event  the  enemy  takes  our  first  posi- 
tions, the  firing  data  will  be  prepared  as  in  the  normal 
barrage,  but  it  will  be  kept  at  the  battery  command 
post,  in  a  place  where  it  can  be  easily  reached  but  not 
confused  with  other  documents.  It  will  be  handed  to 
the  chiefs  of  section  only  at  the  moment  it  is  to  be 
put  into  effect. 

Fire  of  opportunity  is  called  for  by  an  airplane,  bal- 
loon or  terrestrial  observer  when  he  sees  enemy  troops 
or  transport  within  the  zone  of  fire  of  our  artillery. 

The  best  results  are  obtained  by  personal  understand- 
ing between  elements  of  command  rather  than  upon 
rigid  orders  which  cannot  cover  all  possible  contingen- 
cies. 

CHAPTER  IX.  Closeup  Defense.— -Due  to  a  variety 
of  reasons,  among  which  may  be  mentioned  the  diffi- 
culty of  moving  the  great  number  of  batteries  used  on 
every  front;  the  necessity  of  keeping  horses  far  behind 
the  batteries;  the  practice  of  shelling  heavily  the  rear 


138  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

areas,  especially  the  roads;  the  use  of  aviation  which  will 
discover  batteries  retreating  in  the  open,  even  when 
defiladed  from  terrestrial  view ;  the  efficiency  of  machine 
gun  fire  upon  large  targets,  such  as  gun  sections,  even  at 
long  ranges ;  the  growth  of  counter-attack  as  a  defensive 
measure,  and  the  greater  means  of  resistance  furnished 
by  emplaced  batteries,  barb  wire  entanglements  and 
machine  guns — the  closeup  defense  of  batteries  has 
assumed  a  more  important  aspect  than  it  held  before 
this  war  broke  out.  Therefore,  defensive  measures  for 
holding  battery  positions  have  been  elaborated.  The 
battery  commander  will  reconnoiter  the  ground  and  be- 
gin his  preparations  for  closeup  defense  as  soon  as  he 
occupies  a  battery  position.  The  guns  will  easily  sweep 
all  open  territory  in  front  of  them.  Attackers  will  have 
to  come  up  some  defiladed  space  or  around  a  flank. 
Battery  machine  guns  will  be  so  placed  as  to  sweep  such 
approaches,  and  ranges  will  be  measured  to  all  points 
from  which  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire  can  be  directed 
on  the  batteries.  Preparations  will  be  made  to  move 
the  pieces  as  occasion  may  warrant;  especially  to  fire 
to  the  flank,  where  they  may  take  a  whole  enemy  wave  in 
enfilade.  Wire  entanglements  will  be  built  around  the 
battery;  concealed  pits  will  be  dug  for  bombers;  hand 
grenades  will  be  drawn  and  distributed  among  the  pits. 
Where  several  batteries  are  grouped  together,  the  officer 
who  commands  them  all  (major,  colonel  or  brigadier 
general)  will  coordinate  the  plan  of  defense.  All  the 
machine  guns  will  be  placed  according  to  a  common  plan. 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  139 

A  veritable  machine  gun  barrage  even  may  be  possible. 

The  howitzers  are  less  capable  for  use  in  closeup  de- 
fense than  the  75s.  For  this  reason  the  personnel  has 
been  furnished  with  rifles.  It  is  not  improbable  that 
these  guns  will  be  firing  on  some  target  of  great  im- 
portance, such  as  a  river  crossing.  In  this  case,  the  de- 
fense should  endeavor  to  leave  a  sufficient  gun  crew 
(four  or  five  men  per  gun)  to  keep  up  this  fire  to  the 
last  moment. 

The  skill  and  stubbornness  of  the  closeup  defense  of 
battery  positions  may  decide  the  fate  of  a  battle.  It 
may  furnish  an  opportunity  for  the  greatest  individual 
distinction. 

CHAPTER  X.  Tlie  Food  Question.— One  of  the 
most  vital  elements  of  this  war  is  food.  In  the  first 
place,  there  is  a  shortage  of  food  all  over  the  world. 
In  the  second  place,  transportation  is  limited  and  ave- 
nues of  transportation  are  limited.  A  soldier  who  wastes 
any  food  not  only  robs  some  other  mouth  but  does  his 
share  uselessly  to  congest  our  means  of  transportation. 
The  rule,  therefore,  must  be  rigidly  established  that 
every  soldier,  officer  or  man  must  consume  all  the  food 
he  takes.  The  cook  must  be  instructed  not  to  prepare 
any  large  surplus  of  cooked  food  each  meal.  He  must 
be  rigidly  compelled  to  serve  all  leftover  food  at  the 
next  meal.  He  should  be  encouraged  to  prepare  soup, 
which  will  use  up  his  bones  and  furnish  valuable  heat 
in  the  winter  and  liquid  in  a  palatable  form,  water  be- 
ing frequently  unpalatable  at  the  front. 


140  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Conclusion. — Less  difficulty  has  been  experienced 
in  teaching  officers  the  technique  of  artillery  than  in 
getting  them  to  carry  out  the  necessary  works — ^to  en- 
force the  many  rules  of  conduct  which  the  making  of 
war  demands.  An  artillery  officer  is  not  a  mere  com- 
puter of  figures  or  instrument  man.  He  is  primarily  a 
commander.  He  must  be  ceaselessly  vigilant  to  enforce 
compliance  of  all  warlike  regulations. 

In  the  foregoing  I  imagine  that  army  haters 
will  find  considerable  ^^Prnssianism"  in  the  con- 
stant reference  to  *  ^  Discipline ' '  and  *^  Enforce- 
ment of  Orders."  Between  the  soldier  and  the 
pacifist,  political  or  otherwise,  there  lies  a  chasm 
unbridgable  because  the  former  thinks,  instructs 
and  regulates  in  contemplation  of  daily  peril  and 
mortal  combat,  while  the  latter  lives,  breathes  and 
has  his  being  in  exquisite  comfort  and  perfect 
safety,  determined  never  to  risk  life  or  limb  or 
time  for  his  country.  The  soldier  imposes  hard 
rules  upon  himself  and  his  subordinates  that  his 
country  may  live.  The  pacifist  preaches  luxury 
of  mind  and  body  that  he  may  profit  at  the  expense 
of  his  fellow  men.  The  civilian  and  the  uniformed 
soldier  lean,  naturally,  to  the  easy  preachings. 
They  do  not  comprehend  the  aw^ful  penalties  of 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  141 

disregarding  military  rule.  To  them,  for  instance, 
the  rules  of  camouflage  appear  like  the  **Keep 
off  the  grass*'  signs  in  the  park.  They  ignore 
the  fact  that  in  the  first  the  lives  of  men  are  at 
stake,  while  in  the  second  merely  those  of  a  few 
blades  of  grass.  To  them  absence  without  leave 
is  like  playing  ** hookey''  from  school;  desertion, 
like  quitting  a  job.  They  do  not  perceive  that  the 
uninterrupted  presence  of  men  is  necessary  not 
only  to  carry  out  the  offensive  moves  of  our  com- 
mand but  to  counteract  the  unexpected  moves  of 
the  enemy. 

The  civilian  beneficiaries  of  our  victory  fail  to 
contemplate  how  terrible  to  them  would  have  been 
the  consequences  of  defeat.  They  are  prone  to 
take  up  all  attacks  on  ** military  justice."  They 
do  not  understand  the  consequences  of  a  lax  ad- 
ministration of  military  law. 

Not  many  weeks  ago  a  one-armed  boy  called 
upon  me  to  tell  me  that  a  disregard  of  my  instruc- 
tions to  hide  from  enemy  airplanes  had  cost  him 
his  arm  and  had  cost  the  lives  of  several  of  his 
comrades.  He  told  how  the  headquarters  com- 
pany, of  which  he  was  a  member,  had  marched 


142  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

at  night  to  the  proximity  of  the  front  and  sought 
concealment  in  a  woods.  The  next  morning  a 
German  airplane  flew  overhead.  Everybody  ran 
ont  to  gaze  at  the  enemy.  Almost  immediately 
the  German  artillery  concentration  fell  upon  the 
woods. 

In  my  last  days  at  Cantigny  I  was  suffering 
severely  from  influenza  and  was  unable  to  make 
my  daily  inspection.  Most  of  the  old  officers  had 
been  evacuated  from  the  same  cause.  On  the  day 
preceding  the  assault,  however,  I  proceeded  with 
assistance  to  inspect  the  observation  posts — ^the 
eyes  of  the  artillery.  There  I  found  a  newly  ar- 
rived lieutenant  in  charge,  the  men  all  exposed 
to  enemy  fire  and  not  wearing  their  gas  masks. 
A  poet  might  say  that  any  consequences  of  this 
carelessness  to  them  would  be  upon  their  own 
heads,  forgetting  that  men  killed,  for  whatever 
fault,  are  none  the  less  dead — they  are  losses  to 
our  army — ignoring  the  vital  fact  that  whenever 
the  artillery  observers  are  killed  or  wounded  the 
artillery  is  blind.  In  this  case  lack  of  training 
was  responsible,  but  if  it  had  been  weakness  or 


A  FEW  TECHNICAL  POINTS  143 

a  desire  to  be  an  easy  boss,  of  course,  no  penalty 
could  be  too  severe  for  such  offense. 

Men  cannot  be  allowed,  because  of  their  laziness 
or  carelessness,  to  jeopardize  the  lives  of  their 
comrades.  The  sentinel  asleep  on  duty  is  not  an 
heroic  or  a  sentimental  figure,  even  though  it  is 
accepted  as  a  presidential  perquisite  to  pardon 
him  for  the  applause  of  the  pacifists.  The  un- 
dutiful  soldier  in  a  well  trained  organization  is 
as  rare  as  a  criminal  in  a  church  congregation. 
It  is  as  much  an  insult  to  the  men  who  wore  the 
uniform  to  suggest  that  all  enlisted  men  are  po- 
tential defendants  in  courts-martial  as  to  say  that 
all  citizens  will  probably  come  before  our  criminal 
courts. 

In  all  my  service,  and  with  several  thousand 
troops,  I  can  remember  every  criminal  case.  Two 
were  for  serious  offenses  against  women.  Two 
were  for  theft.  One,  a  false  charge  of  assault 
with  a  deadly  weapon,  which  the  judge  advocate 
directed  to  have  dismissed.  Summary  court  cases, 
the  police  court  cases  of  the  army,  were  not  much 
more  numerous,  and  the  only  serious  penalty  ever 
inflicted  in  summary  court  was  six  months'  con- 


144  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

finement  and  loss  of  rank  to  a  sergeant  of  long 
service  who  got  himself  and  two  young  soldiers 
drunk  in  barracks  when  he  should  have  been 
on  duty.  If  others'  experience  was  very  different 
from  mine,  it  must  be  because  they  served  with 
worse  troops  and  worse  ofi&cers. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE  PUKSUIT  FROM  THE  MARNB 

The  defeat  of  the  Germans  in  the  second  battle 
of  the  Marne  furnished  the  occasion  for  giving  the 
first  American  army  corps  command  at  the  front. 
The  French  had  wished  to  incorporate  all  the 
American  divisions  into  French  army  corps,  while 
the  American  high  command  desired  to  build  up 
all- American  organizations  as  fast  as  possible.  On 
the  side  of  the  French  contention  it  was  urged 
that  French  losses  in  the  war  had  greatly  reduced 
the  number  of  combatant  troops,  while  leaving  her 
general  staffs,  her  army  and  her  corps  troops  al- 
most intact.  France,  therefore,  had  a  superfluity 
of  corps  commanders  and  corps  staff  officers  who 
were  first  trained  in  the  French  school  of  high 
command,  had  benefited  by  the  experience  of  four 
years  of  war,  and  now  held  their  present  posi- 
tions by  demonstrated  ability.  No  American,  on 
the  other  hand,  could  meet  any  of  these  require- 
ments.   Prior  to  our  entry  into  the  war  no  Ameri- 

145 


146  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

can  officer  had  ever  commanded  so  large  a  nnit 
as  a  complete  division. 

However,  there  were  a  number  of  men  qualified 
to  command  divisions,  because  the  duties  of  divi- 
sion commanders  and  the  maneuvers  to  be  ordered 
by  them  are  only  one  step  removed  from  those  of 
regimental  and  brigade  commanders,  with  which 
all  studious  officers  of  the  regular  army  were  con- 
versant. A  division,  moreover,  like  a  brigade, 
regiment  or  battalion,  is  primarily  an  obeying 
organization,  carrying  out  orders  laid  down  with 
greater  or  less  precision  by  a  higher  authority. 
From  commanding  a  division  to  commanding  a 
corps,  however,  there  was  a  gap  which  any  Ameri- 
can officer  would  find  great  difficulty  in  crossing. 

An  army  corps  is  a  planning  organization.  It 
has  to  work  out  the  complicated  arrangements 
whereby  a  number  of  divisions  move,  relieve,  or 
reinforce  each  other,  and  at  the  same  time  receive 
supplies  and  munitions;  must  place  troops,  sup- 
plies and  munitions  in  such  places  that  they  can  be 
readily  used  to  meet  unforeseen  developments 
of  battle ;  must  determine  how  great  a  force  should 
be  concentrated  on  each  portion  of  the  corps  front. 


THE  PURSUIT  FROM  THE  MARNE      147 

It  must  also  order  the  very  complicated  disposal 
of  the  great  quantities  of  artillery  of  different 
sizes  and  ranges,  and  make  plans  for  the  concen- 
trations of  fire  to  destroy  the  enemy's  defense  or 
break  his  attack. 

Since  early  spring  a  high  ranking  American 
general  and  his  staff  had  been  attached  to  a 
French  army  corps  for  instruction  to  acquire  the 
necessary  technique  to  perform  these  duties.  These 
officers  had  been  for  some  time  bending  every 
effort  to  obtain  command  at  the  front. 

While  the  issue  of  the  German  offensive  re- 
mained in  doubt  it  was  manifestly  impossible  to 
risk  a  disaster  by  confiding  a  large  sector  of  the 
line  to  this  inexperienced,  insufficiently  trained 
and  untried  corps  organization.  With  the  de- 
feat of  the  Germans,  however,  a  new  situation  pre- 
sented itself  which  rendered  the  formation  of  the 
first  American  army  corps  at  the  front  not  only 
possible  but  advisable. 

All  military  text  books  require  the  vigorous 
pursuit  of  a  retreating  enemy.  Against  inferior 
troops  vigorous  pursuit  has  been  crowned  with 
success  in  this  war,  but  wherever  the  retreating 


148  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

troops  have  been  of  high  order  they  have  not  only- 
conducted  their  retreats  safely  but,  owing  to  the 
long  range  of  modern  cannon,  aided  by  the  deadly 
effect  of  concealed  machine  guns  and  the  defensive 
strength  of  barbed  wire  entanglements,  have  in- 
flicted disproportionate  losses  upon  their;  pur- 
suers. 

In  1914  the  French  had  been  able  to  retreat  from 
the  frontier  as  ordered  and  had  attacked  accord- 
ing to  plan.  The  Germans,  in  turn,  withdrew  from 
the  Mame,  their  rear  guards  checking  the  vigor- 
ous French  pursuit  with  heavy  loss,  retired  in 
order,  and  stopped  at  the  Aisne.  Now  that  an- 
other pursuit  from  the  Marne  was  necessary,  the 
French  were  neither  anxious  to  conduct  it  them- 
selves nor  to  command  American  troops  in  a  pro- 
ceeding which  promised  heavy  losses  with  small 
prospects  of  strategic  success.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Germans  would  be  unable  to  take  advantage  of 
any  blunders  which  the  American  army  corps  staff 
might  make  in  conducting  the  pursuit. 

On  July  30th  I  received  orders  to  return  home 
to  command  one  of  the  new  regiments  being 
formed  to  proceed  to  France  in  the  winter.    I  took 


THE  PURSUIT  FROM  THE  MARNE      149 

advantage  of  the  travel  order  to  visit  our  troops 
in  the  pursuit  from  the  Marne,  stopping  at  each 
headquarters  on  the  way  forward.  This  brought 
me  to  our  General  Headquarters,  to  the  staff  of 
the  First  army,  the  staff  of  the  First  corps  and 
to  several  division  and  brigade  staffs.  At  each 
stopping  place  I  was  impressed  by  the  high  char- 
acter, the  distinct  force  and  the  great  native  in- 
telligence of  the  officers.  I  also  missed  the  per- 
fection of  organization  and  easy  running  elasticity 
that  characterized  the  French  staffs  which  had 
been  trained  for  years  in  the  higher  schools  of  war 
and  had  received  their  post-graduate  course  dur- 
ing four  years  at  the  front.  The  American  com- 
munications were  defective  and  the  higher  com- 
mands were  not'by  any  means  sufficiently  informed 
of  the  location  of  their  front  lines.  Koad  condi- 
tions back  of  the  troops  were  far  from  satisfac- 
tory. The  rules  of  road  discipline  had  not  been 
sufficiently  taught  to  the  trains  which  blocked 
each  other,  not  only  at  junctions  but  even  on 
straight  stretches  of  wide  turnpike.  Military 
police  were  few  and  inefficient.  This  was  the 
inevitable  result  of  the  short  period  of  training. 


150  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

The  staff  officers,  who  in  normal  times  would  have 
regulated  the  moving  of  the  trains,  were  so  taxed 
by  their  unaccustomed  duties  in  this  movement  as 
not  to  have  any  reserve  time  to  manage  the  in- 
dispensable service  of  the  rear. 

Eventually  I  came  up  to  an  artillery  colonel  of 
long  overseas  service  fuming  with  rage.  He  had 
reported  to  a  brigadier  general  from  a  regular 
division  recently  arrived  in  Europe  whose  brigade 
he  was  to  support.  The  artilleryman  had  been 
at  the  front  several  days  supporting  the  infantry 
of  his  own  division  and  should  have  been  notified 
by  a  higher  authority  of  the  relief  of  the  infantry. 
The  first  information,  however,  was  from  his  own 
liaison  officer,  who  telephoned  that  new  infantry 
were  coming  into  the  front  line.  After  waiting 
for  some  time  for  the  new  infantry  brigade  com- 
mander to  send  for  him  he  had  finally  located  the 
latter  and  after  several  hours '  wait  was  still  with- 
out word  from  the  infantry  commander  of  his 
plans  or  of  the  service  he  wished  from  the  artil- 
lery. 

Let  me  say  for  the  benefit  of  the  uninitiated  that 
in  any  division  the  commander  of  the  artillery 


THE  PURSUIT  FROM  THE  MARNE      151 

brigade  lives  beside  the  division  commander,  re- 
ceives his  orders  for  artillery  support,  and  advises 
him  upon  the  technical  possibilities  of  the  artillery 
arm.  In  like  manner  the  commander  of  each  regi- 
ment of  field  pieces  sits  in  with  the  commander  of 
each  infantry  brigade,  while  the  artillery  battalion 
commander  is  in  close  touch  with  the  commanders 
of  infantry  regiments.  The  preliminary  military 
education  of  the  infantry  brigadier  in  this  case 
had  not  taught  him  how  to  avail  himself  of  his 
artillery  support  and  his  sojourn  in  France  had 
been  too  short  for  him  to  learn  it  before  entering 
the  lines.  Perhaps  this  fault  might  have  been 
remedied  at  division  headquarters  except  for  the 
fact  that  the  general  commanding  the  artillery 
brigade  himself  had  only  just  landed  in  France 
without  any  preliminary  study  or  observation  and 
had  been  ordered  to  the  front  to  replace  a  general 
from  the  engineering  corps  who  now,  for  the  sec- 
ond time,  had  been  relieved  from  command  of  an 
artillery  brigade  because  of  his  inability  to  grasp 
the  duties  and  maneuvers  of  that  arm. 
In  the  summer  of  1918  the  lower  ranks  were 


152  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

very  mucli  fartlier  along  their  road  than  were  the 
staffs  and  senior  officers. 

The  public  seems  to  be  fairly  well  educated  to 
the  necessity  of  training  soldiers,  but  it  has  not 
yet  been  impressed  with  the  greater  necessity  of 
training  officers.  It  is  easier  to  make  a  soldier 
than  to  make  a  staff  officer  and  to  perfect  a  com- 
pany organization  than  to  perfect  a  general  staff 
or  produce  a  general. 

Instances  of  inefficiency  or  insufficient  training 
on  the  part  of  general  officers  in  the  pursuit  from 
the  Marne  abound.  Time  and  again  infantry  were 
ordered  to  attack  without  artillery  assistance,  al- 
though the  artillery  was  in  position  and  ready 
to  fire.  Formations  were  frequently  used  which, 
while  laid  down  in  text  books  before  the  war,  had 
been  proven  obsolete  in  actual  experience.  A  great 
deal  of  greenness  among  the  junior  officers  also 
showed  itself.  Troops  came  under  enemy  fire 
while  still  in  column  and  bodies  of  soldiers  crossed 
the  skyline  and  approached  the  Germans  in  full 
view,  when  with  a  little  maneuvering  they  might 
have  kept  behind  a  crest  or  a  woods  and  have 
avoided  detection.    Efforts  at  concealment  from 


THE  PURSUIT  FROM  THE  MARNE      153 

airplane  observation  also  left  much  to  be  desired. 
On  the  other  hand,  both  officers  and  men  demon- 
strated upon  every  occasion  their  willingness  to 
attack  the  enemy  irrespective  of  loss.  This  qual- 
ity is  one  which  can  be  attained  by  the  troops  of 
only  a  few  nations  and  by  them  only  after  suffi- 
cient training  and  an  infusion  of  the  proper  dis- 
cipline. It  is  a  glory  not  only  to  the  troops  but  to 
the  men  who  led  them  and  to  the  higher  officers 
who  inspired  their  training  that  they  had  acquired 
in  one  year  a  power  of  self-immolation  for  which 
military  text  books  state  two  years  is  the  irre- 
ducible minimum. 

The  imperfection  of  training  of  our  troops  and 
the  incapacity  of  some  of  their  commanding  offi- 
cers made  our  casualties  unduly  large.  However, 
they  did  not  prevent  a  continuous  and  heavy  pres- 
sure on  the  German  rear.  If,  as  in  1914,  the  Ger- 
mans withdrew  successfully  from  position  to  posi- 
tion and  stopped  upon  the  line  they  had  chosen, 
they  were  still  further  tired  and  so  much  nearer 
the  breakdown,  and  their  losses,  moreover,  irre- 
placeable. The  American  troops  which  survived 
were  the  better  for  the  ordeal.    They  learned  many 


154  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

valuable  lessons.  They  had  increased  confidence 
in  themselves,  and  those  officers  who  themselves 
were  unable  to  keep  up  and  absorb  the  lessons  of 
war  were  beginning  to  show  their  incapacity  to 
the  higher  command. 

The  soldiers  covered  themselves  with  glory. 
The  sins  of  the  pacifists  filled  many  graves. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  AMEBICAN   OFFENSIVES 

The  pursuit  of  the  Germans  after  their  repulse 
at  the  Marne  in  July,  1918,  ended  one  of  the  closing 
chapters  in  the  world  war.  Secure  from  defeat, 
the  allies  began  a  long  and  systematic  preparation 
to  win  a  victory.  This  plan  they  soon  abandoned 
to  embark  upon  the  successful  and  final  campaign 
in  the  fall  of  the  year. 

Congress,  meanwhile,  legislated  to  extend  the 
age  provisions  of  the  draft  act  in  order  to  raise 
another  army  of  a  million  men.  The  general  staff 
in  Washington  instructed  General  Pershing  to 
send  home  officers  experienced  in  combat  to  com- 
mand new  regiments  and  battalions.  As  I  was 
among  the  number  ordered  back,  I  visited  general 
headquarters  in  hopes  of  having  the  order  re- 
scinded so  far  as  it  applied  to  me.  My  old  friends 
in  the  intelligence  department,  while  sympathizing 
with  my  view,  declared  that  the  war  would  con- 
tinue for  two  or  three  years.     A  high  ranking 

155 


156  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

artillery  officer  jokingly  said  I  would  miss  the 
summer  campaign,  but  would  return  in  time  to 
spend  another  winter  in  the  trenches. 

The  commander-in-chief  pleasantly  but  firmly 
refused  my  request,  saying  that  the  important 
movements  were  over  for  the  year,  and  that  the 
essential  work  ahead  was  to  bring  another  army  of 
a  million  Americans  to  France  by  March,  1919. 

I  intrude  this  personal  experience  merely  to 
show  the  opinion  of  our  high  command  in  August, 
1918,  as  to  the  duration  of  the  war.'  Since  the 
termination  of  hostilities  I  have  learned  from 
those  in  authority  that  the  British  held  the  same 
views. 

It  was  on  the  5th  of  August  that  I  visited  our 
general  staff.  Three  weeks  later  in  Washington 
I  was  told  by  a  member  of  our  diplomatic  service 
that  the  war  would  be  over  in  a  month  or  two.  The 
reasons  for  this  diametrically  opposite  forecast 
have  never  been  made  public.  Undoubtedly,  the 
successful  Franco-British  offensives  of  August 
8th  and  21st  had  something  to  do  with  it.  I 
imagine  that  information  obtained  by  our  secret 
service  from  the  Central  Powers  also  was  partly 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  167 

responsible.  I  surmise  as  an  obvious  fact  that 
our  secret  service  agents  were  in  touch  with  the 
German  revolutionaries,  just  as  German  secret 
service  operatives  were  in  communication  with 
malcontents  in  allied  countries.  Our  men  may 
have  received  information  concerning  the  internal 
condition  of  Germany  which  was  not  known  even 
to  the  German  authorities. 

At  all  events  the  decision  to  assume  a  vigorous 
offensive  at  once  was  reached  by  the  allies.  The 
return  of  officers  to  America  to  train  the  new  army 
was  stopped.  The  flow  of  American  reinforce- 
ments to  France  continued  in  a  steady  stream, 
although  there  was  not  sufficient  food  in  sight  to 
feed  them  in  the  event  of  a  repulse  of  the  allied 
offensive  or  a  successful  resumption  of  the  Ger- 
man submarine  campaign.  There  were  not  even 
arms  enough  to  equip  them. 

From  the  end  of  March,  Marshal  Foch  had  com- 
mand of  all  the  allied  forces.  He  had  been  con- 
strained to  act  strictly  on  the  defensive  until  July 
18th,  when  the  American  and  French  attack  near 
Soissons  relieved  the  German  pressure  on  the  west 
side  of  the  salient  and  compelled  its  evacuation. 


158  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

In  the  Franco-British  attacks  of  August  8th 
and  21st  American  infantry  participated  vigor- 
ously; but  their  achievements  are  not  the  full 
measure  of  American  contribution  to  the  victory. 

We  have  seen,  in  a  previous  chapter,  how  the 
American  1st  army  corps  pounded  the  retreat- 
ing Germans.  If  no  immediate  advantage  from 
this  costly  maneuver  was  visible,  the  harvest  of 
this  American  sowing  was  reaped  in  Picardy  by 
our  French  and  British  allies.  Ludendorff  in  his 
book  tells  how  the  divisions  in  reserve  in  Picardy 
were  shifted  to  resist  and  to  stand  behind  the  sec- 
tor the  Americans  had  punished  so  hard.  Without 
the  heavy  American  attacks  on  the  German  rear 
guard,  from  the  Marne  to  the  Vesle,  with  conse- 
quent heavy  American  losses,  the  Franco-British 
success  of  August  8th  would  not  have  been  pos- 
sible. 

The  initiative  was  again  in  Foch's  hands  and 
it  remained  with  him  to  the  end  of  the  war.  He 
now  had  a  larger,  better  equipped  and  a  less 
fatigued  army  than  Ludendorff. 

A  fundamental  principle  of  war  is  to  mass  a 
greater  number  of  troops  against  a  lesser  nuna- 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  169 

ber  of  troops  and  defeat  the  smaller  number.  The 
principle  has  one  drawback;  namely,  when  the 
greater  number  is  successfully  massed  against  the 
smaller  number,  but  fails  to  defeat  that  smaller 
number,  the  attacker  has  exhausted  and  disor- 
ganized a  greater  number  of  troops  than  has  the 
defender,  and  has  created  a  situation  where  his 
opponent  has  larger  numbers  of  fresh,  organized 
troops  than  himself.  He  has  created  the  oppor- 
tunity for  successful  counter-attack.  History 
shows  that  when  the  defending  general  has  taken 
advantage  of  this  situation,  most  disastrous  re- 
sults have  attended  the  attacker.  The  successful 
defensive-offensive  battles  of  the  world  have  been 
the  most  decisive. 

In  the  Spring  the  Germans  threw  superior  num- 
bers against  the  British  and  defeated  them.  They 
were  stopped  by  the  arrival  of  French  reinforce- 
ments, whose  great  exertions,  as  well  as  numbers 
engaged,  however,  were  much  less  than  those  of 
the  attacking  Germans,  because  the  French  re- 
inforcements simply  moved  by  roads  and,  to  a 
great  extent,  in  automobile  trucks  emd  trains, 
while  the  German  attackers,  after  concentrating 


160  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

with  great  effort,  had  advanced,  fighting,  through 
ravines  and  across  plowed  fields.  Ludendorff  had 
struck  successfully  twice  more,  and  twice  unsuc- 
cessfully, before  Foch  unleashed  his  counter- 
stroke  on  July  18th. 

By  August  all  the  German  troops  were  tired; 
the  British  army  had  enjoyed  comparative  rest 
since  April,  and  the  American  army,  crossing  the 
ocean  in  a  steady  flow,  was  fully  effective  as  a  re- 
serve. The  experienced  troops  already  were  be- 
ing used  in  offensive  action;  the  partly  trained 
troops  were  in  line  in  quiet  sectors,  gaining  ex- 
perience, wearing  down  their  tired  adversaries, 
and  at  the  same  time  releasing  veteran  troops 
for  maneuver.  The  newest  arrivals  were  in  train- 
ing camps,  and  the  day  they  would  be  ready  to 
enter  the  line  could  be  figured  mathematically. 
The  English  and  French  continued  a  vigorous  of- 
fensive in  Picardy  and  Flanders,  while  the  tired 
American  divisions  of  the  Marne  salient  were  re- 
organized and  prepared  for  further  battle. 

Upon  this  occasion  the  American  authority  was 
extended.  General  Pershing  in  person  took  the 
field  as  commander  of  the  American  1st  army, 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  161 

under  tlie  command  of  General  Petain  as  army 
group  commander.  The  St.  Mihiel  salient  was 
selected  as  the  ground  for  the  operation. 

Some  controversy  has  arisen  as  to  who  planned 
the  battle  of  St.  Mihiel.  Some  say  the  plans  were 
drawn  by  the  American  1st  army  staff  and  ac- 
cepted without  revision  by  General  Petain.  Others 
say  they  were  French  plans  and  accepted  in  their 
entirety  by  the  Americans.  Between  these  state- 
ments there  seems  but  little  purpose  in  argument. 
Indeed,  the  general  plan  of  operation  was  obvious. 

Of  course,  all  the  technique  that  was  used  in 
the  battle  of  St.  Mihiel  had  been  acquired  by  us 
from  the  French.  We  had  accepted  their  organiza- 
tion of  infantry  regiments  and  had  learned  our 
minor  tactics  under  their  instructors.  Our  ar- 
tillery was  entirely  armed  with  French  guns,  the 
power  and  limitations  of  which  only  the  French 
could  know.  All  our  tanks  were  made  in  France, 
and  the  aviation  was  principally  French  and  Eng- 
lish. The  organization  of  the  artillery  fire  was, 
for  the  most  part,  under  French  officers  serving  in 
the  American  army  as  ** chiefs  of  corps  artillery." 
Furthermore,  the  American  1st  army  still  lacked 


16S  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

a  great  deal  of  the  equipment  necessary  to  conduct 
army  operations,  and  this,  with  its  personnel,  was 
lent  by  General  Petain. 

It  is  not  by  hiding  the  military  shortcomings  of 
the  American  government  behind  the  brilliant 
achievements  of  American  soldiers  that  we  are 
going  to  save  future  Americans  from  the  handi- 
caps under  which  we  fought  the  war.  Nor  is  it 
fair  to  our  fallen  companions,  nor  to  future  gen- 
erations, that  we  should  claim  credit  for  military 
excellence  that  Congress  and  our  executives  had 
put  beyond  our  powers  to  attain. 

The  French  had  begun  to  organize  the  St.  Mihiel 
salient  for  an  attack  before  the  American  1st  di- 
vision occupied  it  in  January,  1918.  They  sup- 
plied all  the  materiel;  and  they  furnished  prac- 
tioally  all  the  technical  and  tactical  services.  If 
the  American  staff  officers  did  write  the  orders  for 
the  attack,  they  did  it  after  having  studied  under 
French  commanders  for  fifteen  months,  and  they 
could  not  have  done  so  when  they  arrived  in 
France. 

America's  contribution  to  the  battle  was  500,000 
men.     Officers  and  men  had  learned  in  France 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  163 

what  American  pacifists  had  forbidden  them  to 
learn  at  home — how  to  maneuver  in  modem  bat- 
tle; and  they  were  willing  to  sulTer  untold  hard- 
ships and  advance  unflinchingly  against  the 
enemy.  America's  glory  is  that  American  troops 
went  forward  across  muddy  fields,  at  heart-break- 
ing speed,  carrying  out  well-prepared  orders,  and 
by  the  very  vigor  of  their  assault  paralyzing  the 
German  defense. 

For  fhe  battle  of  St.  Mihiel,  which  was  the  first 
American  offensive  on  a  great  scale,  and  yet  not 
one  requiring  the  entire  American  strength  in 
France,  General  Pershing  had  assembled  sub- 
stantially all  of  his  better  trained  divisions  and 
his  three  best  organized  army  corps  staffs. 

Even  while  preparing  for  this  battle  he  also 
was  preparing  for  a  larger  battle,  since  known  as 
the  Battle  of  the  Argonne. 

The  battle  of  the  Argonne  was  projected  by 
Marshal  Foch  as  a  gigantic  maneuver  in  which  the 
American  1st  army  to  the  east  of  the  forest  and 
the  French  4th  army  to  the  west  were  to  advance 
side  by  side,  outflanking  this  formidable  defense. 

General   Foch  had  wished  to  constitute  two 


164  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Franco-American  armies  under  French  army 
commanders.  Doubtless,  lie  felt  greater  confi- 
dence in  Ms  better  trained,  more  experienced  and 
fully  tried  French  army  commanders  than  he  did 
in  the  American  high  command.  He  also  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  fact  that  French  armies  possessed 
all  the  technical  equipment  and  transportation 
necessary  to  the  conduct  of  armies,  while  the 
American  armies  did  not.  He  may  or  may  not 
have  been  influenced  by  personal  and  national 
considerations.  Because  of  its  enormous  losses, 
the  French  army  had  decreased  in  size,  throwing 
out  of  employment  a  number  of  generals  and  staff 
ofiicers  who  were  anxious  to  command  American 
troops.  There  was  national  advantage  also  in 
having  French  generals  commanding  American 
troops  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

General  Foch's  plan  would  have  been  correct 
if  a  long  war  had  been  in  prospect.  The  end  was 
in  sight,  however,  and  it  was  essential  for  Ameri- 
ca's position  at  the  peace  table,  and  for  American 
safety  after  the  peace,  that  the  closing  of  hos- 
tilities should  leave  an  American  army  in  the  field 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  166 

tinder  command  of  generals  experienced  and 
proven  in  battle. 

General  Pershing,  therefore,  was  right  in  lead- 
ing an  all  American  army  into  the  Argonne  and  in 
borrowing  such  French  equipment  and  such  staff 
and  other  officers  as  he  needed. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  cull  from  official  and 
unofficial  accounts  the  progress  of  the  forty  days' 
battle,  but  to  point  out  circumstances  which  are 
of  value  to  our  army  and  which  have  not  received 
sufficient  recognition. 

The  Ajnerican  1st  army  was  not  a  well  oiled 
machine.  It  was  lacking  in  many  essential  re- 
spects :  it  was  short  of  its  own  artillery,  of  trans- 
port, of  signal  equipment,  of  aviation,  of  horses ; 
and,  as  indicated  before,  many  of  its  divisions 
were  not  complete.  It  also  was  deplorably  weak 
in  generals. 

For  his  initial  assault  between  the  Argonne  and 
the  Meuse  General  Pershing  chose  his  least  ex- 
perienced divisions.  Indeed,  most  of  these  units 
were  not  divisions  at  all,  because  they  did  not 
possess  their  divisional  artillery.  A  division  con- 
sists of  infantry,  artillery  and  auxiliary  troops,  all 


166  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

of  which  should  be  trained  to  act  together  for  the 
common  benefit.  A  division  without  artillery  is 
as  incomplete  as  an  infantry  regiment  without 
machine  guns. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  exigencies  of  the 
allies  following  the  defeat  of  March  21st  had  in- 
duced or  compelled  the  Americans  to  send  over  in- 
fantry without  artillery.  In  consequence,  these 
infantry  organizations  were  forced  to  fight 
through  the  Argonne  battle  without  their  divi- 
sional artillery,  a  handicap  which  cost  them 
severely  in  loss  of  life,  but  which  their  valor  over- 
came. These  lost  lives  cannot  be  blamed  upon  any 
section  of  the  American  army.  Our  allies  are  re- 
sponsible to  a  certain  degree,  but,  of  course,  the 
chief  blame  rests  upon  those  pacifists  who  pre- 
vented us  from  being  prepared  to  protect  our 
soldiers  in  this  war. 

Looking  back  with  a  perspective  of  more  than 
a  year,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  General  Pershing  was 
absolutely  right  in  engaging  his  less  organized 
and  less  trained  troops,  while  holding  his  better 
organized  and  trained  troops  in  reserve,  as 
Napoleon  was  wont  to  employ  his  Imperial  Guard. 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  1(57 

The  hardest  part  of  an  offensive,  under  conditions 
of  modem  artillery  preparation,  is  not  the  first 
assault,  but  the  more  or  less  confused  battle  which 
develops  as  the  troops  move  forward. 

It  has  been  suggested  by  students  of  the  battle 
that  if  the  best  troops  had  been  used  in  the  initial 
assault,  the  war  might  have  been  terminated  that 
week  of  September  26-October  2.  Never  were 
troops  more  surprised  than  were  the  Germans  on 
the  morning  of  the  Argonne  attack.  Only  five 
divisions  opposed  the  American  advance,  which 
penetrated  deeply  from  the  first  day  and  almost 
broke  through  the  line  before  German  reserves 
were  brought  up  on  the  third  day.  It  has  been 
argued  that  if  the  seasoned  divisions,  assisted  by 
their  divisional  artillery,  had  made  the  first  attack 
they  certainly  would  have  broken  clear  through 
the  German  line  and  compelled  a  retirement  which 
would  have  given  us  Sedan  before  the  week  end. 
If  we  could  be  sure  that  this  is  what  would  have 
happened,  we  can  agree  that  it  would  have  been 
better  to  engage  the  seasoned  divisions ;  but  noth- 
ing is  certain  in  war,  and  least  of  all  the  moves 
of  your  opponent. 


168  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

As  the  battle  was  fought  German  reserves  and 
American  reinforcements  simultaneously  arrived 
upon  the  scene,  and  there,  in  a  series  of  bitter  en- 
gagements called  the  second  phase  of  the  battle, 
the  Ajuericans  constantly  gained  ground  until 
brought  to  a  stand  on  October  14th.  If  the  trained 
divisions  had  been  used,  and  if  they  had  broken 
the  German  line  the  first  or  second  day,  a  general 
German  collapse  might  have  resulted;  yet,  other 
things  might  have  happened.  Driven  by  the  im- 
minence of  their  destruction,  the  Germans  might 
have  massed  a  larger  number  of  reserves,  and  our 
trained  assault  divisions  might  have  faced  battle, 
tired  and  farther  from  their  bases  than  they  were 
when  they  entered  the  second  phase  as  fresh 
troops.  If  the  American  veterans  had  become  ex- 
hausted, they  would  have  had  to  be  relieved  by 
less  experienced  and  less  trained  troops,  and  the 
very  reverse  of  a  complete  victory  might  have 
taken  place. 

Tested  by  the  possibility  of  unexpected  success, 
General  Pershing's  judgment  remains  sound. 
Tested  by  the  possibility  of  mischance,  it  was 
equally  correct.    What  if  the  American  and  the 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  169 

French  intelligence  had  been  mistaken  as  to  the 
number  of  German  troops  in  readiness  for  the 
defense?  What  if  the  assault  had  met  such  a 
devastating  fire  as  shriveled  up  the  army  of  Gen- 
eral Nivelle  in  1917  and  destroyed  the  best  assault 
divisions  of  France?  General  Pershing's  conduct 
is  justified  by  every  analysis.  His  army  marched 
through  to  victory.  Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that 
General  Ludendorif's  brilliant  breaches  of  our 
lines  in  March  and  May,  in  which  he  used  his  as- 
sault troops  to  break  the  line,  led  him  to  disaster. 
Of  the  great  difficulties  under  which  insuffi- 
ciently trained  and  organized  divisions  labored 
there  is,  unfortunately,  no  comprehensive  and  au- 
thentic record.  In  all  of  them  knowledge  of  mod- 
ern battle  conditions  was  wanting.  They  had  re- 
ceived their  trench  mortars  and  their  infantry 
cannons  only  a  short  time  before  and  did  not  know 
how  to  use  them.  Some  regiments  marched 
through  the  whole  campaign  without  taking  these 
indispensable  weapons  from  their  trains.  They 
were,  in  consequence,  badly  in  need  of  materiel 
with  which  to  attack  German  machine  gun  nests  at 
close  range.    Not  understanding  their  own  arms, 


170  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

and  still  less  imderstandiiig  the  artillery  arm, 
they  called  for  75s  to  accompany  the  infantry. 
Unfortunately,  they  did  not  furnish  the  drivers 
with  sabers  or  sharpen  the  teeth  of  the  horses — 
the  only  way  in  which  they  could  have  expected 
to  hurt  the  enemy  with  75s  on  the  infantry  firing 
line. 

The  modem  field  piece  is  a  long  range  weapon. 
It  ranges  up  to  11,000  meters  and  is  most  effective 
between  7,000  and  2,500  meters.  At  a  less  range 
than  that,  because  of  its  flat  trajectory,  its  diffi- 
culty of  concealment  and  of  transportation,  it  is 
no  match  for  the  machine  gun,  the  infantry  can- 
non or  the  long  range  trench  mortar.  Even  so,  a 
school  of  officers  has  been  formed  which  desires  to 
return  our  artillery  to  the  role  it  played  in  the 
days  of  the  Civil  War,  when  artillery  losses  were 
large  and  artillery  results  small.  They  have  cited 
in  support  of  their  contentions  the  use  of  the  field 
piece  by  the  Germans  in  infantry  waves.  The 
point  is  not  at  all  well  taken.  The  Germans  lacked 
tanks  and  had  to  seek  fire  power  in  the  front  line 
by  other  means.  For  this  they  used  an  ample 
number  of  trench  mortars  very  superior  to  those 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES         171 

of  the  allies.  They  made  special  mounts  on  low 
wheels  for  a  small  number  of  77  m.m.  guns  to 
serve  certain  special  purposes.  Finally,  they  did 
engage  some  77s  at  close  range  with  very  bad  re- 
sults. This  maneuver  was  not  a  development  of 
the  war  but  a  remaining  erroneous  fragment  of 
their  former  artillery  instruction. 

A  very  good,  impression  of  what  an  under- 
trained  division  suffered  can  be  had  by  studying 
the  testimony  before  the  Senate  committee  sup- 
porting and  contradicting  the  charges  of  Governor 
Allen  of  Kansas,  and  from  the  history  of  the  35th 
Division. 

From  the  latter  I  extract  a  communication  from 
the  chief  of  staff  of  the  1st  army  to  the  conunander 
of  the  division : 

HEADQUARTERS,  FIRST  ARMY 

AMERICAN  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCES, 

FRANCE 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff 

October  26, 1918. 

From:  Chief  of  Staff,  1st  Army. 

To:  Commanding  General,  35th  Division. 

Subject:  Conclusion  of  an  inspection  of  the  con- 


m  THE  ARMY  OP  1918 

duct  of  the  35t]i  Division  during  attack  in  recent 
operations. 

1.  The  Army  Commander  directs  me  to  transmit 
to  you  the  following  conclusions  of  an  inspection 
of  the  conduct  of  the  35th  Division  during  its  at- 
tack in  our  recent  operations.  He  desires  that 
these  conclusions  be  given  the  greatest  weight  in 
the  organization  and  training  of  your  Division. 

2.  These  conclusions  have  been  deduced  from 
the  testimony  of  several  eye-witnesses  and  are 
transmitted  to  you  with  the  desire  not  only  to 
point  out  the  causes  for  undesirable  conditions 
but  also  to  give  you  a  basis  for  the  future  train- 
ing of  the  35th  Division. 

Conclusions: 

1st.  That  the  35th  Division  at  the  commence- 
ment of  operations,  September  26th,  was  not  a 
well  disciplined  combat  unit,  and  the  many  officers 
with  the  Division  were  not  well-trained  leaders. 

2nd.  That  the  Division  Staff  was  not  efficient 
or  well  organized. 

3rd.  That  the  changes  in  the  Staff  and  Brigade 
and    Regimental    Commanders    greatly    handi- 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES         173 

capped  the  Division  Commander  in  the  proper 
functioning  of  his  Division. 

4th.  That  after  the  attack  started  there  was  no 
system  of  liaison.  Even  the  runner  failed  to  fol- 
low the  axis  of  liaison  prescribed. 

5th.  That  brigade  and  regimental  commanders 
failed  to  make  use  of  the  means  of  liaison  at  their 
disposal  and  failed  to  keep  in  touch  with  their 
higher  commanders. 

6th.  That  the  failure  of  all  commanders  to  keep 
a  headquarters  established  where  communications 
could  be  received  was  inexcusable. 

7th.  That  the  action  of  brigade  and  regimental 
commanders  in  going  far  to  the  front  and  out  of 
all  communication  resulted  in  their  having  no 
more  effect  on  the  action  than  so  many  company 
or  platoon  commanders,  and  prevented  the  head- 
quarters in  rear  from  sending  orders  to  units  in 
front. 

8th.  That  if  commanders  had  remained  in  their 
headquarters  or  made  provisions  for  messages 
reaching  them  immediately,  they  would  have  been 
able  to  have  had  a  fair  knowledge  of  conditions, 


174  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

and  perhaps  have  straightened  out  the  many  diflfi- 
culties  that  arose. 

9th.  That  the  intermingling,  confusion  and 
straggling  which  commenced  shortly  after  H  honr 
showed  poor  discipline,  lack  of  leadership,  and 
probably  poor  preparation. 

10th.  That  it  was  a  serious  error  for  both  the 
Division  Commander  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  to 
leave  their  Headquarters  at  the  same  time. 

11th.  That  the  five  attacks  which  the  Division 
made  followed  each  other  so  closely  that  there 
was  no  opportunity  after  the  evening  of  Septem- 
ber 26th  to  reorganize  and  get  the  various  units 
in  hand. 

12th.  That  after  September  27th  the  Division 
was  really  one  in  name  only,  as  maneuvering 
power  with  intact  units,  except  the  Engineers, 
ceased  to  exist. 

13th.  That  the  casualties  among  the  officers 
were  undoubtedly  responsible  for  a  great  deal  of 
the  disorganization. 

14th.  That  most  of  the  straggling  and  confu- 
sion was  caused  by  men  getting  lost  and  not  hav- 
ing leaders,  and  not  from  any  deliberate  design 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES         175 

to  go  to  the  rear  in  order  to  avoid  further  fighting. 

15th.  That  the  fighting  spirit  and  bravery  of 
officers  and  men  were  excellent. 

16th.  That  the  failure  to  have  telephone  and 
wireless  communication  forward  to  include  Regi- 
ments, and  the  failure  to  use  the  proper  code  call 
to  Corps  Headquarters,  was  due  to  the  inefficiency 
of  Lt.  Colonel  George  A.  Wieczorek,  Signal  Corps, 
then  Division  Signal  Officer. 

17th.  That  the  Artillery  Commander,  Brig. 
Gen.  L.  G.  Berry,  failed  to  cooperate  with  and 
make  full  use  of  the  Air  Service  until  ordered 
to  do  so. 

H.  A.  DRUM, 
Chief  of  Staff. 

The  criticism  seems  sweeping,  the  more  so  that 
the  division  commander  and  brigade  commanders 
and  a  part  of  the  colonels  were  officers  of  our  regu- 
lar army  who  would  be  supposed  by  the  general 
public  to  know  the  principles  so  confidently  set 
down  by  General  Drum.  The  fact  is  that  few, 
if  any,  of  our  regular  officers  knew  any  of  these 
principles  before  they  went  to  France,  and,  of 
course,  no  other  officers  did. 


176  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  disorganization  in 
the  army  was  confined  to  National  Guard  troops. 
An  excellent  article  in  the  Field  Artillery  Journal 
shows  the  complete  disorganization  of  the  3rd 
artillery  brigade  in  the  battle  of  July  15th.  This 
brigade  was  gallant,  as  were  all  American  troops, 
but  its  commanding  officer  and  its  colonels  had 
rendered  themselves  powerless  to  exert  the  slight- 
est influence  upon  the  course  of  the  combat. 

Indeed,  officers  of  the  1st  division  will  remem- 
ber in  their  early  training  maneuvers  a  simulated 
attack  against  an  imaginary  enemy  which  broke 
down  solely  through  the  inability  of  officers  of  all 
ranks  to  carry  out  the  parts  assigned  to  them  by 
their  instructors.  It  is  training  and  experience, 
not  inspiration  and  valor  alone,  which  make  pos- 
sible success  in  modern  warfare. 

To  the  difficulties  arising  from  lack  of  training 
were  added  in  many  instances  unskillful  general- 
ship. 

It  has  long  been  the  law  in  America  that  general 
officers  shall  be  appointed  by  the  President,  sub- 
ject to  the  confirmation  of  the  Senate.  In  the 
emergency  of  a  war  for  which  he  had  refused  to 

\ 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  177 

prepare,  the  executive  was  unwilling  to  assume 
this  responsibility  and  called  upon  a  number  of 
high  ranking  officers  in  the  war  college  to  recom- 
mend a  method  for  selecting  general  officers.  This 
board  recommended  that  all  officers  not  notori- 
ously incompetent  should  be  promoted  in  the  order 
of  seniority  in  the  regular  service  and  that  all 
officers  upon  reaching  the  retiring  age  of  64  should 
be  retired  from  any  service. 

The  ruling  was  made  upon  the  assumption  that 
a  soldier  was  senile  at  64  but  at  the  height  of  his 
power  at  63  years,  11  months  and  30  days.  The 
rule  also  held  that  a  regular  army  officer  of  every 
branch  was  equally  competent  to  command  in  any 
other  branch.  An  engineer  might  command  artil- 
lery, a  cavalryman  tanks,  or  an  artilleryman  avia- 
tion, although,  as  turned  out  to  be  the  case,  he 
might  never  have  given  five  minutes'  thought  fo 
these  services  before  his  assignment.  It  was  also 
the  doctrine  that  a  general  officer  needed  no  train- 
ing and  that  failure  to  command  successfully, 
which  led  to  his  removal  from  one  command,  did 
not  incapacitate  him  for  reassignment  to  a  newer 


178  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

and  less  experienced  organization,  which,  there- 
fore, needed  a  still  abler  commander. 

The  creation  of  generals  by  seniority  was  popu- 
lar in  the  regular  army  because  while  under  it 
many  inexcusable  promotions  were  made,  and 
many  ridiculous  assignments,  still  every  officer  in 
the  service  received  more  than  enough  promotion 
to  satisfy  his  natural  ambition  and  every  one  was 
saved  the  humiliation  and  even  the  danger  of 
humiliation  of  being  overslaughed;  that  is  to  say, 
of  having  an  officer  junior  to  him  in  the  service 
promoted  over  his  head. 

The  rule  adopted  was  carried  through  syste- 
matically and  no  consideration  of  the  good  of  the 
service  or  the  lives  of  soldiers  was  allowed  to  in- 
terfere with  the  course  of  promotion.  Officers  ap- 
proaching the  retiring  age  were  assigned  to  duty 
or  given  high  commands  or  sent  on  to  visit  the 
battle  front  as  though  to  prepare  them  for  active 
service  and  then  retired  as  the  clock  struck  their 
sixty-fourth  birthday.  Not  only  was  the  time 
spent  on  their  training  wasted,  but  the  experience 
of  their  successors  was  delayed  by  so  much,  and 
divisions  whose  commanders  had  just  been  retired 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  179 

were  sent  overseas  under  generals  they  did  not 
know  and  who  did  not  know  them. 

I  believe  that  General  Pershing  was  bitterly  op- 
posed to  this  rule.  In  the  higher  commands  which 
came  under  his  personal  supervision  he  made  as- 
signments without  reference  to  seniority,  but  in  a 
great  army  where  generals  are  numbered  by  the 
hundreds  the  assignments  and  removals,  or  most 
of  them,  had  to  be  done  by  rule,  and  the  rule  was 
that  every  general,  from  whatever  branch  of  the 
service,  should  be  considered  competent  to  com- 
mand every  other  branch  until  he  had  proven  his 
incapacity  beyond  the  reasonable  doubt  of  staff 
oflScers  remote  from  the  actual  scene  of  hostilities. 

Late  in  the  war,  when  the  qualifications  of  vari- 
ous officers  had  been  made  plain,  the  removals  of 
generals  became  so  common  as  to  provoke  much 
comment  and  some  resentment.  Even  if  injustice 
may  have  been  shown  toward  a  few  individuals, 
it  was  as  nothing  compared  to  the  frightful  in- 
justice to  the  millions  of  soldiers  whose  lives  had 
been  jeopardized,  and  many  of  them  forfeited, 
while  a  few  generals  were  being  given  a  **full 
and  fair''  try-out. 


180  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

The  regular  army  is  not  and  is  not  intended  to 
be  a  self-governing  organization.  The  very  prin- 
ciple of  all  military  organization  is  subordination 
to  a  higher  authority.  Wherever  soldiers  of  any 
rank  are  allowed  to  select  their  leaders  intolerable 
harm  is  done.  We  learned  from  the  Civil  War  and 
other  wars  not  to  allow  enlisted  soldiers  to  select 
their  company  officers.  Our  government,  unfortu- 
nately, did  not  understand  that  it  should  not  allow 
commissioned  officers  to  select  their  generals.  To 
be  sure,  a  strong  policy  aimed  toward  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  most  competent  soldiers  to  high  com- 
mand would  have  bred  a  great  deal  of  ill-feeling 
among  the  officers  not  so  chosen,  but  any  method 
of  selection  would  have  been  better  than  that  of 
pure  seniority.  On  the  basis  of  military  educa- 
tion, the  chief  engineer  of  any  railroad  would  be 
as  competent  to  command  a  division  as  an  army 
engineer  whose  life  had  been  spent  building  break- 
waters and  dredging  rivers,  while  the  head  of  any 
manufacturing  concern  would  have  more  natural 
qualifications  to  command  the  aircraft  organiza- 
tion than  any  officer  in  the  United  States  army. 

The  chief  blame  for  this  great  evil  must  lie 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  181 

where  the  Constitution  puts  it,  on  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  United  States  army  and  upon  his 
secretary  of  war,  rather  than  upon  the  unfortu- 
nate committee  of  soldiers  upon  whom  was  loaded 
the  responsibility  and  who  proved  unable  to  resist 
the  impulses  of  ambition  and  the  importunities  of 
life-long  friends. 

In  the  divisions  that  first  came  to  France  con- 
siderable progress  in  weeding  out  incompetents 
was  made,  more  noticeably  in  the  lower  ranks 
than  among  the  general  officers ;  but  in  the  newly 
arrived  divisions  little  of  either  was  possible.  Con- 
sequently there  resulted  a  great  deal  of  mishan- 
dling of  troops  at  a  time  when  skillful  leadership 
was  more  than  ever  essential. 

As  early  as  the  second  day  of  the  Argonne  the 
removal  of  general  officers  began,  and  it  continued 
in  increasing  numbers  until  the  end. 

The  failure  to  provide  the  army  with  the  best 
available  generals  caused  two  hardships  to  the 
men :  First,  the  hardship  of  serving  under  incom- 
petents; second,  after  the  removal  of  these,  the 
hardship  of  serving  under  new  officers,  frequently 
assigned  from  strange  organizations. 


182  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Among  hundreds  of  stories  concerning  the  ig- 
norance of  general  officers  throughout  the  war,  I 
give  three,  because  I  have  proven  their  authen- 
ticity : 

A  battery  of  artillery  was  skillfully  camouflaged 
at  the  edge  of  a  muddy,  much  traveled  road.  Pass- 
ing vehicles  threw  mud  over  the  camouflage  and 
onto  the  guns,  thus  improving  the  camouflage.  A 
general  officer,  after  complaining  several  times  of 
the  dirty  guns,  ordered  the  road  back  of  the  bat- 
tery position  to  be  swept  clean  and  kept  so.  For 
the  information  of  civilians,  I  will  explain  that  a 
German  air  photograph  showing  a  traveled  road 
swept  clean  for  a  length  of  one  hundred  yards 
would  cause  such  attention  to  be  directed  to  that 
spot  as  would  certainly  discover  the  battery.  This 
general  was  not  an  incompetent;  he  was  merely 
new  to  warfare.  Afterwards  he  attained  high 
rank  in  the  army. 

An  infantry  major,  in  advancing,  left  two  of  his 
companies  under  cover,  and  went  forward  with 
two.  Experiencing  stubborn  resistance,  he  sent  a 
runner  to  bring  up  the  two  companies  in  support. 
The  runner  met  a  general  but  recently  arrived 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  188 

from  America  and  assigned  to  command  a  brigade. 

**Here,  where  are  you  going  T'  shouted  the  gen- 
eral. 

**I  am  carrying  an  order  to  bring  up  the  sup- 
porting companies  of  the  battalion,  sir/'  replied 
the  runner. 

**Well,  I  will  have  you  understand  that  nobody 
in  my  brigade  goes  to  the  rear,''  answered  the 
general.    **You  return  to  your  company." 

When  the  runner  reached  his  battalion  com- 
mand post  he  reported  to  the  major,  who  again 
sent  him  back  for  the  two  companies,  with  orders 
to  hide  behind  a  bush  if  he  saw  any  general  officers 
coming  along! 

During  the  advance  in  the  latter  days  of  the 
Argonne,  an  infantry  battalion  was  ordered  to 
clear  out  a  ravine,  a  mile  and  a  quarter  long,  oc- 
cupied by  the  Germans.  Shortly  before  H  hour 
the  division  commander  met  a  battery  of  artillery 
changing  position.  He  halted  it  and  directed  the 
captain  to  unlimber  and  execute  **a  heavy  bar- 
rage*' on  the  ravine  for  twenty  minutes. 

He  then  sent  a  message  to  the  battalion  com- 
mander to  delay  his  attack,  as  he  had  ordered  a 


184.  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

heavy  artillery  barrage  on  the  ravine  to  precede 
the  assault.  The  major,  who  had  already  begun 
his  attack,  anticipating  a  devastating  flood  of 
shell,  pulled  his  men  back  to  await  the  artillery 
fire. 

The  artilleryman,  being  in  a  position  where  he 
could  obtain  no  observation  of  the  ravine,  and 
having  no  time  to  orient  his  position  to  obtain  ac- 
curate fire,  merely  assured  himself  that  his  range 
was  sufficient  to  clear  the  American  troops  and 
fired  for  twenty  minutes.  The  infantry  major 
did  not  even  perceive  the  artillery  fire,  so  wild 
and  thin  it  was;  he  lost  three  hours  and  a  half 
waiting  for  assistance  which  had  never  been  pos- 
sible. 

To  deliver  supporting  fire  to  an  attack  a  bat- 
tery of  75s  should  not  be  given  a  front  of  more 
than  200  yards  to  sweep;  and  unless  it  has  ob- 
servation to  regulate,  it  must  have  accurate  maps 
and  orienting  data. 

This  division  commander,  whose  function  it 
was,  among  other  things,  to  command  three  regi- 
ments of  artillery,  did  not  know  even  the  simplest 
principles  of  artillery  fire.    But  I  do  not  blame 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  186 

the  general;  he  was  an  energetic  and  gallant  offi- 
cer. I  do  feel,  though,  that  the  army  is  to  blame 
for  raising  to  the  rank  of  major  generals  officers 
who  had  not  been  instructed  in  the  arms  which 
they  were  to  employ. 

The  first  phase  of  the  Argonne  consisted  of  the 
initial  assault  of  the  greener  divisions  of  the 
army.  This  assault  lost  momentum  as  the  divi- 
sions became  exhausted  or  disorganized.  New  di- 
visions took  their  places  as  fast  as  they  could  be 
moved  over  congested  roads,  and,  German  rein- 
forcements arriving,  there  ensued  a  period  of  dis- 
jointed attacks  known  as  the  second  phase. 

In  this  respect  the  battles  of  the  Argonne  re- 
semble those  of  Verdun  and  the  Somme  with  the 
exception  that  now  the  allies  were  so  greatly  pre- 
ponderant in  numbers  of  men  and  munitions  that 
a  battle  of  attrition  was  as  certain  to  end  in  vic- 
tory as  in  former  cases  it  was  bound  to  be  inde- 
cisive. For  this  reason  the  policy  of  continuing 
the  assault  night  and  day  with  all  the  means  at 
hand  deserved  the  highest  military  commendation. 

The  minor  tactics  employed,  however,  cannot 
receive  the  same  degree  of  praise.     The  second 


186  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

phase  of  the  Argoime  was  strategically  successful 
in  that  it  wore  down  the  weakening  enemy.  Tac- 
tically, it  was  a  series  of  failures.  Soldiers  are 
taught  that  a  tactical  victory  consists  of  posses- 
sion of  the  battlefield  at  the  end  of  the  action. 
In  the  days  of  spears  and  shock  tactics  this  was 
clearly  the  case.  Leaders  sought  security  in  the 
superiority  of  the  location  of  the  ground  upon 
which  they  placed  their  troops  and  upon  the  rigid- 
ity of  their  formation.  Pushed  off  this  ground, 
the  troops  inevitably  lost  the  regularity  of  their 
order  and  were  doubly  defeated. 

When  firearms  again  brought  extreme  mobility 
into  warfare  the  advantage  of  holding  a  certain 
piece  of  ground  decreased  to  the  vanishing  point. 
The  English  troops  on  King's  Mountain  were  at  a 
disadvantage  and  their  successive  successful 
charges  against  the  Tennessee  militia  were  totally 
unavailing  because  these  never  stood  before  the 
enemy,  but  kept  shooting  at  him  from  all  sides. 

The  introduction  of  artillery  into  mobile  war- 
fare gave  to  possession  of  the  battlefield  its  old 
importance.  No  matter  how  mobile  the  artillery, 
once  engaged  it  could  not  be  withdrawn  from  be- 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  187 

fore  a  vigorous  attack.  Placed  practically  in  line 
with  its  infantry,  sometimes  in  front  of  it,  it  was 
doomed  to  capture,  if  the  infantry  were  driven 
back.  Conquest  of  the  battlefield,  therefore,  meant 
conquest  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  as  an  army, 
no  matter  how  mobile,  without  artillery  cannot  op- 
pose an  army  with  artillery,  it  meant  victory. 

The  long  range  of  modern  artillery  lent  a  new 
aspect  to  warfare — ^what  is  termed  the  ** depth''  of 
the  battlefield. 

Where  Napoleon's  cavalry  could  re-form  in  per- 
fect security  a  few  hundred  yards  distant  from  the 
British  squares  at  Waterloo,  the  modern  soldier 
is  in  range  of  the  enemy  at  many  miles.  In  mod- 
em defensive  warfare  artillery  may  be  placed  sev- 
eral thousand  meters  behind  the  infantry  line  and 
fire  upon  the  enemy  at  varying  distances  in 
front  of  the  line,  according  to  the  range  of  the 
guns.  In  a  previous  chapter  it  has  been  related 
how  General  Gouraud  planned  his  defensive  battle 
of  Champagne  in  depth  and  withdrew  his  infantry 
from  position  to  position  while  firing  upon  the  ad- 
vancing Germans  with  cannon,  machine  guns  and 
rifles.    So  far  had  he  extended  this  principle  that 


188  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

some  of  his  artillery  could  not  reach  the  Germans 
until  they  had  advanced  a  considerable  distance 
inside  the  original  French  first  line. 

Under  these  conditions  a  tactical  success  can 
only  be  gained  by  an  advance  which  overruns  and 
captures  the  defensive  artillery.  Any  advance 
less  than  this  is  merely  a  march  forward  under 
enemy  fire  which  becomes  more  effective  at  every 
step,  while  the  protecting  barrage  of  the  offensive 
artillery  gives  less  support.  When  the  assault  is 
stopped,  if  it  is  stopped  short  of  the  defensive  ar- 
tillery, the  defensive  artillery  is  moved  back. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  attacker  must  suf- 
fer much  more  heavily  than  the  defender. 

Many  mistakes  were  made  in  the  Argonne  in 
ordering  attacks  which  did  not  even  contemplate 
overrunning  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  these  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  tactical  principle  above 
enunciated  had  been  acted  upon  by  American 
troops  when  on  the  defensive  and  should  have 
been  thoroughly  understood  by  all  general  and 
staff  officers. 

The  appreciation  of  this  principle  is  the  line  of 
demarcation  between  the  second  and  third  periods 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  18# 

of  the  battle.  For  the  decisive  attack  all  available 
artillery  was  mobilized  on  the  front  of  the  5th 
corps.  Both  the  corps  commander  and  the  chief 
of  the  corps  artillery  were  skillful  ofiScers  whose 
experience  dated  back  to  the  early  days  of  the 
1st  division.  All  the  artillery  was  organized  to 
fire  according  to  one  comprehensive  plan.  The 
rolling  barrage  was  planned  to  sweep  11,000 
meters.  The  infantry  was  ordered  to  capture  all 
the  enemy  defenses,  however  deep.  The  assault 
was  a  complete  success.  Everywhere  the  German 
infantry  was  thrown  back  and  finally  the  2nd  divi- 
sion broke  clear  through  and  opened  the  road  to 
Sedan. 

The  Argonne  will  be  known  as  Pershing's  battle 
and  so  brings  up  the  personality  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief. 

One  of  the  questions  I  am  asked  most  frequently 
is:  What  about  Pershing?  What  do  you  think 
of  Pershing?  What  was  Pershing,  anyhow t  I 
can  add  no  details  to  the  story  of  General  Psrsh- 
ing's  early  career.  He  is  a  graduate  of  West 
Point.  At  the  battle  of  Santiago,  Cuba,  he  com- 
manded a  troop  of  cavalry.    In  the  Philippines  he 


190  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

attracted  attention  by  Ms  aggressiveness  in  a 
campaign  against  one  of  the  savage  tribes.  Pres- 
ident Eoosevelt,  in  his  process  of  vitalizing  the 
Eegular  army  and  changing  it  from  a  constabulary 
into  a  military  force,  promoted  him  from  the  rank 
of  captain  to  that  of  brigadier  general.  In  1916 
he  commanded  the  unsuccessful  expedition  to  cap- 
ture Francisco  Villa.  His  conduct  of  this  expedi- 
tion received  general  commendation,  it  being  thor- 
oughly understood  that  the  limitations  put  upon 
him  by  the  War  Department  made  his  success 
impossible.  When  he  was  ordered  to  Europe  in 
1917  as  commander-in-chief  he  was  generally 
recognized  as  the  proper  man  for  the  place,  if 
General  Wood  was  to  be  passed  over. 

I  met  him  for  the  first  time  in  Paris,  and  my 
acquaintanceship  with  him  was  only  that  of  a 
major  on  staff  duty  with  his  commanding  general. 
From  the  day  I  reported  to  duty  I  have  seen  him 
five  times.  In  August,  1917,  he  sent  for  me  to 
receive  my  report  of  Erzberger's  secret  peace 
offer  to  the  allies,  of  which  I  have  spoken  before. 
The  second  time  was  when  I  asked  permission  to 
leave  staff  duty  for  the  line.   And  I  saw  him  twice 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  191 

during  his  inspections  of  the,  front,  the  last  time 
during  a  heavy  German  artillery  fire.  I  mention 
this  because  of  the  pusillanimous  suggestion  that 
General  Pershing  absented  himself  from  the  firing 
line.  I  saw  him  last  when  I  asked  to  remain  in 
France.* 

The  demands  upon  General  Pershing  were 
varied  and  difficult.  For  the  first  few  months 
after  his  arrival  in  Europe  he  was  compelled  to 
appear  at  many  places  as  tangible  evidence  of  the 
coming  of  the  American  army.  He  had  to  receive 
receptions,  eulogies  and  flatteries  such  as  never 
before  were  showered  upon  an  American  officer. 
His  friends  wondered  whether  he  could  keep  his 
head  after  such  ovations.  He  could  and  he  did. 
He  was  responsible  for  the  organization  that  was 
to  receive,  transport,  feed,  equip  and  munition 
the  huge  army  coming  from  America  with  nothing 
but  the  clothes  on  its  back.  This  task  was  suc- 
cessfully accomplished.  In  March,  1918,  he  had 
to  make  one  of  the  gravest  military  decisions  that 
ever  confronted  a  general.    The  allies  were  being 

♦I  have  met  General  Pershing  twice  since  this  chapter  was 
written. 


192  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

badly  beaten.  Within  the  next  two  months  they 
might  be  defeated  and  destroyed.  Americans 
reaching  France  could  not  be  made  effective  fight- 
ing forces  in  twice  that  time. 

Should  he  bring  them  over  and  risk  their  cap- 
ture or  destruction  by  a  victorious  enemy  before 
they  were  capable  of  fighting,  or  should  he  leave 
them  safely  in  America,  where  they  could  protect 
our  shores  against  a  triumphant  foe? 

People  who  see  only  that  the  Germans  were 
finally  overcome  can  never  realize  how  close  the 
Kaiser  came  to  victory,  and  they  never  will  ap- 
preciate how  momentous  was  the  problem  faced 
by  General  Pershing.  Another  might  have  taken 
the  safer  but  the  weaker  course. 

In  September  he  was  compelled  to  decide  the 
question  of  putting  our  newly  arrived  troops  into 
the  offensive  while  unequipped  and  untrained. 
'  Under  other  circumstances  it  would  have  been 
criminal  to  put  many  of  these  formations  into  a 
major  battle.  Only  in  the  last  extremity  of  defeat 
or  to  secure  a  victory  almost  within  grasp  should 
the  newly  arrived  divisions  have  been  allowed  to 
fight  a  trained  and  still  organized  enemy.     The 


THE  AMERICAN  OFFENSIVES  193 

second  condition  existed,  and  General  Pershing 
showed  irreproachable  military  judgment  in 
throwing  every  resource  of  his  command,  every 
soldier,  trained  and  untrained,  into  the  fire. 

The  Battle  pf  the  Argonne  in  a  measure  re- 
sembles the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness.  With  the 
superiority  of  force  at  our  disposal  only  an  iron 
will  to  hammer  away  irrespective  of  loss  was 
necessary.  But  this  quality  was  indispensable. 
Our  losses  inevitably  would  be  enormous  and 
our  efforts  not  spectacular.  Criticisms  of  the 
Argonne  we  have  had,  and  more  will  be  forth- 
coming, and  very  just  ones;  but  there  can  be  no 
fair  criticism  of  General  Pershing  for  throwing 
every  available  man  into  the  attack  that  ended 
the  war. 

We  got  only  the  armistice  as  a  result,  and 
a  peace.  If  the  Germans  could  definitely  have 
stopped  the  allied  advance  before  winter,  how 
much  worse  might  be  the  plight  of  the  world  to- 
dayl 

What  heights  General  Pershing  might  have  at- 
tained as  a  strategist  or  a  tactician  had  he  been  in 
the  war  long  enough  to  learn  all  that  the  Russian, 


194.  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

French  and  German  generals  knew,  it  is  futile  to 
ask.  No  man  can  do  more  than  meet  an  emerg- 
ency. Pershing  did  this.  For  the  numerous  vexa- 
tions, inconveniences,  and  even  unnecessary  hard- 
ships which  our  troops  underwent  let  us  place 
the  blame  where  it  belongs — on  Americans  refusal 
to  prepare  for  war — and  not  hold  responsible 
men  who  did  their  best  in  a  hurry  and  with  the 
few  miserable  tools  they  were  given. 

It  may  be  remarked  in  closing  that  General  Per- 
shing is  not  an  officer  who  rose  according  to  regu- 
lar army  methods.  "While  still  a  captain  he  was 
picked  out  for  high  command.  If  all  the  other 
American  generals  had  been  selected  in  the  same 
way  our  success  would  have  been  greater. 


CHAPTER  IX 

SOME  ELEMENTS  OP  NATIONAL  DEFENSE 

The  armistice  found  the  army  still  vigorous  and 
its  efficiency  much  increased  by  its  experience  in 
the  great  battle.  Men  of  real  military  power  had 
come  to  the  front — and,  not  the  least  important, 
were  fully  aware  that  they  had  not  learned  all 
there  was  in  the  military  art.  Schools  were  im- 
mediately formed  to  study  the  lessons  of  the  cam- 
paign and  maneuvers  were  held  to  instruct  all 
arms  and  all  ranks  in  the  evolutions  which  had 
proven  the  most  successful  and  the  most  econom- 
ical of  human  life.  The  American  army  had  ap- 
proached— perhaps  it  had  reached — the  stage 
where  it  could  function  without  the  assistance  of 
French  officers. 

Let  il  be  our  effort  to  continue  the  development 
of  our  military  from  the  point  it  attained  in  the 
war  and  not  let  it  drop  back  to  a  position  where 
it  will  need  foreign  arms  and  a  year's  instruction 

196 


196  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

by  foreign  officers,  under  the  protection  of  a  for- 
eign navy,  to  get  ready  for  tlie  field. 

We  have  demobilized.  This  was  necessary.  We 
have,  however,  given  np  every  form  of  organiza- 
tion which  we  so  painfully  built  up  during  the  war 
and  which  we  will  need  to  protect  us  in  any  strug- 
gle which  the  rivalries  of  the  world  may  force 
upon  us.  Surely,  aa  intelligent  people  will  not 
allow  this  condition  of  helplessness  to  continue. 

Enough  time  has  passed  to  cool  any  ill-will 
which  has  sprung  up  from  personal  injustices, 
themselves  caused  by  the  rotten  military  system 
preceding  our  entry  into  the  war.  Let  us  consider 
dispassionately  how  we  can  form  a  skeleton  organ- 
ization best  adapted  for  rapid  mobilization. 

In  retrospect  it  is  not  difficult  to  measure  the 
services  of  all  factors  that  contributed  to  our 
success.  The  Regular  army,  of  course,  played  by 
far  the  greater  part.  It  was  the  reservoir  from 
which  the  fundamentals  of  our  military  instruc- 
tion were  drawn.  It  had  already  largely  instructed 
the  National  Guard  in  1916.  It  continued  this  in- 
struction the  following  year,  furnishing  the  bulk 
of  the  high  ranking  officers  for  that  organization. 


ELEMENTS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE     197 

It  also  examined  the  fitness  of  the  National  Guard 
oflBcers  and  got  rid  of  the  not  inconsiderable  num- 
ber of  incompetents  it  contained.  It  furnished 
instructors  for  the  OflScers '  Training  Camps  and  it 
furnished  all  the  regimental  commanders  for  the 
National  army. 

The  Regular  army  also  furnished  the  principal 
officers  of  all  the  general  staffs.  In  sincerity,  in 
patriotism,  and  in  bravery  on  the  battlefield  its 
members  lived  up  to  the  high  expectations  of  its 
admirers.  However,  it  had  certain  defects  which 
it  was  unable  to  remedy  of  itself  and  there  was  in 
this  war  no  higher  authority  capable  of  rendering 
it  this  service.  It  could  not  control  its  group  feel- 
ing. The  system  of  promotion  put  into  effect  by 
it  regarded  too  highly  the  career  of  the  profes- 
sional soldier  and  too  little  the  success  of  the 
war.  The  selection  of  generals  merely  in  order  of 
seniority  was  a  grave  offense  against  the  army. 
The  rapid  promotion  given  to  the  younger  officers 
was  not  in  itself  detrimental  to  efficiency.  These 
officers  shone  in  their  new  positions  with  great 
brilliancy. 

In  dealing  with  the  question  of  supplies  at  home, 


198  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

its  failure  was  almost  complete.  The  fault  here, 
however,  does  not  rest  upon  the  army  officers  as 
much  as  upon  the  civilians  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment, not  only  those  who  officiated  during  the  war 
but  those  who  had  failed  to  make  a  plan  of  co- 
operation between  the  military  and  industry  long 
before. 

The  administration  in  Europe  was,  on  the  whole, 
exceedingly  good,  such  failures  as  were  evinced 
being  due  to  the  herculean  tasks  imposed  and  the 
necessity  of  improvising  organizations  which  had 
never  existed  even  on  paper. 

Little  praise,  however,  can  be  given  to  the  Keg- 
ular  service  for  its  conduct  of  aeronautics  either 
in  Europe  or  at  home.  It  failed  grossly  to  deliver 
the  necessary  planes.  It  shone  in  no  respect,  and 
it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  famous  fliers  whose  gal- 
lantry relieved  the  monotony  of  unsuccess  did  not 
come  from  the  Eegular  service.  It  is  proper  to 
add  that  one  exception  to  this  unfortunate  recital 
is  Brigadier  General  William  Mitchell,  who,  fre- 
quently suppressed  in  Europe,  is  now  the  chief  of 
aeronautics,  and  who,  it  may  be  hoped,  will  rescue 


ELEMENTS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE     199 

that  branch  of  the  service  from  its  unenviable 
position. 

In  military  education  the  Eegular  army  ranks 
high.  Considering  the  paucity  of  opportunity  for 
study  and  the  mistreatment  it  received  at  the 
hands  of  two  succeeding  administrations,  the  mis- 
erable conditions  under  which  it  was  kept  along 
the  Mexican  frontier,  its  achievements  in  this  line 
are  astounding.  The  average  in  intelligence  and 
character  of  its  members  is  elevated,  and  men  of 
capacity  for  great  command  were  shown  to  be 
present,  although  their  arrival  in  position  was 
delayed  by  the  cabal  of  the  senior  officers  to  retain 
active  rank. 

The  training  camps  furnished  a  great  majority 
of  the  officers  in  the  war.  The  course  of  instruc- 
tion was  made  short  by  necessity,  but  it  was  effi- 
cient, and  the  principle  of  requiring  every  man  to 
pass  this  test  before  receiving  a  commission  is 
surely  one  we  must  never  abandon.  It  must  not 
be  thought  that  all  the  officers  who  came  from 
these  camps  entered  them  from  civil  life.  A  very 
large  percentage  entered  from  the  ranks  of  the 
army.    This  is,  of  course,  the  right  principle,  and 


200  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

would  have  been  adopted  from  the  beginning,  if  it 
had  been  possible.  It  only  becomes  possible  in 
practice  if  every  citizen  has  served  in  the  ranks. 
We  would  have  been  lost  if  we  had  tried  to  officer 
our  great  armies  in.  1917  from  the  ranks  of  the 
Regular  army  and  the  National  Guard. 

I  firmly  believe  that  the  National  Guard  should 
be  continued.  It  is  highly  desirable  that  there 
should  be  other  military  organizations  or  another 
military  organization  from  that  adimnistered  by 
the  War  Department.  Everybody  knows  the 
blanket  effect  which  the  War  Department  always 
has  put  on  all  initiative.  Let  us  by  all  means 
have  military  organizations  where  men  of  military 
talent  can  develop  along  free  lines.  The  Regular 
army  should  compel  the  National  Guard  to  main- 
tain a  certain  standard,  but  should  not  prevent  its 
rising  above  that  standard. 

The  National  Guard  comes  out  of  the  late  war 
with  a  marvelous  record  and  a  clean  slate.  De- 
nounced for  decades,  not  only  by  Regular  army 
officers  but  by  slackers  as  well,  as  an  organization 
of  tin  soldiers,  it  furnished  the  cadres  which  made 
the  success  of  1918  possible.    The  troops  which 


ELEMENTS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE     201 

the  Regular  army,  distracted  by  its  manifold 
duties,  could  not  furnish,  the  National  Guard  sup- 
plied. Their  achievements,  early  recognized  by 
both  our  allies,  are  now  acclaimed  by  the  com- 
mander-in-chief himsellf.  The  National  Guard, 
however,  was  only  a  cadre  which  was  not  complete 
at  the  top  nor  at  the  bottom.  It  had  to  borrow 
most  of  its  general  officers,  and  this  always  will  be 
so.  The  spare  time  which  a  civilian  may  give  to 
military  training  can  hardly  fit  him  to  hold  gen- 
eral rank.  Even  a  brilliant  civilian  is  less  fitted  at 
the  outset  than  a  Regular  chosen  in  order  of  sen- 
iority. 

The  National  Guard  did  not  furnish  its  entire 
quota  of  officers,  needing  replacements  from  the 
training  camps,  to  which  it  furnished  many  pupils, 
and  it  also  drew  heavily  upon  the  draft  for  its 
effectiveness.  At  the  end  of  the  war  it  stood  with 
a  long  list  of  divisions  and  regiments  only  less 
effective  than  the  1st  and  2nd  divisions.  It  is  now 
an  organization  in  being,  or,  rather,  a  series  of 
organizations  ra  being.  These  organizations  have 
developed  among  themselves,  by  experience  under 
fire  and  by  elimination,  men  competent  to  hold 


202  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

very  high  command.  It  is  entirely  proper  that 
they  should  receive  commissions  in  these  com- 
mands from  their  state  governments  and  that 
these  commisions  should  be  honored  by  the  Fed- 
eral government.  We  know  from  the  experience 
of  this  war  that  if  any  National  Guard  officers 
prove  incompetent  to  perform  their  duties,  they 
will  easily  be  removed. 

Reserve  officers  should  not  be  left  in  their  pres- 
ent unorganized  condition.  Calling  them  out  from 
time  to  time  for  a  short  period  of  instruction  will 
not  bring  the  best  results.  They  should  be  en- 
cadred  into  regiments  and  organized  in  the  sev- 
eral departments  ready  to  receive  their  allotment 
of  recruits  or  selected  men  in  emergency.  Nor 
should  any  limitation  be  placed  upon  the  rank  to 
which  they  may  rise  by  suitable  demonstration  of 
efficiency.  The  Reserve  corps  will  never  be  of  any 
value  to  the  Union  if  it  is  to  be  branded  as  an  in- 
ferior organization.  The  young  Regular  officer 
who  alluded  to  the  U.  S.  R.  on  a  Reserve  officer's 
collar  as  his  ** badge  of  shame"  showed  bad  taste, 
but  he  phrased  in  Napoleonic  language  the  regula- 
tion which  rendered  our  Reserve  corps  unpopular. 


ELEMENTS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE    203 

Any  idea  that  high  command  shall  be  confined 
to  officers  of  the  Regular  army  is  not  only  repug- 
nant to  American  principles  but  also,  as  history 
shows,  productive  of  inefficient  generalship,  and 
lastly  will  vitiate  all  attempts  to  obtain  necessary 
military  legislation. 

Superior  advantages  which  come  to  the  Regular 
army  officers  to  fit  themselves  for  high  command 
will  result  in  bringing  Regular  army  officers  into 
most  of  the  important  positions.  From  the  point 
of  view  of  their  own  ambition  they  do  not  need 
any  such  written  or  unwritten  law.  As  a  success- 
ful general  from  the  Regular  army  put  it:  **If 
after  twenty  years  of  study  I  am  not  a  better 
soldier  than  one  of  these  new  men,  heaven  knows, 
I  want  to  get  out  of  his  way." 

The  great  success  of  the  war  was  the  draft. 
Jn  the  permanent  establishment  of  this  service 
lies  our  national  security  £ind  the  remedy  of  such 
military  ills  as  developed  in  our  war.  If  every 
officer  has  to  rise  from  the  ranks,  there  can  be  no 
feeling  of  officer  favoritism.  If  every  citizen 
serves  a  period  in  the  army,  there  will  not  be  that 
lack  of  understanding  between  manufacturer  and 


^04  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

supply  officer  whicli  acted  so  detrimentally.  If 
every  member  of  Congress  has  served  in  the  army, 
there  will  be  an  end  to  the  lamentable  misconcep- 
tion about  the  army  and  military  affairs  which 
now  characterizes  our  legislators.  If  every  citizen 
is  always  liable  to  the  call  to  war,  young  pacifists 
and  old  pacifists  with  sons  will  not  embark  so 
lightly  on  the  fallacies  that  cost  us  so  heavily  in 
wounded  and  dead. 

To  be  sure,  universal  service  will  not  eradicate 
aU  faults  or  all  mistakes,  but  it  will  end  the  great 
faults  under  which  we  have  served. 

To  provide  our  personnel,  therefore,  we  should 
have  universal  training  to  start  every  citizen  on 
the  road  to  military  efficiency  and  to  give  each 
one  an  equal  opportunity  to  become  a  commis- 
sioned officer.  The  Regular  officers'  corps  chosen 
from  those  who  apply  for  commissions  will  be  the 
heart  of  our  military  system.  The  officers '  reserve 
corps  and  the  National  Guard  shall  be  auxiliaries. 

Let  us  undo  at  once  our  error  of  demobilization. 
Officers  of  the  Regular  army  holding  temporary 
commissions  have  had  to  vacate  these  temporary 
commissions  entirely.    Why  entirely  f    Obviously, 


ELEMENTS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE     205 

a  regular  army  of  a  few  hundred  thousand  men 
cannot  support  an  officers '  corps  necessary  for  as 
many  millions.  But  why  should  not  an  officer 
serving  in  the  capacity  in  the  Eegular  army  which 
the  occasion  demands  still  have  a  reserve  rank  or 
a  war  rank  to  which  he  will  rise  immediately  on 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  and  without  further 
action  on  the  part  of  the  authorities.  Surely  an 
officer  who  knows  he  will  occupy  a  position  of  in- 
creased authority  in  the  event  of  war  will  work 
to  prepare  for  that  position,  will  be  familiar  with 
it,  and,  unlike  so  many  of  the  generals  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  late  war,  will  not  think  as  a  major 
or  a  captain. 

T"his  plan  would  also  facilitate  the  recruiting 
of  an  officers'  reserve  corps.  Now  an  officer  who 
accepts  a  reserve  commission  feels  that  he  is 
accepting  a  rank  beyond  which  he  cannot  be  pro- 
moted and  that  if  he  is  mobilized  he  will  be  con- 
stantly overslaughed  by  an  unlimited  number  of 
Regular  army  officers  who  will  be  promoted  not 
by  selection  because  of  efficiency  but  by  seniority 
because   of  class   feeling.     The   reserve   officer 


me  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

should  know  just  where  he  will  be  at  the  outbreak 
of  war  and  that,  once  the  whole  army  is  mobilized, 
all  officers  will  be  on  the  same  list — will  rise,  stand 
still,  or  fall  on  their  merits. 


CHAPTER  X 

NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE 

Just  as  we  should  learn  from  our  war  experi- 
ence how  to  provide  an  army  to  defend  us  in  the 
next  great  crisis,  so  must  we  find  a  true  military 
doctrine  for  the  use  of  the  army. 

It  is  vital  to  resist  the  temptation  to  find  in  the 
experiences  of  the  war  corroboration  of  precon- 
ceived ideas.  This  will  be  especially  hard  among 
the  officers  of  the  Regular  army  because  they  have 
studied  from  pre-war  text  books  and  because  a 
minority  of  them  have  had  actual  experience  in 
combat.  Just  now  too  much  stress  is  being  laid 
upon  the  value  of  'draining  for  open  warfare/' 
and  the  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  mobility 
as  contrasted  with  force.  It  would  be  absurd 
to  suggest  that  open  warfare  training  should  be 
abandoned  or  to  minimize  in  the  least  degree  the 
value  of  mobility.  Furthermore,  there  is  no 
danger  of  such  a  mistake  being  made  in  America- 
There  is,  however,  a  danger  that  men  who  have 

207 


S08  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

not  participated  in  heavy  combat  will  fail  to  ap- 
preciate that  when  troops,  substantially  equal  in 
numbers,  equipment  and  discipline,  meet,  there 
must  result  a  grueling  combat  in  which  every  re- 
source of  materiel  and  technique  must  be  em- 
ployed. 

I  am  frankly  afraid  that  those  officers  who  have 
not  learned  the  intricate  technique  developed  on 
the  west  front  will  prevent  its  being  taught  in 
American  schools.  Let  us  not  forget  that  the 
armies  which  clashed  in  1914  were  all  led  by  gen- 
erals educated  up  to  the  eyes  in  the  school  of 
mobility.  And  let  us  not  forget  that  a  month  of 
inconclusive  '^open  warfare"  ended  with  the  op- 
posing armies  completely  demobilized  in  the  face 
of  each  other.  For  years  thereafter  neither  side 
was  able  to  use  enough  fokce  to  break  the  other's 
lines.  "When  finally  the  Germans  found  the  means 
to  break  our  lines,  these  were  in  every  case  re- 
stored and  at  less  expenditure  of  energy  than  had 
been  used  in  breaking  them. 

The  campaign  of  the  fall  of  1918  is  no  criterion 
for  a  campaign  between  equals.  The  Germans 
were  inferior  in  men  and  in  munitions.    They  were 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE        209 

deserted  by  their  allies.  The  country  behind  them 
was  breaking  into  revolution. 

In  our  teachings  of  mobility  let  us  appreciate 
that  we  move  only  to  concentrate  force.  Let  us  be 
prepared  to  exercise  this  force  to  the  fullest  effi- 
ciency, and  let  us  appreciate  that  *'open  warfare '* 
can  only  be  used  in  advance  guard  actions  and  in 
the  pursuit. 

When  main  bodies  come  into  contact,  methods 
wrongly  called  those  of  ** trench  warfare*'  must 
be  used,  as  was  shown  in  the  transition  from  the 
second  to  the  third  period  of  the  battle  of  the  Ar- 
gonne. 

To  attack  successfully  an  enemy  who  is  organ- 
ized to  defend  himself  it  is  necessary  to  concen- 
trate a  superiority  of  artillery  which  by  carefully 
regulated  fire  and  well  defined  objects  will  neu- 
tralize his  barrage  batteries  and  will  put  out  of 
service  the  greater  part  of  his  organized  strong 
points.  The  infantry  concentrated  in  superior 
numbers  for  the  assault  can,  by  use  of  its  proper 
weapons,  overcome  the  defense  of  hostile  infantry 
and  artillery  which  has  been  shattered  by  our  ar- 
tillery preparation,  or  it  can  attack  with  reason- 


210  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

able  success  enemy  rear  guards ;  but  for  infantry 
to  attack  an  organized  enemy,  equipped  with  ma- 
chine guns  and  protected  by  wire  and  a  barrage 
and  not  greatly  shaken  by  our  preparatory  fire, 
has  been  proven  suicidal  by  the  experience  of  all 
combatants  in  this  war.  The  fact  that  tanks  are 
of  great  assistance  in  attack  and  that  surprise  is 
still  possible  and  of  great  value  does  not  detract 
from  these  established  principles. 

It  is  imperative  that  artillery  be  handled  as 
artillery  and  not  as  though  it  were  trench  mortars 
or  infantry  cannon.  Bringing  artillery  into  the 
assaulting  line  adds  nothing  to  the  attack,  while  it 
deprives  it  of  the  invaluable  support  of  guns 
properly  handled. 

Artillery  fire,  to  be  effective,  must  be  concen- 
trated. The  long  range  of  modern  guns  permits 
concentration  not  only  to  a  point  far  beyond  that 
which  heretofore  was  possible  but  to  the  point  of 
annihilation.  To  attain  this  irresistible  use  of 
artillery  perfect  liaison  between  infantry  and 
artillery  is  essential.  This  liaison  can  be  accom- 
plished only  in  divisions  trained  and  exercised  in 
the  combined  use  of  arms. 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       211 

Due  to  the  lack  of  divisional  artillery  and  the 
consequent  lack  of  support  to  some  infantry  divi- 
sions, and  because  of  the  ignorance  of  many  gen- 
eral officers  in  the  use  of  artillery,  there  has  grown 
up  a  school  of  infantry  officers  who  believe  that 
cannon  should  be  attached  to  small  infantry  units 
to  move  with  them  and  fire  on  the  restricted  front 
of  the  unit  to  which  they  are  attached.  This  is  an 
error  of  the  first  magnitude. 

The  correct  employment  of  artillery  is  simple 
and  self-evident,  but  it  seems  as  much  of  a  mystery 
to  some  intelligent  men  as  music  or  painting  is  to 
others. 

At  the  time  of  Francis  I.  the  Chevalier  Bayard 
is  quoted  as  advocating  the  concentration  of  artil- 
lery fire;  and  a  chronicle  of  the  time  of  Joan  of 
Arc  remarks  the  amazement  of  a  lieutenant-gen- 
eral that  Joan  knew  by  instinct  how  to  concentrate 
the  fire  of  artillery  as  well  as  he  could  have  done 
it.  Yet  war  after  war  has  been  fought  and  this 
simple  principle  has  been  utterly  ignored  by  men 
of  lifelong  service  in  the  army. 

In  justice  to  our  army  let  it  be  recorded  that 
prior  to  the  war  neither  the  French  nor  the  Ger- 


212  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

mans  had  thoroughly  mastered  the  use  of  the 
combined  arms  under  modern  conditions.  The 
technique  of  the  first  was,  to  be  sure,  nearly  per- 
fect in  accuracy  of  aim  and  in  concentration  of 
fire.  They  themselves  admit,  however,  there  was  a 
lack  of  cooperation  between  the  artillery  and  the 
infantry  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war.  The  Ger- 
mans understood  both  the  concentration  of 
artillery  fire  and  the  use  of  the  combined  arms; 
but  they  fell  into  the  error  of  exaggerating  the 
value  of  moving  the  guns,  and  from  this  mistake 
they  never  entirely  recovered.  Soldiers  should 
know  that  the  moving  of  cannon  is  a  defensive 
operation  and  that  the  offensive  operation  of  can- 
non, within  their  range,  lies  in  moving  their  fire. 

Of  course,  the  four  developments  of  this  war 
which  most  profoundly  have  affected  its  present 
and  future  conduct  are :  Airplanes,  mustard  gas, 
tanks  and  automobile  trucks. 

Of  these,  airplanes  have  practically  monopolized 
public  attention.  It  has  even  been  suggested  in 
the  American  Congress  that  the  next  war  will  be 
won  in  the  air.  This  is  a  threefold  misapprehen- 
sion due  to  the  natural  appeal  the  airplane  makes 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       213 

to  the  imagination,  to  the  propaganda  carried  on 
by  inefficient  and  dishonest  aircraft  production  au- 
thorities, and  to  its  spectacular  attacks  on  civil 
populations,  timid  and  easily  panic  stricken. 

The  airplane  undoubtedly  is  effective  in  attack- 
ing towns  behind  the  lines.  The  German  air  raids 
obtained  results  greatly  incommensurate  with  any 
material  damage  done.  Bombing  factory  towns  at 
night  robbed  the  workers  of  sleep,  shook  their 
nerves,  and  detracted  from  their  capacity  to  turn 
out  munitions.  The  effect  of  air  raids  in  this 
direction,  however,  shrinks  to  insignificance  when 
compared  with  General  Scott's  bombardment  of 
the  civil  population  of  Vera  Cruz  with  heavy  ar- 
tillery in  1847.  The  Germans  made  a  practice  of 
bombing  factory  cities  as  far  as  their  means  would 
permit,  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  all  their  efforts 
had  any  appreciable  effect  upon  the  final  outcome 
of  the  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  allied  blockade  produced 
a  condition  of  near  famine  in  Germany  in  1918 
and  was  largely  instrumental  in  breaking  down 
Teutonic  morale.  This  reached  its  lowest  ebb  in 
the  summer  and  fall  of  1918,  when  the  hard 


214  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

pressed  army  in  the  field  had  need  of  every  pos- 
sible support  from  home,  but  received  discourage- 
ment instead.  The  blockade,  therefore,  remains 
supreme  as  the  most  effective  and  the  most  cruel 
weapon  to  use  against  the  enemy's  civil  popula- 
tion. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  military  attack  air- 
plane bombing  is  not  effective.  If  the  bomber  flies 
by  night  to  avoid  detection  from  the  ground,  he 
has  great  difficulty  in  seeing  the  target.  If  he 
comes  low  enough  to  see  and  hit  the  target,  he 
becomes  visible  and  vulnerable.  If  an  airplane 
attacks  back  areas  in  daytime,  it  must  fly  so  high 
in  rarefied  atmosphere  to  avoid  the  anti-aircraft 
guns  that  it  is  not  able  to  carry  a  large  quantity 
of  bombs,  and  it  must  launch  these  without  pos- 
sibility of  aim.  As  a  weapon  of  destruction  the 
airplane  cannot  compete  with  the  artillery  in 
accuracy  or  in  volume  of  fire. 

The  principle  that  ^  *  one  gun  on  shore  is  worth 
two  guns  at  sea"  has  remained  true  at  every  de- 
velopment of  the  battleship,  and  the  same  probably 
will  be  true  of  the  airplane.  Ground  gives  con- 
cealment, protection,  and  the  opportunity  to  use 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE   «15 

the  biggest  gun.  The  ship  and  the  airplane  may 
choose  the  time  and  range  of  attack,  but  these 
will  not  offset  the  greater  advantage  of  fighting 
from  the  ground. 

In  attacking  troops  the  airplane,  armed  with 
machine  guns,  has  proven  more  effective.  It  is 
exaggeration  to  say  that  any  value  comes  from 
dashing  at  a  battery  in  position  or  upon  troops  in 
trenches,  because  these  usually  find  protection. 
But  when  the  roads  are  congested  by  columns  of 
infantry  loaded  down  with  equipment,  and  by  ar- 
tillery and  transport  tired  and  not  vigilant  against 
air  attacks,  airplanes  with  machine  guns  have  in- 
flicted considerable  losses;  and  by  scattering  or- 
ganizations and  blocking  roads  have  materially 
delayed  movements  of  troops.  For  this  purpose, 
therefore,  airplanes  will  be  used  more  extensively 
in  future. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  development  of  aviation  advanced  much 
more  rapidly  than  did  the  science  of  anti-aircraft 
counter-offensive.  Undoubtedly  instruments  will 
be  invented  to  improve  the  fire  upon  airplanes  at 
great  heights,  and  gunners  will  be  better  trained 


216  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

to  combat  airplanes  flying  low  to  attack  troops. 
For  the  latter  we  have  only  to  devise  a  simple 
weapon  and  put  it  in  the  hands  of  experienced 
wing  shots.  The  red  tape  of  the  War  Department 
prevented  the  use  of  this  simple  expedient  in  Eu- 
rope, although  frequently  advocated;  and  yet,  in. 
several  cases,  infantrymen,  relying  only  upon 
their  sense  of  an  object  moving  in  the  air,  and 
using  either  the  service  rifle  or  the  French  auto- 
matic rifle,  succeeded  in  bringing  down  enemy 
planes. 

The  great  use  of  aviation,  of  course,  will  be  to 
obtain  information.  Airplanes  now  can  fly  many 
hundreds  of  miles  without  alighting.  They  can, 
therefore,  patrol  the  enemy's  rear  for  a  distance 
that  it  will  take  troops  several  days  to  cover,  even 
while  marching  at  the  most  rapid  speed.  On  clear 
days  they  can  easily  detect  all  movements  in  force 
on  the  railroads  or  roads,  and  on  clear  and  espe- 
cially on  moonlit  nights  should  gather  a  great  deal 
of  information.  The  value  of  airplane  reconnais- 
sance in  this  war  became  the  greater  because  of 
the  almost  solid  line  between  Switzerland  and  the 
sea,  which  made  the  work  of  ground  patrols  and 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       217 

spies  much  more  difficult.  Airplanes  not  only- 
acted  as  patrols  but  carried  spies  by  night  and 
left  them  in  enemy  country  to  send  back  reports 
by  carrier  pigeon,  by  contact  with  other  spies, 
and  by  returning  in  an  airplane  with  which  an 
appointment  had  been  made. 

In  this  way  airplanes  make  the  problem  of  the 
commander  contemplating  an  attack  much  more 
difficult.  That  they  do  not  make  it  impossible  has 
been  shown  by  the  concentrations  of  troops  and 
surprise  attacks  which  characterized  the  year 
1918.  Four  instances  will  confirm  this — ^in  the 
early  spring  of  that  year  the  British,  with  a  large 
preponderance  in  the  air,  were  unable  to  learn  of 
the  German  concentration  against  their  5th  army ; 
on  the  18th  of  July,  the  Germans,  with  a  superior- 
ity in  the  air,  were  not  aware  of  the  concentration 
of  the  Franco-American  corps  in  the  forest  of 
Villers-Cotterets ;  in  April,  1917,  the  information 
which  the  Germans  got  of  the  proposed  French 
attack  was  obtained  by  a  trench  raid ;  and  on  July 
15th,  1918,  the  vital  information  which  General 
Gouraud  received  of  the  very  hour  that  the  Ger- 


218  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

man  general  attack  was  to  start  was  obtained  by 
an  old-fashioned  patrol  of  only  four  men. 

I  feel,  however,  that  the  intelligence  depart- 
ments of  all  armies  signally  failed  to  take  full  ad- 
vantage of  the  possibilities  of  gaining  informa- 
tion by  airplane. 

In  addition  to  its  long  range  patrolling,  the  air- 
plane is  valuable  in  obtaining  news  of  enemy 
movements  near  the  front  during  battle  and  the 
movements  of  its  own  advancing  troops.  Making 
photographs  which  reveal  the  positions  of  enemy 
batteries,  strong  points  and  trenches  is  perhaps 
the  most  important  service  of  the  airplane,  since 
it  is  impossible  to  break  an  enemy  line  without  ac- 
curately bombarding  his  defensive  organization. 
Having  located  the  enemy's  defenses,  the  airplane 
also  offers  great  service  in  regulating  the  fire  of 
the  destroying  artillery. 

Great  as  the  value  of  the  airplane  unquestion- 
ably is  for  locating  and  directing  fire  upon  enemy 
organizations,  it  is  not  indispensable.  Many  ex- 
pedients have  been  devised  for  detecting  enemy 
positions  from  the  ground  and  for  directing  fire 
upon  them. 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       «19 

The  American  artillery  became  especially  profi- 
cient in  this  because  it  had  to  fight  almost  with- 
out aviation  through  the  greater  part  of  the  time 
it  was  in  the  war.  On  the  contrary,  the  British 
were  superior  to  their  enemy  in  the  air  throughout 
most  of  the  struggle,  but  did  not  get  the  full  benefit 
of  this  superiority  because  their  artillery  never 
reached  the  technical  development  which  the 
Americans  learned  from  the  French.  It  seems 
well  to  point  out  that  in  the  development  of  our 
aviation  to  the  utmost  we  should  not  neglect  fully 
to  develop  all  the  ground  methods  of  countering 
the  enemy's  aviation. 

Airplanes  and  balloons  again  give  commanding 
officers  the  opportunity  to  make  personal  observa- 
tions and  to  inspire  the  men  with  their  presence. 

It  was  Napoleon's  constant  endeavor  to  occupy 
a  position  on  the  battlefield  where  he  could  view 
all  maneuvers  and  could  direct  tactical  movements 
in  person.  His  corps  and  division  commanders 
personally  commanded  their  compact  masses  and 
inspired  them  by  example  of  individual  courage. 

The  increasing  size  of  armies  and  of  the  range 
and  destruotiveness  of  weapons  had  led  to  such 


220  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

great  extensions  of  fronts  and  such,  depths  and 
openness  of  formations,  such  necessity  for  con- 
cealment from  sight  even  before  the  great  war  as 
to  make  individual  observation  by  the  commander 
on  the  one  hand  and  example  on  the  other  no 
longer  possible.  Coincidentally,  the  development 
of  the  telephone  made  possible  the  transmission 
of  orders  over  long  distances. 

These  causes  led  to  the  exercise  of  command 
from  a  command  post,  selected  because  of  its  ac- 
cessibility to  lines  of  communication  frotm  all 
points,  and  generally  placed  immediately  in  rear 
of  the  center  of  the  command.  Here  the  com- 
mander receives  information  from  the  front  and 
orders  from  the  rear  and  from  it  regulates-  the 
movements  of  his  troops.  If  he  leaves  his  posi- 
tion for  the  front,  he  can  obtain  only  a  small  part 
of  the  information  necessary  to  form  his  judg- 
ments and  can  inspire  only  an  infinitesimal  per- 
centage of  his  men,  while  all  efforts  made  in  these 
directions  necessitate  his  turning  over  the  com- 
mand of  his  troops  to  his  subordinate  for  a  con- 
siderable period  of  time,  perhaps  during  the  time 
when  his  presence  is  most  needed. 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       221 

By  using  an  airplane  a  division  conunander  can 
make  frequent  and  rapid  surveys  of  the  condition 
at  his  front,  size  up  the  situation  at  the  vital  spot 
and  intervene  with  a  decisiveness  which  is  not 
possible  when  dependent  upon  varying  and  con- 
flicting reports  from  subordinates.  At  the  same 
time  by  use  of  special  insignia  on  the  plane  the 
commander  can  make  his  presence  known  and 
thereby  encourage  his  troops. 

It  seems  strange  that  this  use  of  the  airplane 
was  not  adopted  in  the  war.  The  reason  probably 
lies  in  the  high  average  age  of  commanders  dis- 
posing of  airplanes  and  to  the  hostility  which  the 
great  number  of  mediocre  generals  would  feel 
towards  a*  dashing  individual  who  would  thus  dis- 
tinguish himself.  In  all  services  brilliancy  was 
frowned  upon  by  the  oligarchies  of  old  fogies 
which  retained  their  palsied  influence  throughout 
the  conflict. 

Among  the  Germans,  artillery  commanders 
were  required  to  study  the  enemy's  terrain  by 
aerial  observation  over  his  lines,  but  this  was  for- 
bidden in  the  American  army.  Of  course,  the  Ger- 
mans were  right  and  we  were  wrong.    We  also 


SaS  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

were  wrong  in  not  allowing  our  artillery  com- 
manders a  personal  use  of  balloons.  The  balloon 
is  tbe  proper  station  for  an  artillery  group  com- 
mander when  his  group  is  in  action.  He  will  do 
better  work  by  the  use  of  his  own  eyes  than  he 
will  by  using  reports  of  a  balloon  observer.  Fur- 
thermore, he  can  be  held  entirely  responsible  for 
the  conduct  of  his  fire  and  cannot  pass  the  blame 
of  failure  to  an  officer  in  another  branch  of  the 
service. 

It  is  hard  to  fix  the  blame  for  the  failure  to  al- 
low our  artillery  commanders  personally  to  take 
the  air.  Undoubtedly  the  higher  officers  of  the 
air  service  intrigued  to  keep  officers  of  other  serv- 
ice from  flying  in  order  to  magnify  the  branch  of 
the  service  over  which  they  presided.  The  gen- 
eral staff  also  discouraged  the  development  of 
initiative  on  the  part  of  line  officers.  Perhaps 
there  was  also  a  lack  of  insistence  on  the  part  of 
the  artillery  officers  to  obtain  personal  use  of  the 
balloons  and  airplanes. 

It  must  become  a  part  of  our  doctrine  that  in 
the  air,  as  it  has  always  been  on  the  ground,  the 
responsible  commanders  shall  make  their  own  re- 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       223 

connaissances  wherever  possible  and  not  delegate 
this  dangerous  but  indispensable  work. 

While  fully  comprehending  the  great  value  of 
the  air  service,  we  must  not  forget  that  in  the 
actual  battle  poison  gas  and  tanks  are  much  more 
effective.  Aided  by  yperite  gas,  surprise  was  the 
great  factor  inj  the  German  victories  of  1918. 
Aided  by  tanks,  surprise  was  the  element  of  allied 
success  in  the  same  year. 

The  enormous  value  of  surprise,  long  recog- 
nized in  the  literature  of  war,  had  been  largely 
counteracted  on  the  western  front  by  the  strong 
defensive  organizations  that  demanded  such  a  long 
artillery  preparation  to  destroy  them  as  to  inform 
the  enemy  of  the  assailant's  purpose.  The  great 
offensive  power  of  gas  and  tanks  reintroduced  the 
opportunity  for  surprise. 

The  great  difference  between  bullets  or  ex- 
plosive shells  on  the  one  hand  and  gas  on  the 
other  is  that  the  action  of  the  former  is  in- 
stantaneous, while  the  latter  retains  its  deadly  ef- 
fect for  varying  periods.  K  the  bullet  or  shell 
fragment  does  not  strike  its  intended  target,  it  is 
harmless. 


224  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

The  most  effective  of  all  gases  used  in  tlie  war 
was  yperite,  which  poisoned  the  neighborhood  of 
its  release  for  hours  and  even  days.  Yperite,  a 
liquid  of  severe  caustic  properties,  penetrates  the 
thickest  clothing  and  inflicts  terrible  burns  upon 
the  body.  Evaporated,  it  becomes  a  deadly  gas, 
invisible  and  nearly  odorless.  Upon  one  occasion 
a  division  marched  in  the  rain  through  dripping 
woods  which  previously  had  been  subjected  to 
yperite.  Nearly  all  of  the  men  had  to  be  taken  to 
the  rear,  writhing  in  agony.  In  many  instances 
men  have  been  fatally  gassed  without  even  know- 
ing they  had  been  subject  to  its  effects.  Because 
of  its  deadly  efficiency  gas  has,  further,  a  moral 
effect.  Troops  become  inured  to  high  explosive 
shell  and  rifle  fire,  but  the  longer  they  are  ac- 
quainted with  the  effects  of  gas,  the  more  they 
dread  if. 

The  Germans,  on  March  21st,  1918,  made  the 
fullest  use  of  gas  in  their  attack  on  the  British. 
First,  batteries  were  silenced  and,  once  splashed 
with  the  liquid  yperite,  they  could  not  be  used 
again  for  a  long  time.  Next,  the  German  guns 
were  turned  upon  strong  points  and  the  garrisons 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       225 

were  subjected  to  the  effects  of  yperite  gas.  A 
part  of  each  garrison  was  put  out  of  action  by 
bums  and  the  remainder  greatly  weakened  from 
having  to  wear  gas  masks  for  several  hours. 

Having  disposed  of  counter-batteries  and  of 
known  strong  points,  the  whole  German  artillery 
was  able  to  fire  the  rolling  barrage  before  its  own 
troops.  It  would  not  be  wide  of  the  truth  to  say 
that  the  use  of  the  yperite  gas  had  increased  three- 
fold the  efficiency  of  the  German  artillery. 

American  troops  suffered  the  same  disadvantage 
from  the  lack  of  gas  shells  that  they  suffered  from 
the  shortage  of  airplanes.  Sentimentalists  whose 
activities  undoubtedly  were  guided  by  German 
agents  delayed  the  manufacture  of  gas  for  use 
against  the  Germans  while  fellow  countrymen 
were  scalded  and  choked  to  death  by  this  modem 
and  terribly  effective  weapon. 

The  tank,  like  every  other  weapon  in  this  war 
excepting  gas,  is  an  American  invention,  neglected 
in  its  home  country  and  developed  abroad.  The 
tank,  in  principle,  is  the  body  of  an  armored  car 
superimposed  upon  the  American  farm  tractor. 
It    is    strange   that  those   countries   which    en- 


2^6  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

deavored  to  be  militarily  efficient  in  times  of  peace 
had  not  already  hit  upon  the  tank.  They  all  de- 
veloped the  armored  automobile  and  used  it  ex- 
tensively along  the  roads  during  the  war  of  move- 
ment. When  the  front  became  stabilized,  the 
roads  immediately  in  the  rear  became  impassable 
and  the  armored  automobiles  could  not  be  used. 
It  has  not  yet  been  determined  who  first  thought 
of  using  the  American  endless  belt  tractor  on  the 
battle  field. 

Originally,  the  tank's  principal  value  was  be- 
lieved to  lie  in  the  facility  with  which  it  cut  barbed 
wire.  Prior  to  the  development  of  the  tank  the 
wire  was  cut  by  artillery  fire,  by  long  tubes  filled 
with  high  explosives  and  placed  beneath  the  en- 
tanglements, and  by  infantry  under  protection  of 
a  barrage.  All  of  these  methods  were  effective 
in  trench  raids,  but  not  satisfactory  in  large  move- 
ments. At  Cambrai  the  British  tanks  opened  ave- 
nues through  the  wire  defenses  in  a  manner  that 
revolutionized  the  principles  of  attack.  Tanks 
also  proved  of  great  value  in  attacking  machine 
guns,  the  tank's  weapon  and  crew  having  an  ad- 
vantage over  the  infantry  machine  gun  crew  in 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       227 

the  open  or  even  in  a  pill  box.  The  tank's  weak- 
ness lies  in  its  absolute  vulnerability  to  a  direct 
hit  from  a  cannon.  From  this  it  seeks  security 
in  surprise,  in  rapidity  of  movement,  and,  most  of 
all,  by  operating  in  misty  weather.  The  mist  which 
makes  the  airplane  powerless  brings  the  tank  into 
its  kingdom.  Therefore,  as  the  reconnaissance 
airplane  is  the  greatest  assistance  to  the  defense 
and  the  tank  is  the  greatest  weapon  in  the  assault, 
misty  weather  will  favor  the  attack  more  than 
ever.  A  general  lesson  should  be  drawn  from  this 
coincidence — ^in  misty  countries  the  offensive  will 
be  more  successful  than  in  regions  blest  with  a 
clear  climate. 

Tanks  constructed  for  that  purpose  also  have 
been  used  to  carry  field  pieces  across  shell-torn 
ground  and  to  bring  up  water  and  munitions. 
Large  tanks  have  been  used,  especially  by  the 
British,  to  carry  infantry  across  open  ground  fiUd 
establish  them  in  woods  and  other  defiladed  areas. 

The  tractor,  which  has  been  adopted  for  the 
American  artiUery,  is  a  tank  in  every  respect 
except  that  the  drivers  have  no  protection  and 
no  weapon.     If  our  ordnance  department  ever 


22S  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

stops  its  policy  of  opposing  improvement,  protec- 
tion will  be  given  to  the  drivers  whicli  will  make 
them  immune  from  shrapnel  fire  and  greatly  in- 
crease the  mobility  of  our  artillery. 

The  word  *Hank'*  was  adopted  to  make  the  Ger- 
mans think  that  these  new  machines  had  no  other 
object  than  the  carrying  of  water  to  the  front.  It 
is  unfortunate  that  the  word  was  appropriated  at 
all.  It  ought  to  be  expunged  from  our  military 
vocabulary  and  the  word  ** tractor''  substituted. 
We  will  develop  the  many  uses  to  which  the  tractor 
is  adaptable  in  warfare  much  more  freely  than 
if  we  hypnotize  ourselves  with  the  word  **tank,'' 
which,  in  the  public  mind,  and  to  a  great  extent 
in  the  military  mind,  limits  the  tractor  mechanism 
to  a  definite  style  of  machine. 

If  aviation  has  received  too  large  a  portion  of 
public  attention,  the  automobile  truck  has  been 
practically  neglected,  and  yet  this  machine  saved 
the  war  for  the  allies. 

The  French  railroads  were  vastly  inferior  to 
the  German,  and  although  the  French  had  the  ad- 
vantage of  fighting  in  their  own  country  and  using 
their  own  railroad  lines,  while  the  Germans  had  to 


NEW  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR  USE       229 

fight  in  foreign  countries  and  connect  their  rail- 
road lines  with  the  captured  lines,  rebuilding 
temporarily  many  dynamited  bridges,  the  latter 
still  gave  their  armies  a  service  immeasurably 
superior  to  the  French  railroad  service.  The 
French  were  the  first  to  fall  back  on  the  use  of 
automobile  trucks,  turned  out  by  their  factories 
in  great  quantity  and  of  splendid  quality. 

One  of  the  considerations  governing  the  Ger- 
man attack  on  Verdun  in  1916  was  that  the  as- 
sailants could  easily  renew  their  supplies  by  rail 
while  the  French  had  only  one  railroad  line  to  the 
city,  and  this  under  long  range  shell  fire.  It  was 
a  distinct  military  surprise  to  the  Germans  to  find 
the  French  were  able  to  supply  the  army  defend- 
ing Verdun  by  an  enormous  and  efficTent  system 
of  auto  truck  transportation. 

When  the  Germans  broke  the  British  line  in 
March,  1918,  the  greater  part  of  the  French  re- 
serves were  moved  to  the  battle  front  in  auto 
trucks ;  and  when  the  Germans  broke  the  line  on 
the  Chemin  des  Dames  in  May,  the  American  2nd 
division  was  moved  across  France  in  auto  trucks 
from  its  position  in  support  of  the  1st  and  arrived 


230  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

in  time  to  block  the  road  to  Paris.  One  of  Lnden- 
dorff 's  laments  is  that  the  German  factories  conld 
not  turn  out  auto  trucks  in  numbers  necessary  to 
offset  the  allies'  advantage. 

The  airplane  in  reconnaissance,  the  tank  in  as- 
sault, and  the  auto  truck  in  mobility  have  sadly  in- 
vaded the  province  of  cavalry.  One  well  may 
wonder  what  lies  before  the  beau  sdbreur.  The 
answer,  perhaps,  is  found  in  the  words  of  the 
chagrined  mechanic  who,  given  a  team  of  artillery 
horses  to  drive,  contemptuously  referred  to  them 
as  *  *  hay  burners. ' '  The  fight  is  between  the  horse 
and  the  machine  and  it  will  be  determined  by  the 
economic  conditions  of  warfare.  Where  horse 
feed  is  abundant  and  fuel  scarce  the  cavalry  horse, 
the  artillery  horse  and  the  army  mule  will  remain. 
Elsewhere,  they  will  be  driven  out  by  the  machine. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  GENERAL  STAFF 

The  subject  of  the  General  Staff  is  one  mention 
of  which  is  the  occasion  for  great  controversy. 
While  its  indispensability  is  acknowledged,  its  un- 
popularity is  great  in  every  country. 

One  hundred  years  ago  Clausewitz,  when  writ- 
ing on  war,  could  not  restrain  himself  from  mak- 
ing contemptuous  allusions  to  staff  officers.  The 
French  called  their  genera^  staff  'officers  *  Pen- 
dente, ' '  meaning  *  *  dressed  in  lace. ' '  The  English 
viewpoint  is  shown  by  the  scale  of  awards  the 
German  officers  were  supposed  to  employ  in  re- 
warding their  sharpshooters  for  killing  British 
officers :  *  *  Ten  marks  for  a  captain,  twenty  marks 
for  a  major,  one  hundred  marks  for  a  colonel,  and 
thirty  days  in  jail  for  shooting  a  British  staff 
officer!*'  In  our  own  army  the  general  staff  was 
frequently  referred  to  as  the  ** general  stuff,''  and 

when  its  officers  went  to  the  front  they  were  some- 

281 


232  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

times  told  tliat  a  star  could  now  be  put  in  the  serv- 
ice flag  of  their  particular  general  staff. 

This  unpopularity  of  this  minority  of  the  army 
with  the  majority,  and  the  great  unpopularity  of 
the  Washington  general  staff  with  the  members 
of  Congress,  make  the  development  of  a  proper 
general  staff  system  a  difficult  matter.  At  the 
same  time  a  general  staff  is  essential  to  an  efficient 
army. 

Every  army  has  long  been  divided  into  three 
fundamental  sections  called  arms,  or  branches,  of 
the  service.  They  are  infantry,  artillery,  and 
cavalry.  To  assist  these  in  their  work  are  sup- 
plementary services  called  engineers  and  signal 
troops,  supply  trains,  hospital  troops  and  a  mili- 
tary legal  department.  Each  is  separate  and  dis- 
tinct, and  its  personnel  devotes  itself  to  its 
particular  branch  of  the  service. 

Management  of  the  whole  rests  in  the  general 
or  generals.  In  the  case  of  a  small  army,  say  one 
regiment  of  infantry,  one  battery  of  artillery,  one 
troop  of  cavalry,  with  a  handful  of  specialists  in 
other  departments,  one  general  can  do  this  work 
with  such  assistants  as  he  can  pick  up  from  the 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  233 

diirerent  branches  or  from  civil  life.  As  armies 
increase  in  size  the  complexity  of  their  administra- 
tion and  command  increases,  and  larger  and  more 
thoroughly  organized  staffs  become  necessary. 

While  armies  exist  for  use  in  the  field  they  must, 
in  their  nature,  have  an  administration  at  a  central 
point ;  this  administration  procures  their  weapons, 
clothing  and  supplies. 

In  early  days  this  was  largely  done  by  con- 
tractors. The  abuses  and  weaknesses  of  the  con- 
tractor system  led  to  the  development  of  bureaus. 
The  collapse  everywhere  of  the  bureau  system 
caused  the  duties  of  the  bureaus  to  be  turned  over 
to  the  General  Staff;  that  is,  everywhere  except  in 
America,  where  the  bureau  system  persisted,  in 
spite  of  a  long  series  of  failures,  up  to  this  war, 
where  it  once  more  left  its  hecatombs. 

The  principal  bureaus  of  our  War  Department 
are  the  Adjutant-General,  whose  duty  is  to  issue 
the  order  to  the  Commander;  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment, whose  function  is  to  procure  arms  and 
fighting  equipment;  and  the  Quartermaster's  De- 
partment,  whose  province  is  to  furnish  clothing 
and  supplies.    The  spheres  of  the  Ordnance  and 


234  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

the  Quartermaster's  Departments  have  become 
overlapped  in  an  exceedingly  ludicrous  manner. 

It  is  necessary  to  dwell  for  a  moment  on  the 
total  failure  of  our  bureaus  in  this  war  because 
of  the  vigorous  efforts  now  being  put  forth  by 
them  and  their  political  supporters  in  Washington 
to  preserve  them  so  they  may  repeat  in  a  future 
conflict  the  horrors  they  achieved  in  this. 

Our  Ordnance  and  our  Quartermaster's  bureaus 
really  were  worse  than  useless.  Better  for  the 
army  had  they  never  existed.  Not  only  did  they 
do  no  good,  but  they  stood  resolutely  in  the  path 
of  every  effort  toward  accomplishment. 

The  Ordnance  Department  had  not  provided  for 
the  war  a  single  weapon  of  first  class.  Our  3-inch 
field  piece  was  badly  sighted ;  our  howitzers  were 
of  such  feeble  range  that  if  brought  into  action 
against  modern  artillery  they  would  have  ap- 
peared like  the  jingalls  of  the  Chinese  against 
the  modem  artillery  of  the  Japanese  in  1895.  The 
machine  gun  was  invented  by  an  American,  but 
the  Ordnance  Department  refused  to  provide  them 
either  in  number  or  quality.  "When  the  American, 
Colonel  Lewis,  invented  a  greatly  improved  ma- 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  236 

chine  gun  and  offered  it  to  this  country  gratis, 
criminal  jealousy  on  the  part  of  the  Ordnance  offi- 
cers induced  its  refusal,  and  this  refusal  was  con- 
tinued long  after  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war 
and  even  after  our  entrance  into  it.  Eather  than 
let  American  troops  fight  with  a  Lewis  gun,  our 
envious  Ordnance  Department  preferred  they  go 
to  battle  unarmed.  The  confessed  pretext  for  this 
criminality  was  that  the  Ordnance  Department 
was  developing  a  better  gun.  At  the  end  of  the 
war  an  excellent  weapon  was  produced,  whether 
better  or  worse  than  the  Lewis  is  a  matter  of 
opinion;  but  this  gun  was  not  available  while 
American  lives  were  being  sacrificed  on  the  battle- 
field. 

No  less  criminal  was  the  conduct  of  this  depart- 
ment in  regard  to  artillery.  When  Joffre  came  to 
America  in  the  spring  of  1917  he  brought  the  com- 
plete plans  for  the  French  75,  the  great  weapon 
invented  by  the  French  in  1896,  and  which,  at  the 
close  of  the  war,  was  still  the  premier  field  piece. 
Not  only  was  this  by  far  the  best  field  piece  in 
existence,  but  the  French,  by  long  practice,  had 
developed  methods  of  handling  it  which  would 


S36  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

require  a  long  period  of  experimentatioii  with, 
any  new  weapon  to  learn  to  imitate.  These 
plans  were  turned  over  to  our  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment just  as  we  were  about  to  enter  the  war  with 
practically  no  artillery,  and  such  as  we  had  of  in- 
ferior quality  and  nearly  worn  out.  The  Ordnance 
Department  spent  a  year  trying  for  its  own  glory 
to  develop  improvements  on  the  **75.''  Mean- 
time,  Am^erican  divisions  remained  miequipped. 
Instruction  was  delayed.  If,  sometimes,  our 
barrages  were  misplaced,  if  the  artillery  did  not 
protect  the  infantry,  if  our  shells  fell  in  the  ranks 
of  our  own  men,  the  chief  blame  lies  at  the  door 
of  these  murderous  egoists. 

If  our  Ordnance  Department  was  vicious,  our 
Quartermaster's  Department  was  ridiculous. 
The  Quartermaster's  Department  purchased 
clothes  for  the  army  and  also  perpetrated  the 
design.  The  result  attained  by  these  sleek  clerks 
has  offended  the  eye  of  Europe  and  America  and 
spoiled  the  temper  of  every  American  soldier.  Our 
infantry  was  dressed  in  riding  breeches,  and  all 
soldiers  were  given  a  legging  cumbersome  to  put 
on,  fragile  in  construction,  and  unsightly  in  ap- 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  237 

pearance.  Our  shoe  was  well  shaped,  having  been 
designed  by  a  doctor,  but  of  such  flimsy  construc- 
tion that  it  could  not  survive  a  single  day's  hard 
marching.  To  save  some  few  cents  per  thousand, 
all  pockets  were  reduced  to  a  minimum  size,  and 
this  for  men  who  had  to  carry  upon  their  person 
not  only  such  comforts  as  they  wished  but  all  their 
necessities.  The  Quartermaster's  Department, 
besides,  had  evolved  a  system  of  transacting  busi- 
ness that  would  amaze  a  Chinese  custom  house 
collector.  Its  end  was  not  to  transact  business, 
but,  incident  to  the  transaction  of  business,  to  per- 
form a  series  of  extraordinary  acrobatics  on 
paper. 

In  consequence,  the  troops  in  Europe  suffered 
hardships  until  a  purchasing  department  was 
organized  which  was  compelled  to  procure  more 
than  half  the  supplies  needed  by  the  army. 

Soldiers,  lacking  in  military  qualities,  uncom- 
fortable in  the  field,  unsuccessful  in  the  connnand 
of  men,  unrespected  by  their  fighting  associates, 
naturally  drift  into  the  swivel  chairs  of  the  bu- 
reaus, there  to  find  themselves  the  masters  of 


^38  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

the  fighting  men,  with  the  tragic  and  comic  results 
already  outlined. 

Stark  necessity  had  driven  the  armies  of  Eu- 
rope into  better  organization,  but  no  such  neces- 
sity had  knocked  at  the  doors  of  our  War  T  apart- 
ment. Our  bureaus  had  become  allied  with  the 
political  machine.  Business  firms  dealt  with  the 
army  through  the  Ordnance  and  Quartermaster's 
Departments.  Also,  they  lent  aid  at  election 
times.  OflScers  and  men  dealt  with  the  Adjutant 
General,  and  political  favors  for  people  with  in- 
fluence could  be  negotiated  through  this  office. 

Elihu  Root,  while  Secretary  of  State,  and 
•Leonard  Wood,  while  Chief  of  Staff,  fought  vigor- 
ously to  eradicate  these  evils,  but  their  efforts 
were  only  partially  successful;  and  with  the  end 
of  the  latter 's  detail,  politics  increased  its  sway 
over  the  military  fate  of  the  millions  destined  to 
go  forth  to  fight. 

The  theory  upon  which  these  administrative 
duties  should  be  turned  over  to  the  General  Staff 
is  that  the  General  Staff  is  composed  of  fighting 
men,  not  of  slackers  and  clerks.  These  fighting 
men,  being  up  to  date  in  military  developments, 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  239 

will  demand  up-to-date  equipment,  and,  themselves 
subject  to  the  hardships  and  dangers  of  war,  will 
be  loath  to  subordinate  military  efficiency  to 
political  expediency,  a  condition  which  has  not 
existed  in  the  staff  departments. 

The  General  Staff,  then,  fundamentally  an  or- 
ganization drawn  from  the  fighting  services,  is 
charged  with  the  administration  and  equipment  of 
the  army,  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war,  and  with  the 
conduct  of  all  affairs  which  involve  more  than 
.one  arm  of  the  service.  These  include  (1)  obtain- 
ing information  about  the  enemy,  (2)  planning 
movements  of  troops  of  different  arms  by  rail  or 
by  road  or  by  water,  (3)  plans  of  battle  for  the 
combined  arms,  (4)  producing  and  delivering  sup- 
plies, and  (5)  training. 

This,  of  course,  makes  the  General  Staff  su- 
perior to  any  of  the  arms  of  the  service,  and  it  has 
led  to  constant  usurpation  of  power,  a  usurpation 
which  has  come  the  more  easily  because  of  another 
consideration. 

The  promotion  of  able  officers  seems  to  become 
more  difficult  as  armies  become  more  regularized. 
More  and  more  high  rank  goes  to  men  who  have 


mo  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

passed  the  age  of  greater  efficiency  and  have  really 
entered  upon  or  advanced  far  down  life 's  decline. 
This  fault  has  been  recognized  without  being  cor- 
rected. Rather  than  assault  the  obstacle  boldly, 
military  practice  has  been  to  circumvent  it  by 
vesting  in  young  staff  officers  of  lower  rank  pow- 
ers which  properly  belong  to  the  superior  gen- 
erals. 

For  example,  a  General  Staff  officer,  acting  in 
the  name  of  his  commander,  can  give  orders  to 
officers  who  far  outrank  him.  The  operations  offi- 
cer of  a  division,  who  may  be  a  Lieutenant-Colonel 
or  a  Major,  may  himself  direct  a  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral what  to  do ;  and  likewise,  any  one  of  the  chiefs 
of  the  General  Staff  sections  of  the  great  General 
Staff  may  issue  orders  to  Army  Commanders.  A 
Brigadier  General  may  designate  in  detail  the 
work  to  be  performed  by  the  troops  under  the  di- 
rect command  of  a  Lieutenant-General. 

The  General  Staff  becomes  a  kind  of  a  superior 
officers'  corps,  standing  in  relation  to  the  line  offi- 
cers somewhat  as  line  officers  stand  to  non-com- 
missioned officers. 

It  has  been  found  necessary  to  put  staff  officers 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  241 

through  a  course  of  instruction  and  to  require 
them  to  pass  an  examination.  They  are  then  as- 
signed to  the  General  Staff  by  an  order  of  the 
War  Department,  and  are  sent  to  duty  with  their 
respective  commands  by  order  of  the  War  De- 
partment or  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Thus,  a 
Division  General  may  not  select  his  staff  officers. 
If  a  difference  arises  between  him  and  his  staff  h^ 
has  a  personal  appeal  to  his  Corps  Commander, 
but  the  staff  officer  has  an  independent  line  of  com- 
munication to  staff  officers  at  Great  Headquar- 
ters, which  dominates  the  Corps  Commander.  As 
the  detail  of  all  administration  is  handled  by  the 
General  Staff,  the  subordinate  of  the  General 
Staff  is  really  closer  to  the  fountain  head  of 
authority  than  his  commander.  This  is  a  fault  and 
a  grave  one,  and  one  which  must  be  remedied. 

Staff  officers  do  not  personally  engage  in  oper- 
ations, whether  maneuvers  or  combats.  Informa- 
tion of  the  actual  working  of  the  plans  they  formu- 
late comes  to  them  second-hand.  Their  perception 
is  limited  by  the  ability  of  combat  officers  to  ex- 
plain and  their  own  capacity  to  comprehend. 
Therefore,  anything  like  permanency  in  staff  as- 


g42  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

signinent  is  certain  to  breed  misconception  in 
high  quarters  and  unskillful,  badly  drawn  orders. 

Another  fault  of  the  General  Staff  system  is  one 
of  morale.  Before  the  days  of  the  General  Staff 
the  path  to  the  rear  was  entirely  too  well  beaten. 
Many  were  they  who  left  the  combatant  branches, 
recognized  as  the  services  of  honor,  for  the  ad- 
ministrative branches,  which  soldiers  held  in  slight 
esteem.  With  greater  power  and  greater  prestige 
attached  to  the  place  of  comfort  and  immunity 
from  danger  on  the  General  Staff,  how  shall  we  be 
able  to  keep  able  and  forceful  men  at  the  front, 
where,  after  all,  the  enemy  has  to  be  met  and  over- 
thrown? 

Finally,  that  conception  of  the  General  Staff 
which  was  developed  in  Germany,  and  which  all 
the  Allied  Staffs  showed  tendencies  to  emulate, 
must  be  annihilated;  namely,  that  in  time  of  war 
the  General  Staff  becomes  the  government  of  the 
country,  an  irresponsible  government,  and  one 
possessing  powers  of  tyranny  which  it  has  taken 
generations  to  drive  out  of  our  civil  system.  If 
a  military  clique  comes  to  possess  complete  power 
to  dictate  who  shall  and  who  shall  not  enter  the 


THE  GENERAL  STAFF  MS 

army,  to  decide  where  mobilized  men  shall  serve, 
to  say  what  industries  shall  be  commandeered  for 
military  purposes,  and  shall  be  able  to  regulate  the 
right  to  travel,  to  conduct  a  military  secret  serv- 
ice, to  have  the  power  of  imprisonment,  and  be 
permitted,  as  was  proposed  by  President  Wilson, 
to  gag  the  press,  how  great  becomes  the  jeopardy 
of  our  liberties ! 

The  solution  of  the  General  Staff  problem  is 
virtually  the  solution  of  every  other  military  prob- 
lem— universal  service  of  all  young  men  while 
they  are  young.  With  universal  service  will  come 
national  and  individual  understanding  of  military 
necessities  and  the  limitation  of  military  author- 
ity. The  nation  will  not,  as  its  civil  authorities 
found  it  necessary  to  do  in  1917,  turn  over  the  con- 
duct of  the  war  to  men  as  unknown  to  the  nation 
as  the  nation  is  unknown  to  them,  with  knowledge 
of  war  too  little  known  to  both. 


CHAPTER  Xn 

THE  CBIME  OF  SILENCE 

That  censorship  is  unavoidably  vicious  is  a 
truth  it  has  taken  history  to  develop,  and  this  was 
understood  before  the  war  only  by  free  peoples. 
In  Eussia,  as  in  oriental  countries,  censorship  was 
employed  as  one  of  the  most  efficient  instruments 
of  tyranny.  In  Germany,  also,  truth  and  forward 
movements  were  combated  by  a  censorship  which, 
while  it  could  not  be  made  complete,  was  none  the 
less  efficiently  exercised.  The  long  struggle  for 
freedom  in  England  and  her  colonies  is  too  well 
known  to  require  even  a  summary  here.  One  hun- 
dred and  fifty  years  ago  the  conviction  of  our  peo- 
ple expressed  itself  in  the  constitutional  provi- 
sion for  the  freedom  of  the  press. 

The  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the  press  was 
established  in  England  contemporaneously  with 
the  supremacy  of  parliament  over  the  king.  It 
first  came  into  relationship  with  the  military  m 
the  Crimean  war,  when  Mr.  Russell,  correspondent 

244 


THE  CRIME  OF  SILENCE  UB 

of  the  London  Times,  exposed  the  frightful  dis- 
organization of  the  British  army  in  that  campaign. 
From  that  day  to  the  great  war  it  exercised  a  wide 
influence  upon  military  affairs.  That  its  influence 
has  not  been  wholly  beneficial  is  certain,  but  its 
faults  have  been  magnified  and  its  benefits  largely 
forgotten. 

The  savage  description  of  the  Union  rout  at  the 
first  battle  of  *^Bull  Run"  by  Mr.  Russell  of 
Crimean  fame,  since  dubbed  **Bull  Run"  Russell, 
was  as  unpopular  among  the  American  people  as 
it  was  in  the  army,  but  it  was  the  greatest  single 
factor  in  awakening  the  north  to  its  real  military 
shortcomings.  The  press  also  is  to  be  credited  in 
large  measure  for  the  removal  of  McClellan  and 
Burnside  and  for  the  popularity  of  Grant,  which, 
if  it  did  not  alone  enable  him  to  rise  to  the  rank 
of  commander-in-chief,  upheld  him  during  his 
well-conceived  and  hard-fought  campaign  that 
ended  the  rebellion. 

Professional,  even  more  than  public,  opinion 
forgets  benefits  and  exaggerates  shortcomings. 
Military  men  added  their  resentment  to  a  just 
criticism  by  a  too  free  press  of  real  faults  in  the 


«46  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

military  zone,  and  became  unanimous  in  their  op- 
position to  it.  Chief  among  free  people  in  their 
opposition  to  the  press  were  the  French  officers 
who,  smarting  under  th^r  fully  earned  defeat  in 
1870,  endeavored  to  conceal  the  f  aultiness  of  their 
maneuvers  under  the  camouflage  that  the  news- 
papers exposed  their  plans  to  the  enemy.  The 
French,  therefore,  absolutely  excluded  newspaper 
correspondents  from  their  armies. 

The  English  army  also  objected  to  journalistic 
criticisms  and  to  their  professional  hostility  added 
class  antagonism,  the  officers  being  from  the 
aristocracy  and  ** pressmen''  from  the  middle  and 
lower  classes!  Furthermore,  the  British  army, 
as  an  organization,  was  exceedingly  hostile  to  the 
** Liberal"  government  and  determined  to  fight 
the  war  without  interference  from  it. 

The  allied  armies  on  the  western  front  organ- 
ized press  bureaus.  These  not  only  prevented  the 
publication  of  news  valuable  to  the  enemy  but  pre- 
vented the  allied  peoples  from  getting  informa- 
tion, already  possessed  by  the  enemy,  which  would 
tend  to  reflect  upon  the  skill  of  the  alHed  com- 
manders.    These  commanders  insisted  upon  the 


THE  CRIME  OF  SILENCE  «47 

publication  of  false  reports  of  military  operations, 
and  as  the  press  bureaus  fell  into  the  hands  of 
sycophantic  individuals  they  gave  great  space  to 
grandiose  letters  and  salutations  between  high 
ranking  officers  that  would  more  naturally  have 
emanated  from  the  half  savage  leaders  of  the 
middle  ages  than  from  the  educated  gentlemen 
thus  led  from  common  sense  by  the  exercise  of  an 
arbitrary  power  which  no  authority,  civil,  relig- 
ious or  military,  has  ever  been  able  to  exercise 
with  moderation. 

It  was  largely  due  to  this  antagonism  to  the 
press  that  our  allies  were  beaten  nations  when 
we  came  into  the  war. 

The  French  people  had  entirely  lost  confidence 
in  its  government  and  in  its  army.  It  knew  that 
both  had  lied  about  the  offensive  of  General 
Nivelle  in  1917.  Public  opinion  was  near  collapse, 
and  even  revolt,  when  America's  unexpected  entry 
saved  the  situation. 

The  English,  while  not  having  suffered  such 
heavy  losses,  because  of  their  smaller  participa- 
tion in  the  war  on  land,  had  yet  suffered  fright- 
fully.   The  making  of  munitions  was  delayed  be^ 


248  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

cause  their  need  had  been  concealed  to  protect  the 
reputations  of  incompetents  in  office.  The  raising 
of  necessary  troops  was  postponed  because  a  pub- 
lic explanation  of  their  need  meant  exposing  a 
lack  of  military  success  that  would  have 
diminished  the  reputations  of  high  ranking  offi- 
cers which  were  built  on  the  reports  of  military 
press  agents.  The  weeding  out  of  incompetents, 
a  practice  indispensable  in  the  making  of  a  vic- 
torious army,  was  prevented,  as  it  was  intended  to 
be  prevented,  by  concealing  the  shortcomings  of 
officers  who  were  to  bring  catastrophe  later. 
It  was  to  a  country  where  the  military  exercised 
such  dictatorship  that  our  General  Staff,  unaccus- 
tomed to  arbitrary  authority,  came  in  1917.  The 
officers  were  taught  how  the  allied  generals  made 
war  without  interference  from  civil  governments, 
and  even  without  unpleasant  criticism  for  such 
errors,  great  or  small,  of  mind  or  of  heart,  as 
they  should  commit.  In  unfamiliar  surroundings 
and' subject  to  foreign  and  aristocratic  influence, 
they  adopted  a  censorship  which  made  them 
despots  for  a  while,  but  which  now  leaves  them 
practically  strangers  in  their  own  land. 


THE  CRIME  OF  SILENCE  249 

In  the  rules  for  censors  one  finds  very  little  re- 
garding the  publication  of  information  valuable 
to  the  enemy.  That  phase  had  been  accepted  as 
axiomatic  for  a  long  time  by  our  civil  as  well  as 
by  our  military  population.  But  criticism  of  any 
kind  was  forbidden;  all  mention  of  shortcomings 
of  whatever  nature  was  prohibited ;  any  reference 
to  the  achievements  or  valor  of  individuals,  how- 
soever insignificant,  was  not  permitted.  In  ad- 
dition, it  was  verbally  explained  to  the  censors 
that  nobody  was  to  get  **any  advertising." 

Whether  this  course  was  forced  upon  the  Ameri- 
can military  authorities  by  the  Washington  ad- 
ministration to  prevent  a  future  presidential  can- 
didate from  rising  in  the  expeditionary  forces,  or 
was  fathered  by  the  high  ranking  officers  to  pre- 
vent any  Grant  or  Sheridan  from  appearing,  I 
have  not  learned.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  ft 
succeeded  in  both  directions.  No  man  from  the 
expeditionary  forces  is  considered  for  the  presi- 
dency ;  and  we  do  not  know  of  an  officer  who  served 
overseas  that  demonstrated  his  ability  to  com- 
mand an  army  without  the  assistance  of  French 
staff  officers. 


250  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

In  its  effect,  our  censorship  was  more  severe 
than  that  of  the  English  or  the  French.  The 
French  soldiers  were  allowed  to  write  letters  un- 
hindered by  censorship,  and  both  the  English  and 
French  soldiers  returned  home  periodically  on 
leaves  of  absence  or  furloughs,  carrying  by  word 
of  mouth  what  the  English  were  forbidden  to  put 
on  paper.  Americans,  of  course,  could  not  return 
home  for  visits,  and  they  were  no  more  allowed 
to  write  their  opinions  from  leave  areas  than  they 
were  when  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 

No  sooner  had  the  censorship  rules  been  put 
into  effect  than  they  were  regretted.  General 
Pershing  and  his  staff  were  strongly  opposed  to 
the  War  Department's  method  of  selecting  gen- 
erals, and  would  have  welcomed  newspaper  sup- 
port to  help  them  weed  out  the  incompetents. 
They  regretted  it  more  at  the  end  of  1917,  when  the 
little  army  in  France  was  short  of  supplies  and 
short  of  food,  and  when  a  request  was  refused  by 
the  War  Department  that  newspaper  correspond- 
ents be  allowed  to  cable  home  about  the  shortage 
of  supplies  in  order  to  stimulate  production  and 
transportation.    Later  in  the  war,  partly  because 


THE  CRIME  OF  SILENCE  251 

of  pressure  coming  from  below,  from  journalists 
and  from  home,  the  rigidity  of  the  censorship 
rules  was  relaxed;  but  to  the  end  it  remained  a 
blanket  on  initiative,  a  snuffer  on  brilliancy  and 
a  camouflage  for  incompetents. 

Censorship  eventually  became  a  disease  in  every 
belligerent  country — the  more  virulent,  the  more 
effective.  In  America  it  merely  held  back  supplies 
and  kept  down  ability.  In  England,  besides  that, 
it  delayed  the  raising  of  troops  and  maintained  in- 
competents in  high  command  throughout  the  war. 
In  France  it  almost  brought  defeat  during  the 
Spring  of  1917.  Had  it  not  been  removed  by 
Premier  Clemenceau  upon  his  ascent  to  power  it 
certainly  would  have  brought  about  a  collapse  of 
France  in  the  spring  of  1918,  when  the  Germans, 
in  an  irresistible  flow,  were  apparently  approach- 
ing the  city  of  Paris  and  when  the  falling  of  *^Big 
Berthas''  in  the  streets  gave  the  impression  that 
the  Kaiser's  guns  were  much  closer  than  was  the 
case. 

Censorship  was  a  vigorous  element  in  the  wreck 
of  Russia ;  and  censorship  was  largely  responsible 
for  the  breakdown  of  morale  in  Germany.    Un- 


252  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

questionably  it  was  proven  by  this  war  that  tbe 
evils  o£  an  absolutely  unrestricted  press  are  not 
so  dangerous  to  victory  as  a  medieval  censorship 
which  oppresses  all  armies  and  all  the  peoples  be- 
hind them. 

In  our  forthcoming  military  legislation  one  of 
the  most  thoroughly  considered  sections  should  be 
that  governing  relations  between  press  and  army. 
We  must,  of  course,  keep  from  the  enemy  all  in- 
formation of  a  military  nature.  Likewise,  we 
must  put  it  beyond  the  temptation  of  any  man  to 
indulge  the  stultifying,  lying  suppression  that 
characterized  every  army  in  th^  late  war. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  ONLY  SOLUTION 

We  have  finished  another  war  in  which  our 
soldiers  suffered  unnecessary  losses  and  hard- 
ships because  of  our  failure  to  prepare,  while  the 
country  at  large  has  suffered  almost  nothing  and 
the  congressmen  and  the  president  who  failed  to 
prepare  for  the  war  have  suffered  not  at  all. 

It  is,  therefore,  difficult  to  establish  a  military 
policy  based  on  the  lessons  of  the  war.  Congress 
cannot  be  expected  to  understand  the  subject.  Our 
only  hope  lies  in  the  formation  of  a  sound  doctrine 
which  will  be  accepted  by  the  public  and  by  its 
representatives. 

This  is  rendered  difficult  by  the  fact  that  few 
Americans  saw  more  than  one  phase  of  the  fight- 
ing in  which  an  American  army  took  part.  The 
American  army,  in  turn,  saw  only  a  small  part  of 
the  war,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  American 
army  was  not  engaged  until  the  height  of  German 
power  had  passed. 

253 


254  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Our  difficulty  is  increased  by  the  fact  that  all 
governments  in  the  war  have  strained  themselves 
to  falsify  its  every  phase  and  to  mislead  public 
opinion,  supposedly  in  the  interest  of  a  national 
morale,  but  really  in  that  of  the  heads  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

It  is  necessary,  therefore,  in  this  work  to  out- 
line the  course  of  the  war  as  it  actually  took  place. 
Space  will  not  permit  proof  of  the  statements. 
They  are  true,  however,  and  controversy  about 
them  can  only  result  in  establishing  their  accu- 
racy. 

Long  before  war  started  all  the  parties  involved 
contemplated  the  possibility  of  Germany's  attack- 
ing France  through  Belgium.  Books  had  been 
published  about  it  in  all  European  languages.  The 
French,  English  and  Belgians  were  not  surprised 
by  a  ^  *  grave  breach  of  international  law. ' '  They 
had  held  military  conferences  for  some  years  in 
contemplation  of  just  such  an  action.  Besides,  in 
similar  situations,  all  the  allies  had  done  what 
Germany  did. 

The  conduct  of  the  allied  and  of  the  German 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  256 

armies  alike  was  based  on  military,  not  on  moral, 
considerations. 

In  time  of  peace  Frenchmen  served  three  years 
in  the  army,  Germans  only  two ;  therefore,  France 
had  half  again  as  large  a  percentage  of  her  popu- 
lation with  the  colors  as  did  Germany.  The  rela- 
tive strength  of  the  French  army  to  the  German 
must  therefore  be  stronger  at  the  outset  of  the 
war  than  after  all  available  reserves  on  both  sides 
had  been  called  to  the  colors.  For  this  reason, 
and  for  reasons  of  tactical  theory,  the  French 
high  command  planned  to  fight  a  decisive  battle 
with  Germany  at  the  first  possible  moment,  and 
therefore  moved  to  the  attack  immediately  after 
the  declaration  of  war  by  the  most  direct  line, 
which  was  across  the  French-German  frontier. 

To  Germany,  also,  a  speedy  decision  was  im- 
perative, as  the  German  plan  was  first  to  over- 
whelm France  and  then  to  turn  upon  Russia.  The 
German  high  command  did  not  believe  in  the 
efiScacy  of  frontal  assault.  Therefore,  it  opposed 
the  French  advance  with  troops  entrenched  in 
previously  prepared  positions,  and  turned   the 


^56  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

French  left  flank  by  the  great  march  through  Bel- 
gium. 

The  number  of  troops  employed  by  the  Germans 
on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  French,  English  and 
Belgians  on  the  other,  were  not  disproportionate. 

What  is  known  to  the  English  as  the  battle  of 
Mons,  and  also  widely  known  as  the  battle  of 
Charleroi,  was  a  very  great  battle,  extending  from 
the  Alps  to  Belgium,  in  which  the  Germans  won  a 
great  victory  all  along  the  line.  After  this  vic- 
tory the  Germans  sent  three  of  the  army  corps 
from  their  right  flank  to  East  Prussia,  and  with 
the  remainder  of  the  army  pursued  the  defeated 
allies. 

On  September  6th  the  French  army,  with  its 
English  assistants,  faced  about  and  in  the  follow- 
ing three  days  fought  the  battle  of  the  Marne, 
which  prevented  the  loss  of  the  war.  It  was  not 
a  victory,  however,  that  was  at  all  decisive  against 
the  Germans,  who  retired  to  the  north  of  the  Eiver 
Aisne,  where  they  in  turn  repulsed  all  Anglo- 
French  attacks. 

The  next  move  in  the  campaign  on  the  western 
front  was  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  allies  to 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  257 

turn  the  German  right  flank,  which,  being  met  by 
German  reinforcements,  led  to  the  well  known 
race  to  the  sea. 

The  purpose  of  each  army  was  to  turn  the  flank 
of  its  enemy  and  to  destroy  him.  In  this  both 
sides  failed.  Neither  side  intended  a  stabilization 
of  the  front  nor  was  either  side  content  with  the 
line  which  actually  became  fixed.  The  allies  would 
have  wished  to  hold  at  least  Lille  and  Antwerp, 
cutting  the  Germans  from  the  Channel,  wlule  the 
German  desire  would  have  been  to  reach  the 
French  seacoast  as  far  south  as  Abbeville. 

From  a  tactical  point  of  view,  then,  the  war  in 
the  west  in  1914  was  a  deadlock.  From  a  strategic 
point  of  view,  however,  it  was  a  great  German 
defeat,  as  Germany  had  planned  to  destroy  France 
in  sixty  days. 

The  lesson  for  us  in  this  campaign  is  that  the 
French  army,  trained  but  untried  by  war,  after 
meeting  a  severe  defeat,  was  able  to  retreat  all 
along  the  line,  in  some  places  more  than  a  hundred 
miles,  face  around,  and  win  a  battle  upon  which 
their  national  existence  depended;  that  the  Ger- 
mans could  maneuver  an  army  of  equal  size  in 


^58  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

accordance  with  the  military  principles  of  encircle- 
ment, brushing  aside  the  untrained  Belgian  army 
like  chaff,  win  a  great  battle,  pursue  a  brave  and 
skillful  enemy  into  the  heart  of  his  country,  then, 
defeated  in  pitched  battle,  retire  to  a  strong 
position  and  check  all  pursuit;  that  England 
could,  upon  a  moment's  notice,  ship  sixty  thou- 
sand men  across  the  Channel,  trained  and 
equipped  for  war,  munition  them,  supply  them, 
and  constantly  reenforce  them  during  months  of 
hard  fighting. 

Compare  this  with  the  two  American  armies  at 
Bull  Eun  a  half  century  before,  where  both 
armies  of  untrained  men  ran  away  from  each 
other;  with  the  war  with  Spain  when  our  men 
died  like  flies  in  camps  at  home ;  with  the  Mexican 
fiasco  of  1916,  when  for  months  our  men  could  not 
be  moved  a  day's  march  from  camp  or  even  sup- 
plied or  armed  in  camp. 

"Warfare  on  an  even  greater  scale  was  waged  in 
the  east.  Although  the  French  had  not  tried  to 
fight  on  the  defensive  while  waiting  for  Eussia 
to  mobilize,  still  after  the  early  French  defeats 
Russia  made  a  great  effort  to  relieve  the  pressure 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION^  259 

on  the  western  front  by  a  hasty  and  half  organized 
invasion  of  East  Prussia.  This  diversion  was  suc- 
cessful in  drawing  three  army  corps  from  the 
German  army  just  before  the  battle  of  the  Marne, 
but  was  itself  roughly  handled. 

The  battle  of  Tannenburg,  or  the  battles  of  the 
Mazurian  Lakes,  as  they  are  popularly  called, 
were  not  great  battles,  nor  were  the  losses  of  the 
Russians  heavy  in  either  men  or  armament.  There 
grew  up  in  Germany,  however,  a  need  for  a  victory 
to  offset  the  disappointment  of  the  campaign  in 
the  west,  and  so  the  '* victory"  of  Hindenburg  was 
created  large  in  fiction. 

The  great  battle  in  1914,  the  most  nearly  de- 
cisive battle  of  the  whole  war,  was  the  battle  east 
of  Lemberg,  in  which  the  Russian  army  totally 
defeated  and  almost  destroyed  the  Austrian  army. 

Thereafter,  the  Russians  attempted  an  invasion 
of  Germany  through  Silesia.  This  was  defeated 
by  a  combination  of  German  and  Austrian  armies, 
after  which  fighting  on  a  large  scale  took  place 
backward  and  foi-ward  across  East  Prussia,  Po- 
land and  Galicia,  the  Germans  generally  having 


260  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

the  best  of  the  Russians,  and  the  Russians  ahnost 
invariably  defeating  the  Austrians. 

It  is  important  to  appreciate  that  in  1914  Rus- 
sia was  the  most  powerful  and  chivalrous  of  the 
allies,  as  she  not  only  fought  her  immediate  oppo- 
nents, but  more  than  once  lent  aid  to  France  and 
England  by  launching  attacks  which  drew  German 
troops  from  their  fronts  at  times  of  great  allied 
distress. 

The  lessons  to  Americans  from  this  campaign, 
in  addition  to  the  readiness  of  all  armies  to  ma- 
neuver and  the  ability  of  all  their  higher  com- 
manders and  staffs  from  the  outset  to  perform 
their  duties,  is  the  way  Austria,  having  lost  one 
great  army,  was  quickly  able  to  produce  another 
from  among  her  trained  reserves.  Surely,  if  any 
one  of  the  chief  contending  nations — France,  Ger- 
many, Russia  and  Austria — ^had  not  been  organ- 
ized on  the  principles  of  universal  service,  that 
country  would  have  been  overwhelmed  in  the  first 
year  of  war. 

When  winter  brought  an  end  to  the  fighting  it 
was  seen  that  th^  opposing  countries  had  been  so 
evenly  matched  that  neither  side  had  been  able 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  261 

to  win  the  decisive  victory  which  had  been  sought 
by  all.  Germany,  as  the  leading  advocate  of  quick 
and  decisive  warfare,  was,  therefore,  considered 
the  loser  in  the  resulting  deadlock.  If  France  and 
Eussia  had  been  able  to  stand  off  Germany  on  her 
0"v\Ti  terms  in  a  war  started  upon  her  own  initia- 
tive, it  was  reasoned,  the  addition  of  England's 
army  in  the  making  would  surely  prove  decisive 
in  1915.    This  argument  proved  faulty. 

In  1915  England's  army  was  not  ready  to  func- 
tion, while  Eussia 's  army  had  exhausted  its  am- 
munition supplies.  Eussia  was  well  prepared  for 
war  in  1914  in  trained  men,  in  technical  equip- 
ment, in  skillful  generals,  and  in  arsenals  full  of 
ammunition,  but  back  of  the  army  there  was  not 
an  organized  civilization  which  in  the  other  coun- 
tries, especially  Germany  and  France,  could  make 
up  the  wastage  of  war  supplies. 

In  May,  1915,  therefore,  while  the  French  with 
the  support  of  the  half-trained  British  formations 
stormed  helplessly  against  the  German  line  in  a 
number  of  heroic  and  useless  battles  that  need 
not  be  enumerated  here,  the  Germans  and  Aus- 
trians  concentrated  against  the  Eussian  army  and 


262  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

broke  the  Russian  line  again  and  again  and  pur- 
sued the  defeated  but  stubborn  Russians  beyond 
the  frontier  of  old  Russia.  Nothing  in  military 
history  is  more  glorious  than  the  grim  determina- 
tion with  which  the  old  Russian  army  fought  with 
empty  pieces  against  the  overwhelming  storm  of 
shot  and  shell  poured  on  them  by  their  enemies. 

In  that  year  Russian  regiments  contained  a  per- 
centage of  unarmed  men  who  had  to  be  clothed 
and  supplied  and  exposed  to  enemy  fire  but  could 
not  be  used  until  they  had  picked  up  rifles  dropped 
by  stricken  comrades. 

I  remember  a  conversation  with  General  Brusi- 
loff  shortly  before  the  German  attack  at  the  Duna- 
jec  river  in  May,  1915.  I  had  been  visiting  his 
front  line  in  the  Carpathians,  and  in  particular 
had  witnessed  an  attack  by  Russian  infantry  on 
Austrians  holding  the  top  of  a  low  precipice.  The 
Russians  had  climbed  a  long  steep  slope  and  had 
dug  a  shallow  trench  at  the  base  of  the  cliff.  From 
this  shelter  they  emerged  several  times  in  a  vain 
attempt  to  escalade  the  heights,  being  slaughtered 
by  machine  gun  and  rifle  fire. 

I  mentioned  this  incident  to  General  Brusiloff 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  ft6S 

and  suggested  that  while  the  Austrian  position 
was  practically  impregnable  against  infantry  as- 
sault, it  was  particularly  vulnerable  to  artillery 
attack  in  that  it  afforded  no  shelter  from  explod- 
ing shells  and  could  not  be  fortified  without  great 
time  and  labor.  The  general  dismissed  the  sug- 
gestion somewhat  impatiently.  Said  he:  **Men 
and  munitions  may  be  used  interchangeably.  I 
haven 't  any  munitions.    I  must  use  men. ' ' 

"What  a  furore  such  a  speech  would  arouse  if 
made  by  an  American  general  I  And  yet  our 
policy  is  not  very  different.  War  can  be  waged 
with  the  loss  of  a  few  well-trained  men  or  of  many 
slightly  trained  men.  Our  Congress  has  deliber- 
ately chosen  the  latter  method  throughout  our 
history.  Three-fourths  of  the  men  killed  in  the 
Argonne  and  elsewhere  in  France  were  killed  by 
Americans;  only  one-quarter  were  killed  by  the 
Germans ! 

In  the  same  year  (September-December,  1915)' 
German,  Austrian  and  Bulgarian  troops,  under 
German  command,  destroyed  Serbia  and  occupied 
its  territory.  In  this  year,  also,  Italy  joined  the 
alliance  and  from  then  on  conducted  against  Aus- 


^64!  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

tria  a  secondary  war,  not  without  effect  on  the 
final  outcome. 

In  1916  the  western  front  became  the  center  of 
importance  for  the  first  time  since  the  battle  of 
the  Marne.  The  English  army,  always  increasing 
and  improving,  and  the  French  army,  reaching 
higher  and  higher  development  in  its  technique, 
were  preparing  for  a  vast  combined  offensive. 

In  order  to  anticipate  them  the  Germans  at- 
tacked Verdun  in  great  force  in  February  while 
the  plans  for  the  Franco-British  offensive  were 
still  incomplete. 

If  the  campaign  of  1914  on  the  western  front 
was  substantially  a  campaign  between  the  German 
and  French  armies,  the  battle  of  Verdun  was 
bought  entirely  by  Germans  and  Frenchmen.  No 
allied  troops  appeared  on  either  side.  The  two 
trained  armies  of  the  two  military  nations  en- 
gaged in  the  greatest  battle  of  history  and  ended 
in  deadlock  when  the  Franco-British  attack  on  the 
Somme  forced  the  discontinuance  of  the  German 
assaults  at  Verdun. 

It  must  be  noted  by  all,  in  spite  of  any  national 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  265 

pride,  that  only  when  attacking  the  French  have 
the  Germans  been  stopped. 

They  broke  the  Russian  line  in  the  spring  of 
1915  (May-September),  and  the  Serbian  line  that 
fall  (September-December).  A  handful  of  Ger- 
man divisions  cut  the  Italian  defenses  like  a  thun- 
derbolt in  the  autumn  of  1917,  and  the  Germans 
smashed  through  the  British  army  in  the  spring 
of  1917.  American  troops  have  resisted  their  on- 
set, but  under  command  of  skilled  and  experi- 
enced French  generals. 

The  year  1916,  which  saw  Roumania  overrun, 
also  saw  a  revival  of  the  Russian  army,  due  to  the 
arrival  of  the  French  and  English-made  artillery 
and  ammunition  and  a  brilliant  Russian  offensive 
xmder  Brusiloff  which  until  1918  was  considered 
the  best  coordinated  attack  effected  by  allied 
troops. 

It  was  fear  of  this  Russian  revival,  as  well  as 
of  the  increasing  British  army  and  the  develop- 
ment of  French  tactics  and  materiel  which  deter- 
mined Germany  to  enter  upon  the  unrestricted 
submarine  campaign  which  brought  about  her  de- 
feat. 


^66  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

The  Russian  army,  often  victorious,  more  often 
defeated,  never  lost  its  power  of  resistance  nor  its 
promise  of  further  aggression.  It  was  at  home 
that  Russia  collapsed.  The  Russian  people,  suf- 
fering from  the  horrors  of  the  war,  broke  into  re- 
bellion, which  rapidly  descended  into  anarchy, 
and  took  Russia  out  of  the  war  and  of  civilization. 

The  course  of  America's  timely  intervention 
and  the  war  in  the  main  theater  have  been  re- 
counted elsewhere.  Our  help  was  the  main  factor 
in  the  decision,  but  other  important  incidents  must 
not  be  ignored. 

In  June  of  1918  the  Austrians,  this  time  without 
the  aid  of  German  troops,  attacked  the  Italian, 
French  and  English  forces  along  the  Piave.  The 
Italians  had  been  much  strengthened  in  munitions 
and  equipment  by  their  allies,  their  morale  had 
been  built  up  and  French  officers  had  tactfully 
imparted  a  considerable  amount  of  military 
knowledge. 

The  Austrian  attack  after  some  local  successes 
broke  down.  The  morale^of  the  Austrian  people 
had  suffered  severely  during  the  winter  and  in- 
fected the  army,  which  in  October  broke  into  a 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  267 

wild  and  disastrous  rout,  taking  Austria  out  of 
the  war. 

In  September  the  line  of  the  Central  Powers  in 
Macedonia  was  broken.  Adopting  the  tactics 
successfully  employed  ]by  the  Germans  on  the 
Piave  the  year  before,  the  French  commander-in- 
chief  concentrated  French  troops  and  French  ar- 
tillery and  with  them  broke  a  hole  through  the 
Bulgarian  line.  The  Serbian  army,  which  was 
not  sufficiently  trained  to  effect  this  complicated 
maneuver,  was  especially  well  qualified  for  the 
arduous  pursuit,  being  familiar  with  the  country, 
hardy,  and  used  to  meager  fare. 

The  Austro-German-Bulgarian-Turkish  army 
was  never  rallied. 

Bulgaria  sued  for  peace  on  September  26th 
and  Turkey  followed  on  October  28th. 

•The  question  has  been  raised  as  to  the  realness 
of  this  battle.  It  has  been  suggested  that  Bul- 
garia asked  for  an  excuse  to  quit.  Time  will  bring 
out  full  information  on  that  point.  It  need  only 
be  observed  here  that  the  morale  of  a  country  at 
war  is  as  much  a  part  of  its  fighting  eflSciency  as 
is  its  artillery. 


268  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

Staggered  by  the  defection  of  her  allies  and  the 
defeat  of  her  armies,  Germany's  morale  collapsed 
and  she  in  turn  fell  into  anarchy.  Tlie  sailors  of 
the  fleet  refused  to  put  to  sea  on  October  21st. 
Their  revolt  rapidly  spread.  The  revolution 
might  have  been  checked  if  troops  had  been  sent 
from  the  front  for  this  purpose,  but  no  troops 
could  be  spared  from  before  the  unceasing  attacks 
of  the  American  army. 

The  revolution  succeeded,  and  in  consequence 
the  army  at  the  front  no  longer  could  be  supplied 
and  was  compelled  to  accept  any  terms  which  the 
allies  saw  fit  to  offer. 

From  this  we  must  draw  an  additional  lesson : 
that  a  popular  government  at  home  is  necessary 
to  support  the  bravest  army  at  the  front. 

France  suffered  more  than  Germany;  France 
suffered  more  than  Eussia. 

From  September,  1914,  until  August,  1918,  the 
life  of  the  French  republic  hung  by  a  thread.  There 
were  murmurings;  there  were  plots;  but  never 
did  the  nation  fail  to  support  its  marvelous  mili- 
tary machine. 

In  this  war  there  were  but  two  armies  of  the 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  269 

first  class,  the  French  and  the  German.  The 
Russian,  American,  English,  Italian  and  other 
armies  trailed  along  after  them;  in  which  par- 
ticular order  does  not  matter.  The  French  and 
the  Germans  were  about  an  equal  match  in  the 
field.  It  was  the  superiority  of  the  French  at 
home,  the  result  of  popular  institutions,  that 
achieved  the  victory. 

Equal  at  the  front  and  stronger  at  the  rear, 
France  offers  the  complete  model  for  national 
defense. 

German  writers  have  dwelt  at  great  length  upon 
the  aid  they  were  forced  to  render  the  Austrians, 
aid  both  in  troops  and  generalship.  Sufficient 
stress  has  not  been  given  to  the  aid  lent  by  France 
to  her  allies. 

During  1914  French  generals  practically  com- 
manded the  British  army.  In  the  years  following 
the  British  withdrew  from  beneath  French  con- 
trol and  suffered  heavily  for  their  national  ego- 
tism. They  accomplished  no  military  successes 
and,  on  the  contrary,  had  to  be  rescued  several 
times  by  the  French  from  predicaments  into 
which  their  inexperienced  officers  had  led  them. 


270  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

It  was  French  generalsliip,  in  addition  to  French 
and  English  materiel  help,  which  reorganized  the 
Italian  army  along  the  Piave  after  its  defeat  at 
Caporetto,  and  French  staff  officers  as  well  as 
French  artillerymen  organized  the  Italian  army 
for  the  campaign  of  1918. 

Our  own  army,  of  course,  was  formed  on  the 
French  model  and  briefly  trained  in  the  French 
school.  Its  most  brilliant  successes  were  achieved 
under  French  generals  and  its  most  bitter  failures 
came  when  French  advice  was  disregarded. 

This  fact  must  be  accepted  before  a  proper 
military  policy  can  be  found.  It  is  a  dose  which 
will  not  be  swallowed  without  effort.  We  admit 
readily  that  the  greatest  schools  of  architecture, 
of  art,  of  acting,  and  of  music  are  in  Europe.  Be- 
fore the  war  no  doctor  denied  that  a  medical  edu- 
cation was  incomplete  without  a  course  in  Berlin 
or  Vienna.  We  approached  Europe  more  closely 
in  all  these  arts  than  we  did  in  the  art  of  war,  and 
yet  we  find  individual  and  national  difficulty  in  ad- 
mitting our  obvious  military  shortcomings. 

Why  is  it? 

It  is  because  fighting  is  the  primeval  purpose 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  «T1 

of  the  male.  In  modem  times,  when  fighting  be- 
comes necessary  only  once  in  a  lifetime  instead  of 
every  day,  the  urgency  is  no  less  great.  The  fact 
that  it  is  the  male  mission  is  as  true  as  in  the  stono 
age. 

Women  have  entered  all  forms  of  industry,  of 
all  the  arts  and  the  sciences.  They  play  an  in- 
creasing part  in  government,  so  long  a  masculine 
monopoly.  From  war  only  do  they  shrink.  Here 
men  stand  alone,  the  preservers,  the  admired  of 
women.  Here  they  glory  in  their  masculinity  and 
resent  any  suggestion  that  the  males  of  another 
race  can  excel  them  even  in  technique. 

Of  this  our  lawmakers  are  ever  conscious.  They 
may  not  think  that  every  man  is  a  soldier  but  they 
know  that  every  man  is  a  voter.  Hence  the  bla- 
tant oratory,  the  misleading  question:  *^How  do 
you  account  for  the  fact  that  our  boys  after  three 
months  are  better  soldiers  than  the  veterans  of 
Germany  f 

The  fact  is  they  were  not.  **Our  boys"  did  not 
fight  in  this  war.  Kegiments  of  soldiers  of  a  year 
or  more  training  fought.  Their  efficiency  varied 
in  direct  ratio  to  the  length  of  their  training,  ex- 


272  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

cept  as  modified  by  exceptionally  capable  or  no- 
toriously inefficient  commanders.  ''Our  boys" 
never  fought  well  in  any  war.  The  civilian  cannot 
endure  the  battle.  A  complete  metamorphosis 
must  take  place  to  turn  the  civilian  into  the  sol- 
dier. Many  times  must  a  man  overcome  the  fear 
of  death  in  his  imagination  before  he  can  rise 
triumphant  over  it  on  the  battlefield. 

It  was  *'our  boys''  who  broke  on  both  sides  at 
Bull  Run.  It  was  ' '  soldiers ' '  that  would  not  give 
way  on  either  side  in  the  "Wilderness. 

The  Great  Division  lost  twenty-one  prisoners 
in  a  little  trench  raid  in  October  of  1917  while  still 
untrained  and  but  eleven  more  during  all  the  great 
battles  that  followed. 

The  steeled  soul  is  not  all  in  war.  The  efficient 
private  is  a  skilled  workman,  and  each  step  up- 
ward in  a  military  hierarchy  demands  an  increase 
of  knowledge  in  geometric  progression. 

Just  as  misleading  as  to  say  that  our  boys  are 
bom  soldiers  is  it  to  suggest  that  our  officers  are 
bom  commanders.  Practice  is  as  necessary  as 
study  to  develop  their  abilities  and  to  permit 
selection  for  important  posts.    This  our  old  army 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  273 

did  not  permit,  and  in  consequence  onr  soldiers 
were  not  led  with  the  same  skill  as  those  of  the 
French  and  the  Germans.  Indeed,  the  advantage 
which  the  American  regular  officer  held  over  the 
National  Guard  officer  in  opportunity  to  become 
proficient  in  the  art  of  war  was  less  than  the  ad- 
vantage the  French  officer  held  over  him.  We 
suffered  as  a  consequence. 

It  is  putting  the  case  conservatively  to  state  that 
throughout  the  army  the  French  of  any  grade 
were  the  peers  in  military  skill  of  the  Americans 
of  the  next  higher  grade.  The  French  private 
knew  as  much  as  the  American  noncom;  the 
French  noncom  as  the  American  company  officer; 
the  French  company  officer  as  the  American  field 
officer,  and  the  French  field  officer  as  the  American 
general. 

So  excellent  was  French  discipline  that  civilians 
and  thick-headed  professional  soldiers  did  not 
recognize  it.  French  troops  on  the  march  looked 
like  a  mob  as  compared  to  Americans  or  English. 
They  were  merely  traveling  in  the  easiest  way 
and  could  be  formed  in  seconds.  But  American 
or  English  raw  troops  allowed  such  latitude  would 


274  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

liave  become  a  mob.  So  in  battle.  French  soldiers 
would  be  found  wandering  all  over,  bnt  they 
were  on  substantial  purpose  bent  and  returned  to 
their  commands.  Well  trained  troops  can  do 
things  and  be  given  liberties  impossible  to  new 
formations. 

The  French  had  no  officer  caste  dispute.  All 
their  officers  were  chosen  from  among  the  whole 
people  by  examination,  many  of  them  from  the 
ranks ;  they  were  then  given  a  complete  education 
in  the  duties  of  company  officers. 

There  was  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  who  was  the 
better  man,  officer  or  private.  The  private  readily 
rendered  obedience ;  the  officer  had  no  need  to  pro- 
tect his  authority  by  aloofness. 

But  the  greatest  superiority  of  all  was  the 
superiority  of  the  French  civil  government  over 
the  American  civil  government.  In  none  of  the 
crises  of  the  war  did  the  French  civil  government 
fail;  not  when  Von  Kluck  approached  Paris  in 
1914  nor  when  the  French  army  was  bleeding  to 
death  on  the  walls  of  Verdun,  or  when  Nivelle's 
offensive  failed,  or  when  the  German  wave  almost 
submerged  the  allies'  defense  in  the  Spring  and 


THE  ONLY  SOLUTION  275 

Summer  of  1918.  The  French  civil  administration 
understood  war  and  the  French  people  under- 
stood war. 

We  scattered  our  energies  into  a  myriad  of 
civilian  pursuits — construction  of  unnecessary 
training  camps,  tremendous  building  of  docks  and 
warehouses.  We  had  the  surplus  energy  to  spare 
and  we  had  a  minor  part  to  play.  France  had 
neither,  but  she  knew  self  defense  as  a  nation  and 
threw  her  full  strength  upon  the  enemy. 

It  is  a  sophistry  of  ours  to  say  that  **man  for 
man,  ship  for  ship,  our  navy  is  the  equal  of  any 
in  the  world,''  as  though  a  man  or  a  ship  means 
anything  in  a  naval  battle.  We  also  salve  indeci- 
sion with  the  statement  that  **our  regular  army 
for  its  size  is  as  good  as  any  army  in  the  world.  *' 
That  is  not  true.  Our  small  army  was  never 
trained  as  an  army.  Our  generals  were  never 
exercised  in  the  command  of  the  full  number  of 
our  troops.  No  effort  had  ever  been  made  to  clean 
out  the  incompetents  among  the  generals  as  Joffre 
cleaned  out  the  incompetent  generals  two  years 
before  the  outbreak  of  war. 


276  THE  ARMY  OF  1918 

There  is  only  one  way  to  have  a  good  army  and 
that  is  to  have  every  man  a  soldier. 

Then  each  one  will  be  exalted  in  the  sense  of  his 
manhood. 

Each  father  will  understand  the  demands  npon 
his  son ;  each  manufacturer  will  know  for  what  he 
is  building;  each  congressman  will  understand 
about  what  he  is  legislating.  The  military  man 
will  be  judged  by  a  comprehending  public  and 
there  will  be  no  room  for  him  to  seek  advancement 
by  playing  upon  the  misapprehensions  of  a  civil 
constituency. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE,  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  50  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $t.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


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